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Environmental Groups and Legal Expertise explores the use and understanding of law 
and legal expertise by environmental groups. Rather than the usual focus on the court 
room, it scrutinises environmental NGO advocacy during the extraordinarily dramatic 
Brexit process, from the referendum on leaving the EU in June 2016 to the debate around 
the new Environment Bill in the first half of 2020.
There is generally a weak understanding of both the complexity and the potential of legal 
expertise in the environmental NGO community. Legal expertise can be more than a 
tool for campaigners, and more than litigation: it provides distinctive ways of both seeing 
the world and changing the world. The available legal resource in the sector is not just a 
practical limit on what can be done, but spills into the very understanding of what should 
be done, and what resource is needed. Mutually reinforcing links between capacity, 
understanding, culture and investment affect legal expertise across the board.
There are, however, pockets of sophisticated legal expertise in the community, and legal 
expertise was heavily and often effectively used in the anomalously law-heavy Brexit-
environment debate. The ability to call on thinly spread legal expertise in a crisis was in 
part due to effective NGO collaboration around Brexit-environment.
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Chapter 1 Law and legal expertise for Brexit-environment: 
scope, meaning and method
Our purpose in this book is to explore the ways in which environmental 
NGOs use and understand law and legal expertise. We scrutinise the 
activity of environmental groups through a case study of Brexit’s 
environmental implications, and the development of the UK Environment 
Bill, especially Part 1 of the Bill, entitled ‘Environmental Governance’. 
Part 1 was developed expressly in response to the enormous impact of 
leaving the EU on UK environmental law. Although we conclude that 
Brexit created special opportunities and demands for legal expertise, our 
detailed analysis of this unusually law-heavy, and anomalously politically 
open, case study provides rich lessons on what NGOs ‘do’ with legal 
expertise, and why, and what legal expertise might do for them.
We set the scene for the rest of this book in chapter 1, outlining 
issues that underpin subsequent discussions, from the diversity of the 
environmental NGO sector in the UK, and the characteristics of key 
groups such as Greener UK, to the theoretical material developed in 
later chapters. Our work is based on literature review, the analysis of 
documents published by environmental NGOs, and semi-structured 
interviews with 17 individuals from different backgrounds who were 
engaged with the Brexit-environment debate.
Chapter 2 NGOs, lobbying and legal mobilisation
Lobbying and advocacy, terms which we use interchangeably to mean 
direct interactions with decision-makers, have been the main approach to 
the Brexit-environment debate by environmental NGOs. In this chapter, 
we provide insights into the complex and wide-ranging literature on 
NGOs, lobbying and their use of law (‘legal mobilisation’).
A number of important factors shape NGO activity. The literature 
on ‘political opportunity’ explores the multitude of factors external to an 
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environmental group that influence its approach to social change. It 
focuses especially on those factors that determine the space for NGOs 
in decision-making fora, and the receptivity of decision-makers to NGO 
demands. The concept of ‘legal opportunity’ emerged from the political 
opportunity literature to embrace important features of the legal, 
political and social environment, which either limit or incentivise legal 
mobilisation. As we explore further in chapter 3, environmental NGOs 
have been operating in a complex and ever-changing web of political 
opportunities during our period of study.
Factors internal to the NGO movement are also crucial in shaping 
NGO activity and impact. Drawing on our interview data, we argue that 
legal expertise is thinly dispersed across the sector (with the obvious 
exception of ClientEarth), partly because of the financial cost of legal 
expertise. Organisational identity, ideas and values are also important 
to the availability and use of legal expertise in the environmental NGO 
community. An organisation’s understanding of itself, and of law, is 
likely to be reflected in investment (or not) in law. In a self-perpetuating 
cycle, investment in legal resource determines the legal expertise in an 
organisation, which reverberates in the understanding of law, back to 
how much investment is thought necessary.
Chapter 3 Brexit and the journey to the Environment  
Act – interrupted
Groups seeking to influence post-Brexit environmental law and policy 
have faced an extraordinarily dramatic and dynamic political context. 
In this chapter, we recount the Brexit-environment saga from the 
referendum in June 2016 to a world responding to pandemic Covid-19 
in June 2020. This period has seen three Prime Ministers, five Secretaries 
of State for the Environment and two General Elections. Government 
has veered from having no majority in parliament, to a working 
majority of 87 seats. Towards the end of our case study, Government and 
Parliament had to begin looking for new ways of working within and 
beyond Covid-19 ‘lockdown’.
We explore the political and legal opportunities available to 
environmental groups in this period, and identify hybrid political–legal 
opportunities, which are new to the literature. We highlight five elements 
of the Brexit process, overlapping and non-exhaustive, which have shaped 
the behaviour of environmental advocates: the relationship between 
parliament and executive, and the extraordinary shifts of power between 
them; the crucial legislation, and colossal amounts of government and 
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parliamentary activity necessary to exit the EU; the increasing electoral 
significance of the environment for the governing Conservative Party; 
Secretary of State Michael Gove’s adoption of a ‘Green Brexit’ rhetoric, 
underpinned by an ‘equivalence’ and ‘governance gap’ framing; the 
technically as well as politically demanding nature of Brexit.
The complex public drama of Brexit highlights the difficulties of 
generalising about NGO advocacy, but may also illuminate the use and 
appreciation of law and legal expertise more clearly than business 
as usual. Looking at our material through the lens of political, legal 
and hybrid opportunity confirms the emphasis of the literature on the 
partial shaping of NGO activities (in our case the use of law and legal 
expertise) by external factors. For much of the period of our case study, 
certainly between the two General Elections in 2017 and 2019, political 
opportunity opened doors for environmental groups, and a different set 
of opportunities would have led to different results, in terms of what 
NGOs did, what they achieved, and what we find in the rest of this book.
But political opportunity is complex. It shifts rapidly, and in 
different ways simultaneously hampers and enables environmental 
groups. Agility is crucial for environmental groups seeking to influence 
those with power.
Chapter 4 Law and legal expertise
In this chapter, we complicate our central organising concept of ‘legal 
expertise’. There are many, diverse literatures on what ‘expertise’ is, its 
strengths and weaknesses, and what experts (expertise embodied) bring 
to the table. There is also a vast literature on the legal profession, what 
(expert) lawyers do and should do. We learn from these literatures that 
‘objectivity’ is elusive, and idiosyncratic values and understandings of 
the world intrude into expert assessments. This undermines claims 
that experts are uniquely qualified to make decisions. Further, an over-
emphasis of technical legal debate may have on occasion rendered crucial 
normative disagreement around Brexit-environment inaccessible.
We do not suggest that legal arguments are more important than 
arguments based on other forms of expertise, or on values. However, 
notwithstanding pockets of impressive legal expertise in the sector, our 
research suggests an undervaluing of legal expertise by environmental 
groups, and ambivalence towards legal specialisation. The diversity 
of the ‘legal’ in the Brexit-environment debate (from environmental 
law in all its diversity, to constitutional law, to trade law, etc.) has been 
extraordinary. Lawyers and non-lawyers alike may have underestimated 
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just how difficult it is for ‘generalists’ to engage with this complexity 
and diversity.
The availability of (expert) resources and an organisation’s under-
standing of expertise are mutually reinforcing: resources are not just 
a practical limit on what expertise is available, but spill into the very 
understanding of what constitutes expertise. The expertise available 
shapes not only what NGOs do, but also what they think they ought to 
do, and hence what (expert) resources they think they need. For as long 
as legal expertise is very thinly spread across the sector, it is hard to make 
the case that more is needed.
Chapter 5 Mobilising law in practice
We have been struck by the range of activities carried out by relatively 
few legal experts across even the largest organisations. Contributing to 
shaping advocacy is far from their priority, with case work and corporate 
work dominating, and litigation playing the starring role.
Legal expertise can make a number of contributions to advocacy. 
Understanding both the detailed implications of law, and the overarching 
frameworks and institutions that govern outcomes, can provide a 
different way of seeing the world, and a different way of changing the 
world. Law and legal experts play a significant role in shaping the rules 
of the social and economic game, in determining the way things get 
done. Many of our participants emphasised the authority and power of 
legal argument and saw legal expertise in environmental groups as an 
important equaliser. Law is one of the approaches available to convince 
influential audiences, and if government and other actors use legal 
expertise, environmental NGOs must too.
Legal expertise makes limited contributions to strategy and 
leadership within environmental NGOs, playing mainly a supportive 
role. Whilst we see indications of change, it is surprising and revealing 
that our participants did not see strategic leadership as a role for legal 
expertise: this is a sophisticated and well-resourced sector, dominated 
in practice by complex regulation, and our sample of interviewees is 
sensitive to law. The relative absence of legal expertise in leadership 
resonates again with the mutually reinforcing limitations on legal 
expertise in the community. Less legal expertise in the strategic brain of 
environmental groups both contributes to and reflects a relative absence 
of highly experienced legal experts in environmental groups; and over-
stretched legal capacity feeds out of and into a relatively weak engagement 
with the need for, and importantly the potential of, legal expertise.
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Alongside a merely patchy interest in legal expertise, however, we 
have witnessed significant, skilful legal input into the public debate 
on Brexit-environment. We conclude from this that there is genuine, if 
under-developed, recognition of the importance of legal expertise, and 
that the sector impressively mustered its capacity in a crisis. Collaboration, 
discussed in the next two chapters, played a central role in that. We share 
the sense of our interviewees that legal expertise had considerable, if 
not uniquely significant, influence in the Brexit-environment debate. 
Combining this chapter’s exploration of the heavy use of law with the 
sector’s influence as a whole (chapter 7) reinforces this conclusion.
Chapter 6 Lobbying in coalition
Collaboration is an important part of our Brexit-environment story. We 
focus on Greener UK, a coalition established in 2016 with the sole 
purpose of working on the impact of Brexit on the environment. We think 
it is relatively uncontroversial to describe Greener UK as being at the 
centre of governance work on Brexit-environment. Working in coalition 
is, of course, not new to the sector. But our rich empirical data points to 
the fact that the sector’s collaboration through Greener UK has been 
different, even special.
Working in coalition can have multiple advantages. We are 
especially interested in the way that drawing on collective resource has 
not only led to an efficient pooling of legal expertise, but has also 
deepened that expertise, creating more than the sum of its parts. But 
collaboration is challenging. Although collaboration creates efficiency in 
the pooling of resources, it has its own costs: the coalition itself needs to 
be resourced. The alignment of interests can be difficult, but if a coalition 
is to achieve its aims, it is vital that its member organisations reach 
consensus on goals and approaches. NGOs often compete (for recognition, 
funding, membership, etc.), so this is no easy task and can imply 
considerable profile sacrifice for individual organisations.
Chapter 7 Greener UK: influence and collaboration
Greener UK has been a crucially important actor in the environmental 
NGO sector’s response to Brexit-environment. Our interviewees 
expressed almost unanimous, and in most cases unconditional, support 
for the work that Greener UK has done in shaping the post-Brexit 
environmental law landscape.
Identifying the ‘success’ of lobbying is extraordinarily challenging. 
Even what constitutes ‘success’ is likely to be contested. Establishing 
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causation is extremely difficult, because of the significant external 
factors, explored in earlier chapters, at play in the Brexit process, and 
because of the many other actors who contributed to the debate alongside 
environmental NGOs. Having said that, we explore the influence of 
Greener UK on the Brexit-environment debate and the development of 
the Environment Bill, drawing on both our analysis of public documents 
produced by environmental NGOs, and the subjective perceptions of 
our interviewees. Although there have been tensions and unachieved 
objectives, and their approach might be contested, Greener UK has been 
broadly successful across two dimensions.
First, many elements of the Environment Bill (arguably even the 
existence of any Bill at all) can be traced to the work of Greener UK and 
its allies. And second, Greener UK has ‘worked’ as a collaboration: holding 
together over a long and difficult period, with constant activity as a 
coalition, and constant contributions from the member organisations. 
This was a strong and recurring theme from our interview data, and we 
identify three particular features of the Greener UK collaboration that 
have contributed to this dimension of success. First, consensus around 
the broad issues associated with Brexit, and the enormous salience of 
Brexit for the sector. Second, the careful attention to the working 
relationships and trust between the individuals involved. And third, the 
direct resourcing of Greener UK itself, making individuals responsible for 
ensuring that the collaboration worked.
There is a clear appetite for collaboration in the sector. Whatever 
happens next, the lessons of Greener UK should be learned and taken 
forward.
Chapter 8 Conclusions
The heterogeneity and complexity of the area we are examining (the 
nature of the sector, the nature of the problem), and the unique 
circumstances thrown up by Brexit, mean we must be cautious about 
drawing generalisations from our case study. But the learning from this 
project can, we believe, contribute to filling significant gaps in the 
scholarship and in practical knowledge in the sector.
Three tightly related themes have emerged most strongly from our 
work. First, the political and legal opportunities around Brexit have been 
fascinating, complex and unique. Our work confirms the emphasis in the 
literature on the influence of external political features on environmental 
groups’ approaches to achieving their objectives. Second, we draw two 
ostensibly contradictory conclusions about the role of legal expertise in 
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the community. We saw intense and sophisticated rallying of expertise 
around Brexit and the Environment Bill. And yet, we observed that legal 
expertise is thinly spread in environmental NGOs, and the understanding 
of the role and complexity of legal expertise is sometimes complacent. 
These limitations may be linked in a self-perpetuating cycle with the 
sector’s internal context, especially cost and culture. Intervening to 
reduce the overstretching of legal capacity in the sector could have effects 
throughout these chains. The point would be not just to allow for more of 
the same, but to create space for more creative thinking about law and its 
contribution to the objectives of the environmental community. And 
third, a very powerful collaboration between environmental NGOs on 
Brexit has enjoyed a certain amount of success as discussed above. 
Greener UK has also had a strong impact on the use of law and legal 
expertise.
We write in strange and uncertain times. Careful and considered 
scrutiny of the Environment Bill as it continues its journey through 
Parliament is crucial, even if circumstances make that difficult. But a 
perfect Environment Act would not be the end of the story. The whole 
point of the ‘governance gap’ exercise was to provide a framework to 
assist civil society in holding the powerful to account. Using the Act will 
require yet more sustained, disciplined, careful, collaborative and at least 
partly legal work.
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Figure 1 Brexit-environment timeline, December 2015 to June 2020 
(source: authors).
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1
Law and legal expertise for  
Brexit-environment: scope,  
meaning and method
Introduction
Environmental groups are a crucial part of environmental protection 
and improvement in the UK. They are diverse in size, sector, activity and 
funding; they take a range of approaches, from protests, demonstrations, 
petitions and campaigning to formal insider lobbying; they play 
different roles, including managing nature protection sites, carrying out 
scientific research, scrutinising public and private sector behaviour, as 
well as advocating for policy and legal change. Law and legal expertise 
are important tools in the persuasive armoury of environmental groups. 
Our main aim in this monograph is to enhance our understanding of the 
ways in which environmental groups use (or do not use) law and legal 
expertise in their public advocacy around environmental protection. 
Our interest in legal expertise and the role of law is broader than much of 
the social movement literature: we focus on legislation-making over 
case-making, and on the ways in which advocates of social and legal 
change use their knowledge of legal norms, rules and discourses to 
influence others. We explore this through the response of environmental 
groups to the UK’s decision to leave the European Union (EU), or ‘Brexit’.
We do not suggest in this book that legal expertise is always 
necessary in arguments for change, or more important than other sorts 
of expertise. But we do argue that legal expertise is one distinctive and 
important way of understanding and shaping the world. Our claims in 
this monograph turn around three tightly related themes. First, the 
political and legal opportunities around Brexit have been fascinating, 
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complex and unique. We confirm the emphasis in the literature on the 
significance of external factors in shaping the activities of environ- 
mental groups: with a different set of political opportunities, we would 
be telling a very different story. Further, paying close attention to legal 
mobilisation outside judicial and quasi-judicial fora has allowed us to add 
to ideas of political and legal opportunity, identifying hybrid political–
legal opportunities that create space for legal expertise in political fora. 
Second, we draw two ostensibly contradictory conclusions about the role 
of legal expertise in the environmental community. We argue that legal 
expertise may be under-utilised and under-appreciated in environmental 
groups, and that its role in advocacy is limited. And yet at the same time, 
we saw intense and sophisticated rallying of legal expertise around Brexit 
and the Environment Bill, and that seems to have had some impact. 
This suggests a genuine, if under-developed, valuing of legal expertise in 
the sector, and an impressive ability to muster resources in a crisis. This 
was in part enabled by what constitutes our third theme, namely the 
very powerful collaboration between environmental non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) on Brexit, which has enjoyed (qualified) success in 
a number of different respects. Our work bears out the assumptions 
in much of the literature and practice that collaboration contributes 
positively to NGO work. We identify some of the key qualities of a 
successful collaboration.
Brexit has been and continues to be an enormous constitutional, 
political, economic and personal rupture. It also constitutes a massive 
change to the UK’s laws and institutions of environmental protection, 
which had been shaped by EU membership since 1973. As such, it is 
a major challenge for the environmental NGO community. One of 
the many pieces of legislation that has been promised to ease the exit is 
the first wide-ranging UK environmental legislation for 25 years: the 
Environment Bill. The Bill is currently (June 2020) paused, due to the 
pandemic coronavirus Covid-19.
We do three things in this chapter to set the scene for the rest of the 
book. We begin with brief introductions to practical and theoretical 
contexts that feature throughout: the environmental NGO sector in the 
UK; Brexit and the Environment Bill; some of the theoretical context 
for our work (in particular legal mobilisation and political and legal 
opportunity theories); NGO advocacy, influence and impact. We touch 
on our methodology throughout this chapter and turn in detail to the two 
empirical elements of our work in the penultimate section. We end this 
chapter with an outline of the book.
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The UK environmental NGO community
Environmental NGOs have developed in many ways since their emergence 
in the mid-nineteenth century.1 Advances in our understanding of natural 
ecology have led to both an expansion in the range of issues considered, 
and a recognition that they extend beyond the local and national to the 
transnational and ultimately global. The number of NGOs, and public 
support for them, has increased dramatically in the UK and groups have 
become more institutionalised both internally (in terms of resources, 
staffing, etc.) and externally (in that they are recognised by governments2 
and other power-holders as authoritative voices that have access to 
important expertise on a range of issues).3
The diversity of environmental NGOs is astounding. There are large 
and small groups, groups that focus on broad or niche areas, groups that 
have national or international reach and groups founded by local 
communities to address particular local challenges. Some groups have a 
strong preference for certain tactics such as protest or litigation, whilst 
other groups would normally seek to initiate change through lobbying 
and media campaigns. Sources of funding also differ considerably. Some 
groups receive significant funding from public membership and sales 
to the public, others rely solely on individual donations, government 
grants and/or philanthropic funding.4 The future of environmental NGO 
funding from all sources is of course a great unknown, given the economic 
and other impacts of the ongoing pandemic Covid-19 and the response to 
it.5 It is difficult to predict how this crisis will affect the state of the sector.
The diversity of groups is reflected in the range of labels attached 
to NGOs: civil society organisations, community-based organisations, 
pressure groups, grassroots organisations, interest groups and environ-
mental groups, to name but a few. Some of these labels may be associated 
with a particular type of group; for example, pressure groups as organi-
sations that display a preference for more activist strategies, grassroots 
organisations as groups focused on local issues and/or action.
We know an NGO when we see one, but a commonly agreed 
definition is hard to find. Taken literally, ‘NGO’ is an umbrella term that 
could arguably cover any kind of organisation that is not a state. The 
literature, as we do, takes a narrower view. We use the term NGO to 
describe a not-for-profit public interest organisation that operates 
independently of government. Their purpose in our case is to address 
environmental issues and challenges. NGOs may pursue goals by seeking 
influence with public and private stakeholders using a range of direct 
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strategies including lobbying, protest and litigation. Groups, including 
think tanks, may also look to influence change through the generation of 
knowledge to support environmental goals. Whilst we acknowledge the 
multiple labels attached to these organisations in this work, we simply use 
the terms ‘environmental NGO’ and ‘environmental group’ synonymously.
In the absence of specific numbers, one can only assume that there 
are thousands of environmental NGOs in the UK.6 A 2013 Environmental 
Funders Network report concluded that one in ten adults was a member 
or supporter of a British environmental or conservation group.7 A small 
number of groups have a relatively high income and staff numbers, and 
some of those also have a large membership base.8 There is also a large 
number of much smaller organisations. Expertise is unevenly distributed 
across the sector. In light of this heterogeneity, the question of how and 
why certain groups pursue certain goals in certain ways is hugely complex 
and makes generalisations difficult if not impossible.
Two groups deserve particular mention in this introduction: 
ClientEarth and Greener UK. Launched in London in 2007, ClientEarth 
focuses on the use of law and legal expertise to achieve social change, 
and occupies an important place in the UK environmental NGO 
community. Made up of lawyers and environmental experts, it uses ‘the 
power of the law to protect the planet and the people who live in it’.9 
Although perhaps best known for using litigation to achieve environ- 
mental change, ClientEarth works on all stages of the lifecycle of 
environmental law, from the science, to law and policy making, to 
implementation and enforcement.10 ClientEarth regularly challenges 
the government and the private sector on their environmental ambitions.
Hosted by Green Alliance, an ‘independent think tank focused on 
ambitious leadership for the environment’,11 Greener UK has been at the 
heart of the environmental sector’s work on post-Brexit environmental 
law. It is a formal coalition of 13 major environmental groups with 
a combined membership of over eight million.12 It was set up in 2016 
with the aim of ensuring the maintenance and enhancement of environ- 
mental protections post-Brexit. As the Brexit-environment debate has 
become bigger and broader, the scope, remit and sheer size of Greener 
UK has expanded and evolved significantly. A lot of Greener UK’s work 
on environmental principles and governance post-Brexit has been 
channelled through its Brexit Scenarios Group. Multiple pillars and task 
groups work on activities across a range of other areas, including 
teams working on the Environment, Agriculture and Trade Bills, and 
on EU negotiations. Its collaboration with other coalitions, including 
Wildlife and Countryside Link, adds a further layer of complexity to its 
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organisational structure and governance. The Greener UK Board, chaired 
by the Executive Director of Green Alliance, oversees the work of the 
coalition and provides strategic direction. The Greener UK unit coordinates 
and drives forward the coalition’s activities. The work of Greener UK 
features throughout this monograph, and we explore its work and its 
impact in detail in chapter 7.
Brexit and the Environment Bill
The UK joined the EU in January 1973. The EU membership referendum 
in June 2016 signalled the beginning of a tortuous process of leaving 
the EU, on 31 January 2020, with two general elections, two new prime 
ministers, and three postponements in between. An unprecedentedly 
dramatic parliamentary situation reflected the fact that for long periods, 
the hardest of no deal Brexits (leaving the EU without any arrangements 
in place to manage the exit or the future relationship), not leaving the EU 
at all, and a more managed exit (itself begging lots of questions), seemed 
more or less equally likely outcomes. Although the UK has now left the 
EU on the basis of agreement, the process of detachment is not over. 
The Withdrawal Agreement between the EU and the UK includes a 
transition or implementation period to the end of 2020,13 during which 
the UK is fully bound by EU law, but plays no role in its institutions or 
decision-making processes. As we write (June 2020), the institutional 
arrangements for the relationship between the UK and the EU after the 
end of 2020 remain open.14 The pandemic Covid-19 has interrupted and 
slowed down negotiations.
The EU has a large and distinctive body of law across the spectrum 
of substantive and procedural environmental matters. The EU’s record 
on the environment is obviously imperfect, in ways too numerous 
to mention. The Common Agricultural Policy is widely criticised for 
allowing and even incentivising damaging agricultural practices. More 
generally, the EU has some obscure processes that take place, literally 
and metaphorically, at a distance from its citizens. It sometimes overly 
prioritises economic and trade interests over the environment. And good 
implementation has often been a weak spot. But the EU has powerful 
ways of making and sticking with environmental standards, and its size 
and strength have allowed it at times to pioneer and insist on ambitious 
objectives.
The EU has dominated the environmental arena in the UK. 
Although EU environmental law is not comprehensive, and can often be 
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implemented by Member States in flexible ways, little is entirely 
untouched by EU law. EU Directives and Regulations have not been 
‘foreign’ law; on the contrary, they create legally binding standards 
within the domestic legal system. The UK also participated in the EU’s 
decision-making bodies, the main institutions of Commission, Council, 
Parliament, European Council and Court of Justice, as well as less high-
profile bodies such as the European Environment Agency, and myriad 
technical and political committees and networks.15
Unpicking this relationship was always going to be a daunting 
challenge. The EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provided for the repeal of the 
European Communities Act 1972, the Act of Parliament that establishes 
the central place of EU law in the UK’s domestic system, from the end 
of the transition period. But EU law is so deeply embedded in UK law that 
the loss of EU law overnight by repeal of the 1972 Act would leave a 
gaping hole. The 2018 Act creates a new category of ‘retained law’, which 
allows for the body of EU law to survive in UK law on exit day, for 
subsequent amendment or repeal if desired.16
Retained EU law includes ‘EU-derived domestic legislation’ 
and ‘direct EU legislation’. The main type of EU-derived domestic 
legislation is secondary legislation that was passed under the European 
Communities Act 1972 (and so needs to be ‘saved’ on repeal of that Act), 
but the definition extends to statutory instruments passed under other 
legislation, and indeed to primary legislation. Direct EU legislation 
is legislation that has effect before exit day, without having been 
transposed into domestic law, most significantly the law contained in EU 
Regulations.
But some environmentally significant EU legal arrangements are 
not retained by the 2018 Act. In chapter 3 we discuss the EU measures 
that enhance the accountability of government for the implementation 
and enforcement of environmental law, EU approaches to developing 
new environmental standards and the environmental principles found 
in the EU treaties. Recognition that losing these features of EU law 
would leave what became known as a ‘governance gap’, provided the 
starting point for the Environment Bill. Part 1 of the Bill, entitled 
‘Environmental Governance’, is the focus of this book. It contains a 
framework for setting legal targets on matters relating to the natural 
environment, and for creating, updating and monitoring environmental 
policy within a legislative framework. It contains provisions requiring a 
government policy statement on environmental principles. And chapter 2 
of Part 1 of the Environment Bill provides for the creation of a new 
body called the Office for Environmental Protection (OEP), designed to 
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monitor government and other public bodies for their compliance with 
environmental law: a body to regulate the regulators.
But this legislative moment has also been an opportunity for 
reshaping UK law in other areas. The Environment Bill is a wide- 
ranging and enormous (133 clauses, 19 schedules, over 240 pages) 
piece of framework legislation, granting powers and providing more or 
less substance on issues from plastic pollution to smoke control, to 
natural capital and nature recovery networks. It is the first proposed 
wide-ranging UK (or English)17 environmental legislation since the 
Environment Act 1995. The intervening 25 years saw a number of 
important acts on single subjects and relatively narrow (but significant) 
institutional change (e.g. Natural Environment and Rural Communities 
Act 2006, Climate Change Act 2008, Marine and Coastal Access Act 
2009, various planning acts). There was nothing of the scope and 
significance of the Bill.
The environmental NGO community, and others, worked extraordi-
narily hard advocating for the introduction of the Environment Bill, and 
then shaping its content. As we argue in chapter 7, they have enjoyed 
major, although not complete, success.
The environmental implications of Brexit, and its stimulation of 
the Environment Bill, provide an opportune case study for our work. 
Although the edges of the process are blurred, the more or less self-
contained ‘story’ of the Bill within the period since the Brexit referendum,18 
and the relative stability of the main actors (especially Greener UK), 
provide a firm core for assessing arguments made by environmental 
groups. Moreover, this is a hugely significant moment: the Environment 
Bill will shape UK or English environmental law for a generation, and this 
book will not be the last word on its genesis.
Our focus on a single Part of a single Bill narrows down our case 
study of Brexit-environment. Principles and governance have been a 
constant and significant focus for NGO activity since the 2016 referendum 
and provide a useful lens through which to consider the role of law and 
legal expertise in NGO advocacy. We do not, however, intend to dismiss 
the involvement of the community in the broader environmental debate. 
In particular, environmental NGOs have engaged intensively around the 
development of three other environmentally significant ‘Brexit bills’: 
fisheries, agriculture and trade. Our view is that the benefits of a focused 
case study outweigh the limitations of scope. For similar reasons, we 
focus on the UK/English perspective, from Whitehall and Westminster. 
The UK’s territorial constitution has been a sensitive part of the Brexit 
journey.19 Both Northern Ireland and Scotland voted to remain in the EU 
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in the 2016 referendum. The Welsh Assembly, the Northern Ireland 
Assembly20 and the Scottish Parliament all withheld consent from the EU 
(Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020,21 which approved the Withdrawal 
Agreement between the UK and the EU, and the UK’s exit from the EU.22 
Withholding consent has no legal impact, but highlights the spatial and 
constitutional aspect of passionate political divides over Brexit. Further, 
where particular environmental powers and responsibilities, previously 
held at EU level, sit after Brexit (with the UK government or the other 
governments or executives) is constitutionally sensitive. Common EU 
baselines, and common membership of the EU single market, have meant 
that environmental discordance between the UK’s countries has been 
kept to a minimum.23 Our self-limitation to English (mainly)/UK law and 
Whitehall/Westminster provides for a different, more focused, discussion 
than a comparative assessment of the four jurisdictions.
The case study methodology has well-rehearsed limitations and 
advantages, in particular around its positive potential for very fine-
grained analysis of social life, versus the challenges of more general 
applicability. We cannot make simple claims for the generalisability of 
the conclusions in this book. Indeed, we conclude that Brexit provided 
special opportunities for, and made special demands on, law and legal 
expertise. We do, however, think that there are lessons to be learned 
from our case study, in part even because of the particular demands 
and opportunities presented by Brexit.24 Our purpose is to explore and 
better understand the ways in which environmental NGOs use and 
understand law and legal expertise, and the political and legal contexts 
that incentivise or restrict the use of law and legal expertise. Our 
unusually law-heavy and anomalously politically open case study (see 
chapter 3) provides rich lessons on what NGOs do with law. The call on 
legal expertise was particularly intense in this case, but the challenges 
faced by the sector remained – challenges around resources and internal 
culture for example – as discussed further throughout this book. The 
nature of our case study means that when we identify challenges or 
limitations in the appreciation of legal expertise here, they are likely to 
be even more acute in other cases.
Some theoretical background
This book contributes to the literature on ‘legal mobilisation’ by 
(environmental) NGOs. As an umbrella term, legal mobilisation refers 
to the use of law in NGO efforts to shape social change.25 Part of the 
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purpose of developing a discourse around ‘legal mobilisation’ was 
precisely to broaden the preoccupations of the literature beyond courts 
and ‘impact litigation’.26 Nevertheless, the scholarship continues to be 
dominated by a consideration of legal rights claims through the courts, 
or other formal institutions.27 Indeed, some argue that the phrase ‘legal 
mobilisation’ should properly be reserved for ‘the use of law in an explicit, 
self-conscious way through the invocation of a formal, institutional 
mechanism’, especially (although not only) a court.28 Focusing on the 
response to Brexit, and the work on various iterations of the Environment 
Bill, takes us well beyond litigation, even broadly defined to include ‘the 
presentation of claims to be decided by the courts (or court-like agencies) 
and the whole penumbra of threats, feints and so forth, surrounding such 
presentation’.29
We are seeking to assess the role of legal expertise, how law is 
mobilised, beyond litigation, beyond the court room or other quasi-
judicial spaces. We recognise, however, that drawing lines between 
litigation and ‘not’ is neither straightforward nor necessarily helpful. 
Most cases started never reach the court room, and most disputes get 
nowhere near becoming cases. Further, when NGOs campaign or lobby 
around legal obligations, the threat of litigation may be implicit. And 
much careful legal work is often necessary to turn successful litigation 
into meaningful action.30
The emphasis on litigation in the legal mobilisation scholarship, 
and also practice, reflects a well-known academic preference for courts 
and cases as ‘the star of the show’,31 over statutes and legislatures.32 Cases 
are appealing, for their human and visceral quality in the retelling, for 
their apparently sudden eventfulness in campaigning, for their visibility 
and apparent speed.33 Whilst there might be good practical campaigning 
reasons to prefer particular approaches, it is short-sighted to pass over 
the many ways in which legal expertise shapes the world outside 
rights claiming or litigation. A rehearsal of legislation’s crucial part in the 
legal landscape is probably not necessary for the current audience: its 
role in adapting law to changing circumstances, negotiating a path 
through contentious, complex issues,34 embracing and working through 
social disagreement,35 solidifying and increasing the enforceability of 
the concessions.
A range of factors influence environmental groups’ approach 
to change. Factors internal to the environmental group, including 
resources, identity, ideas and values, contribute to NGO strategy.36 
Political opportunity theories argue that the approaches taken, and 
their effectiveness, are shaped (not determined) by external factors: 
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‘The basic premise is that exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects 
for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims to be advanced rather than 
others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and for 
movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy.’37 We 
conclude that both internal and external factors have shaped environ- 
mental groups’ activities and their ability to achieve their objectives over 
the past four years.
The main interest of political opportunity theories was initially 
in the relationship between strategies of protest, outside of orthodox 
political spaces, and conventional political activity within institutions.38 
Legal opportunity theory was developed to add more thoughtful 
consideration of law to the lobbying/protest dyad, analysing what 
influences the choice of and success of legal mobilisation.39 The legal 
opportunity literature focuses almost entirely on efforts to advance social 
change through litigation, exploring the issues that facilitate or inhibit 
legal action.40 In seeking to understand legal mobilisation around Brexit, 
we expand the literature on lobbying by looking at the role of legal 
expertise in political advocacy, and the literature on legal mobilisation by 
looking at the role of law outside judicial and quasi-judicial fora. In 
addition to political or legal opportunities, we identify what we call 
hybrid political–legal opportunities, a space within which arguments 
based in law and legal expertise may be particularly politically powerful.
NGO advocacy, influence and impact
One of the many ways in which NGOs try to influence the state of the 
world is through what we term, interchangeably, ‘advocacy’ or ‘lobbying’. 
Either advocacy or (less intuitively) lobbying41 can involve campaigning 
activities to influence public opinion, as well as direct contact with policy 
elites. We are concerned with the latter: ‘insider’ advocacy or lobbying, 
an ‘information-based interaction between groups and organizations 
and government’42 with the aim of influencing policy formulation, law-
making and decision-making. ‘Lobbying’ can sometimes imply illegitimate 
influence over political decision-making, but the scholarship generally 
implies no such negative intent, and nor do we. Moreover, we are not 
concerned with the activities of commercial or professional lobbyists 
who are paid by clients to leverage influence with power-holders (public 
and private) but instead, focus on lobbying by environmental groups.
We have some sympathy for the critique that the use of legal 
expertise may be inherently conservative and status quo preserving, that 
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it might colonise more activist or inclusive approaches to change.43 
‘Outsider’ groups44 may provide a sense of the perceived limits of legal 
strategies: the language of Extinction Rebellion, for example, at least in 
spring/summer 2019, gives a sense that law and negotiation within 
established institutions have failed.45 Lisa Vanhala describes (with 
caveats) Greenpeace (often seen as towards the outsider end of any 
spectrum) as having ‘a skeptical orientation toward what can be achieved 
by relying on the legal framework alone’; environmental law is described 
by one of her participants as ‘a fig leaf covering dirt’.46 Although we think 
that there is such a thing as activist or radical law,47 we accept that our 
decision to focus on law and formal engagement around Brexit may leave 
an important, more radical, part of the environmental movement (and 
Brexit) unexamined.
Environmental groups have to make important decisions when 
designing an approach to their objectives. Where choices are to be made, 
NGOs will ultimately choose those approaches that they believe are likely 
to be most effective in achieving their goals. There is a rich literature on 
measuring the impact or influence of NGO action. This includes significant 
debates on the impact of litigation, and its ability to contribute (both 
directly and indirectly) to social change.48 And there is some consideration 
of the impact of lobbying (across different jurisdictions, different policy 
areas and different branches of government), although relatively little on 
the UK specifically, or on the impact of lobbying using arguments based 
on law or legal expertise.49
The methodological literature is clear: assessing impact is incredibly 
complex. Even taking the extreme case of Friends of the Earth’s ‘Big Ask’ 
campaign for the Climate Change Act 2008, very widely accepted to be 
impactful,50 there would be a lot to think about. Other factors intervene 
(much of our book revolves around the significance of ‘other’ factors in 
the evolution of the Environment Bill), and success is rarely complete 
(Friends of the Earth did not get everything they wanted). An additional 
complicating factor is that even if there is evidence of influence, the 
outcome may not necessarily be viewed as a success. For example, a very 
weak Climate Change Act would have demonstrated Friends of the 
Earth’s influence, but not necessarily success. NGO objectives may not 
always be easily identifiable, for example in the difference between what 
NGOs publicly demand, and what they privately hope for. Nor is lobbying 
generally a zero-sum game, in which policy outcomes are measured on a 
‘winner-takes-all’ basis. As noted by Christine Mahoney, ‘if they get 
nothing but prevented something worse, have they succeeded? If they 
got some of what they wanted but not all, have they failed?’51 Lobbying 
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may make no difference to the specific outcome, but may influence the 
political assumptions of the future. Would this be a ‘victory’ for interest 
groups? And even if the outcome is perceived as a success, to what extent 
can that outcome be attributed to the lobbying activities of a particular 
group or groups, or indeed the use of particular arguments in advocacy 
(such as those based on law and legal expertise)? What is clear is that 
sometimes lobbying seems to work and sometimes it does not.52
In chapter 7, we adopt and adapt Michelle Betsill and Elisabeth 
Corell’s powerful framework for measuring influence. They argue (in the 
context of international law and lobbying) that there are two dimensions 
to influence: ‘(1) the intentional transmission of information by NGOs 
and (2) alterations in behavior in response to that information.’53 
The first dimension in the framework can be evidenced by, for example, 
NGO activities, access to (in their case, international) negotiations, 
and resources, all of which provide an insight into how NGOs shared 
information and the types of information provided. Betsill and Corell are 
critical of an overemphasis in the literature of this side of the equation; 
it is of course possible that NGOs will be very active in negotiations 
without other actors altering their behaviour in response. The second 
dimension, which focuses on behavioural alteration, is perhaps most 
easily evidenced if the final text reflects NGO wording, although even 
that does not necessarily indicate causation. Betsill and Corell advocate 
the use of diverse methodologies to provide robust conclusions on 
influence, including process tracing, which involves the construction of a 
chain of evidence linking NGO sharing of information, actors use (or not) 
of that information and the effects (or not) of that information.54
Our work has not been designed to draw absolute conclusions on 
the impact of NGOs. As discussed in later chapters, the journey to what 
will (may) become the Environment Act was tortuous, and environmental 
NGOs interjected vigorously at numerous points with numerous other 
actors, using legal and other forms of expertise heavily in their arguments. 
As Matthew Paterson says of NGO activity during the UN Framework 
Convention on Climate Change, ‘it is hard to conceive’ that all of their 
activities ‘were without effect’.55 But environmental NGOs were far from 
the only influential feature of the landscape, which included for example 
the effects of young voters in the 2017 general election56 and the school 
strike and Extinction Rebellion in 2019. And it is also of course early to 
be thinking about impact. The impact of all of this advocacy on the 
environment depends on continued activity over the coming years; and 
at the time of writing, the Environment Bill has been postponed due to 
the Covid-19 pandemic.
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We do however draw some conclusions, in chapters 5 to 7, on 
the role of the sector around Brexit. We develop our methodology 
further in those chapters. We use our analysis of Select Committee 
submissions, plus a reading of some other public communications on 
Brexit-environment, to identify key NGO ideas and demands that were 
strongly made during the Brexit-environment debate. We do not aim to 
be comprehensive, but rather to identify some illustrative issues and 
areas. We explore specifically Greener UK’s demands, for two main 
reasons. Most importantly, Greener UK represents a significant part 
of the community on the issues at the heart of our case study, and 
so provides a rough proxy for sectoral demands and success. More 
prosaically, ensuring a systematic analysis of an individual NGO’s 
demands would be problematic as websites evolve and old material has 
been removed. However, we do not intend to suggest that Greener UK is 
responsible for all of the positive outcomes of the sector’s work in this 
area. Most obviously, the active and energetic collaboration by a large 
number of NGOs is what made Greener UK what it is (as discussed 
in chapters 6 and 7). Equally importantly, the impact of work by those 
NGOs from within and outside the coalition, and other actors such 
as practitioners and academics, is impossible to separate from the impact 
of Greener UK.
Bearing in mind Betsill and Corell’s cautions, we explore whether 
the demands of Greener UK shaped the content and depth of the 
public (especially parliamentary and government) discussion of Brexit-
environment, and whether they found their way into parliamentary 
conclusions, government documents, and ultimately the Bill. Further, 
whilst our interviews did not set out to ‘measure’ impact, our interviewees 
shared some useful insights on the impact of environmental group 
lobbying around Brexit. We conclude that Greener UK had considerable 
success in shaping the Brexit-environment debate and the existence and 
content of Part 1 of the Environment Bill. It did not, of course, get 
everything it wanted and it will no doubt be subject to criticism over 
detailed decisions.
If it is difficult to measure a sector’s overall influence on a debate, 
drawing confident conclusions on the role of particular arguments (those 
based on law and legal expertise) is almost impossible. The special 
circumstances of Brexit, discussed in chapter 3, have however enabled us 
to shine a brighter light than usual on law, and as discussed in chapter 5 
(pages 118–20) we share the sense of many of our interviewees that legal 
expertise had some impact on the debate and the existence and content of 
the Bill. The strong place for legal expertise in this broadly successful 
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advocacy campaign provides some additional indirect evidence for the 
impact of legal expertise.
Method and methodology: the empirical material
Turning to our empirical material, it is important before we go further 
to address the fact that one of us (Maria) has been working on the 
environmental implications of Brexit since well before the referendum,57 
in an academic as well as ‘public service’ context.58 She has to some 
extent participated in, and contributed to shaping, the phenomena being 
investigated. Her (unpaid) membership of Greener UK’s Brexit Scenarios 
Group since early 2017 has involved reasonably consistent attendance 
at monthly and then fortnightly two-hour meetings, and many email 
exchanges on specific issues. This involvement was particularly intense 
between mid-2017 and summer 2019. The relationship with Greener 
UK emerged organically and informally rather than from recruitment or 
appointment, and has been longer and deeper than probably anyone either 
intended or would have predicted. Occasionally, Maria’s observations as 
something of an ‘insider’ will enrich our discussion. This is, however, far 
from an insider account. Maria’s involvement came out of a desire to use 
her knowledge of EU environmental law to counter her dismay at Brexit, 
including its environmental impacts,59 not to research her Greener UK 
colleagues. Her involvement is anyway peripheral to those working full 
time in environmental groups, or in environmental groups on Brexit 
specifically. This project is driven by both authors’ longstanding interest 
in participation and expertise (and hence NGOs),60 as well as curiosity 
about what we saw taking place in NGOs, set against the scholarly emphasis 
on litigation.
We should also say at this point that the restrictions imposed as a 
result of the pandemic coronavirus Covid-19 had some impact on our 
methodology. The two authors were unable to meet physically as planned 
and so completed the research and writing together online. A very small 
amount of material that we would otherwise have read has not been 
available. The follow-up interviews in March and April 2020 had always 
been planned remotely, primarily for the convenience of the interviewees. 
More generally, we had expected to know the fate of the Environment Bill 
by the time of completing this manuscript. The very severe impacts of 
Covid-19 and the associated restrictions on gatherings and movement 
have had a major impact on the progress of the Environment Bill. We 
return to this in chapter 3. Further, the profound implications of the 
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virus, and the global response to it, will have unpredictable impacts on 
the issues we have been researching.
participants in our research
We conducted semi-structured interviews with 17 people. We drew on 
personal knowledge of the field and personal contacts, plus their recom-
mendations, to identify potential interviewees. We sought individuals 
with diverse professional backgrounds, as below. For richness of insight 
into our case study, we sought out interviewees with a common interest 
in Brexit-environment and/or the Environment Bill. Probably unsurpris-
ingly, but with implications for our work, our NGO participants had all at 
some point worked with or for the Greener UK coalition. Our analysis 
for the same reason has tended towards the larger, more ‘establishment’ 
side of the NGO movement, and that is bound to be reflected in our 
conclusions.
We made initial contact by email, and most of those whom we 
approached agreed to be interviewed; in total five people either did not 
respond or were unwilling or unable to be interviewed. Ten of our 
participants were employed by environmental NGOs (including think 
tanks). Some of these NGOs are well established whilst others have 
been formed more recently, and we have included both membership 
and non-membership NGOs. They are all active nationally, and in some 
cases have an explicit European or international remit. Between them, 
they span a broad range of environmental interests, including species 
and landscape protection, pollution and climate change. Seven of our 
interviewees were not employed by environmental NGOs, but have 
worked with such groups, and in some cases have been employed by 
such groups in the past: two worked in large philanthropic re-granting 
organisations with a good overview of the NGO community; two worked 
in private practice; two were senior actors in government or non-
departmental public bodies; and one was an academic with strong 
links to legal practice. These interviewees provided useful alternative 
and additional perspectives to the self-reported views of the other 
participants.
Most of our interviewees were deeply involved in the activity 
around Brexit, the rest were at least familiar with the debate. Ten of our 
interviewees have a legal background (i.e. have studied law at under-
graduate or postgraduate level), although not all of those have profes-
sional legal qualifications. At the time of the interviews, they had between 
one and over forty years of experience working in or with environmental 
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NGOs. All worked primarily in England, although some have been and 
continue to be involved in Brussels, Wales and Scotland.
At the same time as Maria’s closeness to the Brexit-environment 
community, discussed above, creates advantages of insight, understanding 
and access, it generates methodological challenges.61 To the extent that 
Maria’s vision of her own role in the world is law-heavy, any influence 
she may have had on people or outputs may resonate in a particular 
approach to law by certain interest groups, or more specifically by 
our participants. She has contributed her own legal expertise to the 
communal effort, and that may sometimes be reflected in NGO expertise. 
Further, because of the very significant role of Greener UK in NGO activity 
on Brexit/environment, most of our interviewees had met Maria since 
the referendum, if not before. All of our interviewees except for two 
knew Maria, in some cases through meeting on a couple of occasions, but 
in other cases through an ongoing friendly, professional relationship, 
over many months or years. We are very aware that the simple human 
desires to be nice and to be liked, which might turn into saying what 
the interviewee thinks the interviewer wants to hear, might be amplified 
in this case.
But researchers and researched are always in a relationship of 
some sort, and the values and perspectives of the researcher are always 
present. There is no direct relationship of power in our case, and our 
interviewees are elite actors in the sense of having skills and experience 
that set them apart.62 But we are conscious that in some cases a large 
gap in experience between researchers and interviewees, together with 
pre-existing relationships, may have introduced a perceived hierarchy; 
although many of our interviewees far outstripped our experience 
and knowledge of the area. We have endeavoured to maintain our critical 
independence. Critical ‘reflexivity’ requires ‘the researchers’ self-
understanding of the research process … their ability to “question” the 
testimony of respondents (are they telling me what I want to hear?) and 
… their awareness of the development of the emerging theory (am 
I seeing what I want to see?)’.63 It has helped to have two equally 
experienced researchers jointly conducting interviews (with one 
exception) and jointly engaging in interpretation. Maria’s pre-existing 
relationships with our interviewees is, to some extent, countered by 
Carolyn having met only two of the interviewees prior to commencement 
of this project.
The community involved in this work is small. To maintain 
anonymity, we are not identifying the characteristics of individual 
interviewees, or the organisations they represent. Other than in our 
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discussion of the Greener UK coalition, we are not attempting to ascribe 
particular approaches to particular organisations, for example large or 
small, or types of individual, for example by qualification or experience. 
The occasional exception is where we draw distinctions, which are 
also drawn by many of our interviewees, between ClientEarth and 
other NGOs. Law is at the core of the culture of ClientEarth, and so 
we might expect them to have particular insight into the role of law and 
legal expertise.
We held a small ‘kick-off’ event in April 2019, before starting the 
interviews, with five NGO actors and one other academic, gathering 
useful insights on NGO perspectives, which helped us to shape our 
interview questions in more detail, and revealed additional lines of 
inquiry. Our first interview, which we used as a pilot to assess questions, 
timing and themes, as well as to gather data, was in May 2019. The next 
14 interviews were carried out in two weeks in July 2019 and assessed on 
a preliminary basis over the summer. It was clear that we could enrich 
our data; we carried out two further interviews (16 and 17), in October 
2019 and February 2020.
It was apparent from our first interview onwards that we would 
want to explore collaboration between NGOs. Our analysis of the 
interviews suggested, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7, that the sector’s 
shared objectives on Brexit provided a particularly favourable context 
for collaboration. We (and some of our interviewees) suspected that 
collaboration might be more challenging around the provisions of the, at 
that point unarticulated, ‘second part’ of the Environment Bill, dealing 
with a whole range of substantive environmental matters.64 As a result, 
we decided to carry out some shorter follow-up interviews by Zoom or 
Skype. We approached most of the initial interviewees who had been 
working in environmental groups both at the time of our original 
interviews and in February 2020.65 Of nine requests, we had eight positive 
responses. We carried out these supplementary interviews in March and 
April 2020.
Both the first and follow-up interviews were semi-structured, 
around a common set of core questions, which were slightly different for 
those employed by NGOs and the others. All participants agreed to be 
recorded. Interviews were transcribed by a professional transcriber. One 
of us listened to each of the recordings, checking the transcript and 
our understanding. All responses were anonymised and anonymised 
identifiers are used in this monograph.66 When the identity of the 
participant might be revealed, we do not attribute the quotation. We 
have very lightly edited the quotations for the benefit of readers.
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With one exception, both researchers participated in all of the 
interviews. We each initially analysed the transcripts independently, 
making a list of themes according to which we highlighted the tran-
scripts.67 We met to discuss the themes, then exchanged and merged our 
themes and documents. We did the same thing with interviews 16 and 
17, and with our follow-up interviews. We each re-read the whole set of 
transcripts at least twice, as well as referring back to them from time to 
time. Drawing conclusions from our interview data was an iterative 
and collaborative exercise.68 We gave our participants the opportunity 
to check the interview quotations used in the book, and occasionally as a 
result removed the identifier to maintain anonymity.
We held a closing event in June 2020, where we tested some of our 
conclusions. This event was for NGOs and the funding community. With 
permission, we have included some quotations from the event in what 
follows.
other empirical work
For external evidence of what environmental groups actually do with 
law, and to get some sense of a broader community’s activity on Brexit, 
we also analysed public documents produced by environmental NGOs. 
Submissions to parliamentary Select Committee inquiries on Brexit and 
the environment69 are an accessible and coherent body of material. Given 
the politics of Brexit, discussed in chapter 3, Select Committees absorbed 
a considerable amount of NGO activity on Brexit and what became 
the Environment Bill. Select Committees are a ‘key site of influence 
for external pressure groups’,70 and they do seem to have nuanced as 
well as some direct impact on government and others.71 We have not 
systematically analysed ‘behind closed doors’, face-to-face or written 
interactions with government and parliamentarians. We recognise that 
this is important, but the public-facing work is sufficient to place alongside 
what interviewees told us.
We read or re-read all Select Committee reports on Brexit and the 
environment. We identified six Select Committee reports (five inquiries), 
plus the work to date of the Environment Bill Committee, for closer 
analysis:
– Environmental Audit Committee, The Future of the Natural 
Environment after the EU Referendum 6th Report of Session 
2016–17 HC 599 (report in January 2017);
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– House of Lords European Union Select Committee, Brexit: 
Environment and Climate Change, 12th Report of Session 2016–17 
HL Paper 109 (report in February 2017);
– Environmental Audit Committee, The Government’s 25 Year Plan 
for the Environment 8th Report of 2017–19 HC 803 (report in July 
2018);
– Joint call for evidence, Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee, Pre-Legislative Scrutiny of the Draft Environment 
(Principles and Governance) Bill, 14th Report of 2017–19 HC 1893; 
– Environmental Audit Committee, Scrutiny of the Draft Environment 
(Principles and Governance) Bill 18th Report of 2017–19 HC 1951 
(reports in April 2019);
– Written and oral evidence submitted to the House of Commons 
Public Bill Committee, Environment Bill.
These reports, from the first submission of evidence to the latest activity 
of the Public Bill Committee, takes us from the end of 2016 (shortly after 
the referendum), and involves four different Select Committees, plus one 
Public Bill Committee. The Select Committee inquiries all address the 
environmental impacts of Brexit, but across a range of areas. The context 
and detail of these inquiries are explored further in chapter 3, and our 
analysis of NGO inputs in chapters 5 and 7.
We analysed only written submissions, with two exceptions: the 
House of Lords inquiry, which did not make a call for written evidence, 
but invited oral evidence; and the Public Bill Committee, to get a broader 
sense of input at this crucial stage. We analysed over 130 written 
submissions, which amounted to several hundred pages of material, 
going beyond the organisations represented by our interviewees, and 
beyond England. The purpose of this analysis was to see how law is used 
in a particular type of advocacy, enriching and supplementing the 
interview data. One of us carried out an initial, detailed assessment, and 
the other reviewed a sample of submissions from all six reports. Our 
review of this material provides insights into the role of law in this 
particular public debate, and provides additional data to set alongside 
the interviews.
Outline of the book
In chapter 2 (NGOs, lobbying and legal mobilisation), we provide insights 
into the complex and wide-ranging literature on NGOs, lobbying and 
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their use of law (‘legal mobilisation’). This includes a discussion of 
political and legal opportunity introduced above, and of those factors 
that are internal to the NGO movement and are also crucial in shaping 
NGO activity and impact. Drawing on our interview data, we argue that 
legal expertise is thinly dispersed across the sector (with the obvious 
exception of ClientEarth), partly because of the financial cost of legal 
expertise. Organisational identity, ideas and values are also important to 
the availability and use of legal expertise in the environmental NGO 
community. An organisation’s understanding of itself, and of law, is likely 
to be reflected in investment (or not) in law. In a self-perpetuating cycle, 
investment in legal resource determines the legal expertise in an 
organisation, which reverberates in the understanding of law, back to 
how much investment is thought necessary.
Groups seeking to influence post-Brexit environmental law and 
policy have faced an extraordinarily dramatic and dynamic political 
context. In chapter 3 (Brexit and the journey to the Environment Act – 
interrupted), we recount the Brexit-environment saga from the referen-
dum in June 2016, to a world responding to pandemic Covid-19 in 
June 2020. We explore the political and legal opportunities available to 
environmental groups in this period, and identify hybrid political– 
legal opportunities, which are new to the literature. We highlight five 
elements of the Brexit process, overlapping and non-exhaustive, which 
have shaped the behaviour of environmental advocates: the relationship 
between parliament and executive, and the extraordinary shifts of 
power between them; the crucial legislation, and colossal amounts of 
government and parliamentary activity, necessary to exit the EU; the 
increasing electoral significance of the environment for the governing 
Conservative Party; Secretary of State Michael Gove’s adoption of a 
‘Green Brexit’ rhetoric, underpinned by an ‘equivalence’ and ‘govern-
ance gap’ framing (which we also examine in some detail here); the 
technically as well as politically demanding nature of Brexit.
The complex public drama of Brexit highlights the difficulties of 
generalising about NGO advocacy, but may also illuminate the use and 
appreciation of law and legal expertise more clearly than business as 
usual. Looking at our material through the lens of political, legal and 
hybrid opportunity confirms the emphasis of the literature on the partial 
shaping of NGO activities (in our case the use of law and legal expertise) 
by external factors. For much of the period of our case study, certainly 
between the 2017 and 2019 General Elections, political opportunity 
opened doors for environmental groups. A different set of opportunities 
would have led to different results, in terms of what NGOs did, what they 
achieved, and what we find in the rest of this book.
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But political opportunity is complex. It shifts rapidly, and in 
different ways simultaneously hampers and enables environmental 
groups. Agility is crucial for environmental groups seeking to influence 
those with power.
In chapter 4 (Law and legal expertise), we complicate our central 
organising concept of ‘legal expertise’. There are many, diverse literatures 
on what ‘expertise’ is, its strengths and weaknesses, and what experts 
(expertise embodied) bring to the table. There is also a vast literature on 
the legal profession, what (expert) lawyers do and should do. We learn 
from these literatures that ‘objectivity’ is elusive, and idiosyncratic values 
and understandings of the world intrude into expert assessments. This 
undermines claims that experts are uniquely qualified to make decisions. 
Further, an overemphasis of technical legal debate may have on occasion 
rendered crucial normative disagreement around Brexit-environment 
inaccessible.
We do not suggest that legal arguments are more important than 
arguments based on other forms of expertise, or on values. However, 
notwithstanding some impressive legal expertise in the sector, our 
research suggests an undervaluing of legal expertise by environmental 
groups, and ambivalence towards legal specialisation. The diversity of 
the ‘legal’ in the Brexit-environment debate (from environmental law in 
all its diversity, to constitutional law, to trade law) has been extraordinary. 
Lawyers and non-lawyers alike may have underestimated just how 
difficult it is for ‘generalists’ to engage with this complexity and diversity.
The availability of (expert) resources and an organisation’s under- 
standing of expertise are mutually reinforcing: resources are not just a 
practical limit on what expertise is available, but spill into the very 
understanding of what constitutes expertise. The expertise available 
shapes not only what NGOs do, but also what they think they ought to do, 
and hence what (expert) resources they think they need. For as long as 
legal expertise is very thinly spread across the sector, it is hard to make 
the case that more is needed.
We have been struck by the range of activities carried out by 
relatively few legal experts across even the largest organisations. 
Contributing to shaping advocacy is far from their priority, with case 
work and corporate work dominating, and litigation playing the starring 
role. Chapter 5 (Mobilising law in practice) explores the contribution of 
legal expertise to advocacy. Understanding both the detailed implications 
of law, and the overarching frameworks and institutions that govern 
outcomes, can provide a different way of seeing the world, and a different 
way of changing the world. Law and legal experts play a significant role 
in shaping the rules of the social and economic game. Many of our 
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participants emphasised the authority and power of legal argument and 
saw legal expertise in environmental groups as an important equaliser. 
Law is one of the approaches available to convince influential audiences, 
and if government and other actors use legal expertise, environmental 
NGOs must.
Legal expertise makes limited contributions to strategy and 
leadership within environmental NGOs, playing mainly a supportive 
role. Whilst we see indications of change, it is surprising and revealing 
that our participants did not see strategic leadership as a role for legal 
experts: this is a sophisticated and well-resourced sector, dominated 
in practice by complex regulation, and our sample of interviewees is 
sensitive to law. The relative absence of legal expertise in leadership 
resonates again with the mutually reinforcing limitations on legal 
expertise in the community. Less legal expertise in the strategic brain of 
environmental groups both contributes to and reflects a relative absence 
of highly experienced legal experts in environmental groups; and over-
stretched legal capacity feeds out of and into a relatively weak engagement 
with the need for, and importantly the potential of, legal expertise.
Alongside a merely patchy interest in legal expertise, however, we 
have witnessed significant, skilful legal input into the public debate 
on Brexit-environment. We conclude from this that there is genuine, if 
under-developed, recognition of the importance of legal expertise, and 
that the sector impressively mustered its capacity in a crisis. Collaboration, 
discussed in the next two chapters, played a central role in that. We 
share the sense of our interviewees that legal expertise had considerable, 
if not uniquely significant, influence in the Brexit-environment debate. 
Combining this chapter’s exploration of the heavy use of law with the 
sector’s influence as a whole (chapter 7) reinforces this conclusion.
In chapter 6 (Lobbying in coalition) we explore an important part 
of our Brexit-environment story: collaboration. We focus on Greener UK. 
We think it is relatively uncontroversial to describe Greener UK as being 
at the centre of governance work on Brexit-environment. Working in 
coalition is, of course, not new to the sector. But our rich empirical data 
points to the fact that the sector’s collaboration through Greener UK is 
different, even special.
Working in coalition can have multiple advantages. We are 
especially interested in the way that drawing on collective resource 
has not only led to an efficient pooling of legal expertise, but has also 
deepened that expertise, creating more than the sum of its parts. Greener 
UK’s collaboration with Wildlife and Countryside Link on the more 
expansive parts of the Environment Bill has enabled the sector to extend 
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its reach further and utilise its expertise in a range of areas. But 
collaboration is challenging. Although collaboration creates efficiency 
in the pooling of resources, it has its own costs: the coalition itself needs 
to be resourced. The alignment of interests can be difficult, but if a 
coalition is to achieve its aims, it is vital that its member organisations 
reach consensus on goals and approaches. NGOs often compete (for 
recognition, funding, membership, etc.), so this is no easy task and can 
imply considerable profile sacrifice for individual organisations.
In chapter 7 (Greener UK: influence and collaboration), we explore 
the role of Greener UK, a crucially important actor in the environ- 
mental NGO sector’s response to Brexit-environment. Our interviewees 
expressed almost unanimous, and in most cases unconditional, support 
for the work that Greener UK has done (and continues to do) in shaping 
the post-Brexit environmental law landscape.
As discussed above, identifying the ‘success’ of lobbying is extra- 
ordinarily challenging. Having said that, we explore the influence of 
Greener UK on the Brexit-environment debate and the development of 
the Environment Bill, drawing on both our analysis of public documents 
produced by environmental NGOs, and the subjective perceptions of our 
interviewees. We conclude that certain elements of the Environment Bill 
(arguably even the existence of any Bill at all) can be traced to the work 
of Greener UK and its allies.
Another way of understanding the ‘success’ of Greener UK is the 
way it has ‘worked’ as a collaboration: holding together over a long 
and difficult period, with constant activity as a coalition, and constant 
contributions from the member organisations. This was a strong and 
recurring theme from our interview data, and we identify three particular 
features of the Greener UK collaboration that have contributed to this 
aspect of success. First, consensus around the broad issues associated 
with Brexit, and the enormous salience of Brexit for the sector. Second, 
the careful attention to the working relationships and trust between 
the individuals involved. And third, the direct resourcing of Greener 
UK itself, making individuals responsible for ensuring that the colla- 
boration worked.
There is a clear appetite for collaboration in the sector. Whatever 
happens next, the lessons of Greener UK should be learned and taken 
forward.
In chapter 8, we draw some conclusions. The heterogeneity and 
complexity of the area we are examining (the nature of the sector, the 
nature of the problem), and the unique circumstances thrown up by 
Brexit, mean we must be cautious about drawing generalisations from 
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our case study. But the learning from this project can, we believe, 
contribute to filling significant gaps in the scholarship and in practical 
knowledge in the sector.
In this chapter, we return to the three themes identified in the intro-
duction above: around political and legal opportunities, about the role of 
legal expertise in the environmental community and about collaboration 
around Brexit-environment. We write in strange and uncertain times. 
Careful and considered scrutiny of the Environment Bill as it continues 
its journey through Parliament is crucial, even if circumstances make 
that difficult. But a perfect Environment Act would not be the end of the 
story. The whole point of the ‘governance gap’ exercise was to provide a 
framework to assist civil society in holding the powerful to account. Using 
the Act will require yet more sustained, disciplined, careful, collaborative 
and at least partly legal work.
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2
NGOs, lobbying and  
legal mobilisation
Introduction
A diverse and voluminous literature is preoccupied with efforts to explain 
or assess the spectrum of activities and approaches adopted by NGOs. 
These activities and approaches range from efforts to mobilise public 
opinion (through protests, demonstrations, petitions, campaigning and 
the like), to direct appeals to political elites, and to the pursuit of policy 
goals through the courts. In this chapter, we draw selectively on some 
of the key themes of this literature, as well as our interview data, to 
begin our task of exploring the use of law and legal expertise by environ-
mental NGOs.
As we explained in chapter 1, by contrast with much of the literature 
on social movement ‘legal mobilisation’, we are concerned with the role 
of legal expertise beyond litigation (even broadly defined), and beyond 
the use of law in quasi-judicial spaces.1 This requires an expansive 
approach to legal mobilisation, embracing ‘any process by which 
individuals or collective actors invoke legal norms, discourse or symbols 
to influence policy or behaviour’.2 We are particularly concerned with 
legal mobilisation in NGO insider lobbying or advocacy around Brexit’s 
environmental impact,3 an ‘information-based interaction between 
groups and organizations and government’4 that aims to influence policy 
formulation and decision-making.
We begin this chapter with an overview of the literature on interest 
group ‘insider’ or ‘outsider’ status. The environmental groups most 
heavily involved in the Brexit-environment debate were consummate 
insiders, with considerable access to the powerful and limiting themselves 
almost entirely to insider activities. The insider/outsider divide is a useful 
first step in thinking about our research, and the ways in which NGOs 
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seek to enhance their influence on power-holders. It is, however, far 
from complete as a framework for assessing interest group behaviour, 
and so we then turn to other factors identified in the literature as shaping 
interest group strategies and approaches. We start with external 
influences, discussing the literature on political and legal opportunity, 
which we explore through the rest of this monograph, especially in 
chapter 3. We then turn to the dynamics within the organisation that 
shape interest group activity. First, we look at resource-based theories, 
and conclude (with provisos) that the resource of legal expertise is spread 
very thinly through the environmental NGO community in England, in 
part because of the (perceived) financial cost of such expertise. We then 
turn to the effect of what might broadly be called organisational identity 
or cultural approaches (‘identity, ideas and values’5) on the use of legal 
expertise by environmental groups. We argue that the way an organisation 
understands itself feeds into its capacity and willingness to use legal 
expertise. Importantly, no single theory can explain the choices that 
interest groups make in pursuance of their goals.
Insiders and outsiders: group status and group strategy
A vast political science literature seeks to understand the place of interest 
groups in the process of law- and policy-making. This literature has made 
a distinction between insider and outsider groups; groups with privileged 
access and status (‘insiders’) and those without (‘outsiders’). As we 
discuss further below, this distinction is not without its critics. Amongst 
other things, the insider/outsider typology is not a binary variable, but 
sits on a sliding scale, with some groups having more access to power-
holders than others at different times and in different contexts. However, 
insidership suggests a relationship in which groups are more likely to be 
invited to take part and listened to when they do, and the theory allows 
us to attribute ‘influence to some groups and impotence to others’.6 
‘Consultation’ is a term used a good deal in this literature, in that insider 
groups are more heavily consulted. Consultation can refer to formal 
public consultation opportunities, for example DEFRA’s Consultation 
on Environmental Principles and Governance after EU Exit (the EPG 
Consultation),7 or Select Committee calls for evidence. The identification 
of insiders and outsiders denotes, however, that not all are equal in these 
apparently open processes. Further, ‘consultation’ might include less 
public, informal events, for example, direct NGO communications such 
as briefings or letters, behind closed doors meetings with officials, or 
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dealings with influential figures or organisations outside government or 
parliament.
Law and policy-makers ‘are likely to be scanning the horizon for 
groups who may be able to aid them in policy formulation’ and the 
‘policy-relevant group can simplify the policy making task’.8 One of our 
interviewees recognised that there may be different reasons for seeking 
out a coalition of interest groups:
… the most cynical – it’s ticking the box if somebody says, well you 
know, talk to civil society. Or it might be, ‘Yeah, we really want to 
talk to civil society, want to know what they think.’ And other times 
it feels more, ‘Well you’ve got some competence, you know what’s 
going on. You’re sufficiently well informed about what civil servants 
are doing’ (Interviewee 3).
Wyn Grant is commonly acknowledged as pioneering the early British 
literature on insider and outsider groups.9 In one of his earliest 
contributions Grant stated that:
The basic distinction in this paper between insider groups and 
outsider groups, is a distinction based on interest group strategies, 
by which is meant the combination of modes of action used by an 
interest group to attain its goals. It must be emphasised that the 
acquisition of insider or outsider status by a group involves both a 
decision by government and a decision by the group concerned. 
The basic aim of such insider groups is to establish a consultative 
relationship whereby their views on particular legislative proposals 
will be sought prior to the crystallisation of the Government’s 
position.10
For Grant, insider groups display three key characteristics.11 First, 
government and parliamentarians recognise these groups as legitimate 
spokespersons for particular issues or concerns. Second, once some 
legitimacy is secured, these groups are allowed to engage in dialogue 
with decision-makers. And third, they agree (albeit implicitly) to abide 
by the rules and put forward well-researched, accurate and truthful cases 
to support their claims. These insider groups would therefore be involved 
in regular, meaningful consultation with government (and other public 
officials), whereas outsider groups would not. In his view, most groups 
would adopt, wherever possible, insider strategies due to their greater 
likelihood of success.12
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The labels ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’, as well as being applied to 
NGOs (as a question of status), may also be applied to the channels or 
strategies of interest group influence.13 The ‘insider’ label (both in terms 
of strategy and status), we suggest, can be legitimately applied to many 
(not all) of the individual environmental NGOs participating in the 
Greener UK coalition, and most of their activities on Brexit understood as 
insider strategies. Green Alliance (the think tank that hosts Greener 
UK) has also adopted an insider approach when seeking influence. As 
noted by Rebecca Willis, founder of Green Alliance’s Climate Leadership 
Programme:
Green Alliance […] were so proud of their close relationship with 
government and politicians that they named their magazine Inside 
Track. Everyone who has worked at Green Alliance could give you a 
few good stories about how a particular tax measure, environmental 
standard or policy proposal emerged from a carefully designed 
process of research and influencing.14
In this light, it is not surprising that the Greener UK coalition has carefully 
cultivated trusted insider status and used insider techniques. In discussing 
the potential role of other environmental group coalitions (notably 
Wildlife and Countryside Link) in the Brexit-environment process, one of 
our interviewees acknowledged the ‘need for a coalition that could tap 
into the heart of Westminster at a more strategic level and would have 
the political access’ (Interviewee 2).15 Greener UK has indeed focused 
almost all of its energy on the lobbying of Westminster and Whitehall. 
The insider approach was described by one of our interviewees:
At the end of the day, if you think about what parliamentarians are 
doing, they’re like all of us, they’re turning up to do their job because 
they want to do a good job, they believe in what they’re doing and 
they have an opportunity to effect change for the better. Our job is 
to help them in that role and, you know, it’s a privileged position to 
be in, I think, to be able to play that sort of advisory role. But if you 
don’t do it in a kind of respectful and trust-based way, you’re only 
gonna get so far (unattributed).
Whilst insiderness best describes Greener UK’s approach to influence, it 
has mobilised broader publics in other ways, perhaps most notably 
through co-coordinating (with the Climate Coalition) The Time is Now 
mass lobby for climate, nature and people.16 This ‘was really the first time 
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that they collectively have gone to their supporters, mobilised their 
supporters. Showed Parliament, “Look, our supporters are with us on 
this”’ (Interviewee 11).
The predominance of insiderness was not without criticism: 
‘if I had a criticism of Greener UK, it’s been such an inside-track 
organisation. Like its primary audience has been DEFRA. And its other 
primary audience has been parliament’ (Interviewee 11). In discussing 
Greener UK’s strategic approach to Brexit, another participant felt that 
there ‘was a bit of a gap in that the coalition, you could see that, at times, 
campaigning would be helpful’ (Interviewee 16). Further, changes in 
political and legal opportunities (see below and chapter 3) prompted one 
interviewee to query whether a shift in Greener UK’s strategic approach 
may be needed:
Greener UK has prioritised a sort of inside-track approach and kind 
of developing a close and friendly relationship with government, 
which I think made sense when we first set up. I think as that’s 
progressed, it’s become less effective as an approach overall, 
because of the changing nature of parliament, and then with the 
final, big landslide victory in December last year, saying, ‘Well hang 
on, is this a government we can do business with?’ (unattributed).
Grant’s insider/outsider model, whilst widely applauded, has given 
‘rise to contradictions and confusions’, and moreover, ‘the terms have 
more to offer than a rudimentary dichotomy of the group world’.17 
The literature proceeds along two broad themes. First, it has been 
suggested that Grant’s model presents an overly simplified model of 
interest group classifications, and we address some of the nuance below. 
Second, Grant’s model arguably conflates two different, albeit closely 
related, phenomena in interest group influence, namely status and 
strategy. In recognition of this latter point, we look at status and strategy 
independently.
interest group status
The insider or outsider status of interest groups speaks primarily to how 
these groups are perceived by those with power. Crucially, as discussed 
further below, group status ‘is conditional upon government granted 
legitimacy: it is ascribed by policymakers to the group’.18 Grant and others 
have developed the basic distinction between insider and outsider groups to 
acknowledge the complexity of group status.19 William Maloney and 
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colleagues, for example, distinguish between ‘core’ insider groups (those 
groups that regularly participate in a wide variety of issues over a broad 
policy area), ‘specialist’ insider groups (groups that participate in a 
particular area) and ‘peripheral’ insider groups (where participation has 
insider features but where influence is marginal at best).20 In terms of 
outsider status, they distinguish between outsiders by ideology or goal, 
and outsiders by choice; neither group pursues insider-style strategies. 
A third category – thresholders – can be ‘characterised by strategic 
ambiguity and oscillation between insider and outsider strategies’.21 
These groups are neither insiders nor outsiders but can be both.
Despite the more nuanced approach taken by many writers, the 
usefulness of the insider/outsider distinction remains controversial. Not 
only do groups display both insider and outsider characteristics, but 
insider status is very widely spread. Almost all (UK) interest groups seem 
to enjoy at least peripheral insider status. Edward Page’s survey of 381 
interest groups revealed (albeit cautiously) that 40 per cent of groups 
displayed all three of the insider characteristics that he used in his research 
(frequent contacts with at least one Ministry, consultation on almost all 
matters within their field and the ability to influence).22 Fewer than 1 in 
12 displayed no insider characteristics and were classed as pure outsiders. 
Page’s research also suggests that the status and influence of groups varies 
from issue to issue, such that groups cannot easily be classified as either 
insiders or outsiders. Nevertheless, however complex and contested the 
ascription of ‘a’ status to groups, and however it is labelled, the idea that 
some groups are heard louder than others is important.
As suggested above, the status ascribed by those whom the NGO 
seeks to influence is crucial. Here, interest group resources (economic 
power, knowledge, expertise, etc.) are important in framing perceptions 
of legitimacy. David Truman recognised the significance of both technical 
and political knowledge – technical expertise and political sophistication 
strengthen a group’s credibility with decision-making – as early as the 
1950s.23 Groups are provided with an opportunity to shape law and 
policy in return for the resources (often information and expertise) that 
are needed to ensure a reasonable, realistic and working policy.24 Sheila 
Jasanoff calls the connection by NGOs of knowledge about the world 
(sometimes but not always scientific knowledge) with actions designed 
to advance particular goals the ‘knowledge–action link’. She argues that 
the knowledge–action link is at the core of NGO activity in the law- and 
policy-making arena and is what ‘gives NGOs their primary points of 
political intervention’.25 As suggested above, ‘Groups may be actively 
pursued because they are the possessors of “indispensable information” 
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which decision-makers seek.’26 That this speaks to legitimacy and 
credibility was acknowledged by one of our interviewees:
You know, sometimes governments like NGOs like us, because 
we’re very scientific, we’re very evidence-based and they know they 
can rely on our credibility […] So we actually have really good 
access sometimes to government, to be able to influence policy 
(unattributed).
The importance of interest group status and legitimacy applies equally 
to coalitions of NGOs, such as Greener UK. Here too, resources are 
important. One of our interviewees, in talking about the membership 
profile of Greener UK, commented that ‘You do definitely get some 
legitimacy from representing a big organisation, especially if it’s got a lot 
of members. But you also get legitimacy through sort of whether you’re 
competent, whether you’re plausible, whether you actually understand 
what’s going on, why you’re in the meeting’ (Interviewee 3).27
These resource-based exchange theories are not the only factors 
that may be relevant in determining group status. Some question 
whether pursuing an insider strategy (such as making ‘reasonable’ 
demands, whilst engaging in formal consultation) may be a precondition 
to (or at least enhance the prospects of) insider status.28 An insider 
strategy will not necessarily lead to insider status, however, as evidenced 
by, for example, David Marsh and colleagues’ study of the Countryside 
Alliance’s campaign on fox hunting.29 Furthermore, it could be argued 
that the state seeks out those groups who are likely to be their allies, 
and so interest groups who are inclined to agree with a particular 
(government) position are more likely to be afforded insider status.30 
Again, this overlaps with some of the discussion below, and we return to 
this in chapter 3.
insider group strategies: lobbying, advocacy  
and legal mobilisation
The literature considering the range of approaches that interest groups 
can take describes and labels those strategies in a variety of ways. As 
discussed above, Grant’s insider/outsider typology is one approach to 
group strategy. Outsider strategies include the use of protests and 
campaigns to generate pressure on power-holders indirectly by appealing 
to the public at large. They can also include the use of litigation, which 
can place indirect pressure on power-holders, but also in some cases 
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compel them to take action.31 Such outsider strategies have historically 
been able to create a space for ‘the polite representations of reasonable 
[NGOs] [to be] more visible and audible in the corridors of power’,32 
and can be an effective way of connecting with actual and potential 
memberships.33 Insider strategies target decision-makers directly and 
involve the exchange of policy-relevant information through formal or 
informal channels. Groups can and do use both insider and outsider 
strategies simultaneously.34 The literature would suggest, however, that 
outsider strategies can alienate those with whom a group seeks insider 
relations, although this involves a complex set of dynamics.35 That mixing 
insider and outsider strategies comes with some risk and can potentially 
damage relationships with power-holders was noted by one of our 
interviewees: ‘if you wanna shout loudly in the press and do the kind of 
public opinion thing, fine, but I don’t think you’re gonna get those really 
helpful insider discussions where you can influence guidance and policy 
documents’ (Interviewee 9).
Strategies can be labelled in other ways. Our explanation of insider 
and outsider strategies in the paragraph above reflects one alternative 
approach, namely differentiating between ‘direct’ (insider) strategies 
and ‘indirect’ (outsider) strategies. Anne Skorkjaer Binderkrantz, in her 
study of Danish interest groups, differentiates between administrative 
and parliamentary strategies (as ‘direct’ strategies) and media and mobi-
lisation strategies (as ‘indirect’ strategies).36 Jan Beyers, in examining EU 
interest representation, uses the terms ‘access’ and ‘voice’ to represent 
direct participation in the EU decision-making process (‘access’) and 
the indirect influence of policy-makers through media attention and 
political campaigns (‘voice’).37
Regardless of terminology, the literature on interest group strategy 
recognises that influence can be exerted through different political 
arenas. Insider strategies exert influence directly through ‘the venues 
where political bargaining takes place’ and outsider strategies take place 
in public spheres ‘where the communication among societal interests, 
policy-makers and citizens becomes visible to a broader audience’.38
Whilst it is not a central part of our assessment, it is clear, as we 
discuss above, that environmental NGOs perceive their actions around 
Brexit-environment and the Environment Bill as insider-style activities. 
In our work, we are analysing their approaches in terms of ‘lobbying’ 
or ‘advocacy’. We provide multiple examples throughout this monograph 
of environmental NGOs, both individually and collectively through 
Greener UK, using advocacy to influence post-Brexit environmental law 
and policy. The precise nature and scope of lobbying varies significantly 
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from one case to another. Interest groups may use different lobbying 
approaches in different circumstances and will base their exchanges with 
decision-makers on the expertise and argument that they think will be 
most effective in achieving their substantive end goals. Our project 
focuses on the use of a particular form of expertise in lobbying, namely 
legal expertise. Legal mobilisation is a way of implementing a lobbying 
strategy.
There are multiple and varied definitions of legal mobilisation in 
the literature which, according to Emilio Lehoucq and Whitney Taylor, 
has led to some ‘conceptual stretching’.39 But as we discuss in chapter 1 
(page 9), a narrow view of legal mobilisation, namely the defence or 
development of legal rights through the courts or other formal institutions 
(and activity associated with such actions40) is prevalent in theoretical 
approaches to legal mobilisation, and dominates empirical investigation 
of the concept.41 Much of the literature considers how individuals and 
groups pursue legal claims to defend or develop legal rights, charting the 
deployment of litigation strategies in the US, from the court battles by 
the NAACP Legal Defense Fund to end racial segregation in public schools 
during the civil rights era.42 The use of litigation by NGOs to achieve 
social change is not, however, a uniquely American or recent concept. In 
the early 1990s, Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings point to English 
cases from the mid-eighteenth century, in which the court was used 
to test the legality of slavery in common law.43 More contemporary 
scholarship considers how NGOs have used litigation to advance social 
change in a range of areas, including environmental protection.44
Lehoucq and Taylor wish to reserve the term legal mobilisation for 
‘the use of law in an explicit, self-conscious way through the invocation of 
a formal institutional mechanism’.45 Whilst we have some sympathy for 
their interest in conceptual clarity, we, as discussed above and in chapter 
1, seek to explore the role of legal expertise beyond litigation, even 
broadly defined. We therefore adopt a broader understanding of legal 
mobilisation which, we argue, reflects the multiple ways in which law 
and legal expertise can be used to shape and influence outcomes. 
Our more expansive definition, set out above (‘any process by which 
individuals or collective actors invoke legal norms, discourse or symbols 
to influence policy or behaviour’46) takes as its basis the principle that the 
law can be mobilised to shape legislation, policy and decision-making 
outside the courtroom and is fundamentally a way of understanding the 
world. It allows us to explore the use of law and legal argument in the 
advocacy activity of NGOs. We return throughout, and especially in 
chapter 5, to quite what environmental NGOs do when they mobilise law.
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AND LEGAL EXPERTISE36
Explaining and shaping NGO strategies
A number of factors influence the strategies that interest groups pursue 
when seeking to achieve policy goals. Broadly speaking, these factors can 
be divided into external and internal influences, although the distinction 
between the two is not always clear-cut. In this section we consider three 
factors that can be used to help us understand the strategic choices 
of interest groups, and which resonate strongly in our case study: legal 
and political opportunities; resource-based theories; and organisational 
culture and identity.47 Some of these factors are also important in 
explaining group status in policy-making, again emphasising the close 
link between interest group strategy and interest group status.
The extent to which these (and other) factors can either individually 
or collectively explain strategic choices is both complex and contested. 
A diverse body of work, both theoretical and empirical, seeks to better 
understand why a particular strategy or strategies are (or should be) 
favoured in any given circumstances. The literature is even divided on 
whether or not groups actually have a realistic choice of strategy. Kay 
Lehman Scholzman and John Tierney support the view that there is some 
choice in terms of the approaches adopted:
…. [A]n organization may have extensive strategic and tactical 
choices. Although the institutional arena in which political conflict 
will be waged is sometimes settled in advance by the actions of 
others, when an organization has a choice, it will try to locate a 
potential conflict in the setting most likely to produce favourable 
results. Once strategic matters have been settled, an organized 
interest still must choose among assorted political tactics.48
In contrast, others such as Maloney and colleagues argue that in reality 
groups have little choice about strategy and that approaches are 
determined, primarily, by the nature of the interest groups’ asks or 
demands.49 For example, it is hypothesised that where the desired policy 
goal leaves room for bargaining and negotiation (as opposed to an ‘all or 
nothing’ demand), then groups will look to meet directly with decision-
makers. Where this is not the case, group strategies are likely to focus on 
outsider lobbying approaches to mobilise the public and thereby 
pressurise decision-makers into adopting a particular position.50 In 
addition, where policy goals reflect a narrower interest, it is more likely 
that groups will use direct strategies whereas broader goals are more 
likely to be pursued through a combination of direct and indirect (such as 
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media and protest) approaches.51 Our case study of Brexit-environment 
is a case in which broad goals about the future of environmental law 
interact with detailed nitty gritty on how to operationalise those broad 
goals, and the balance between them varies over the four years of our 
study. Insider interactions of various types dominate.
Legal and political opportunities
We introduce legal and political opportunities (or opportunity structures)52 
in chapter 1. Political opportunities (such as access to political decision-
making bodies and the receptivity of policy-makers) are external factors 
that ‘enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of 
claims to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies 
of influence to be exercised, and for movements to affect mainstream 
institutional politics and policy’.53 As discussed further in chapter 3, in the 
context of the Brexit-environment debate, shifting political opportunities 
‘really changes the conversation’ (Interviewee 2).
Perhaps most obviously, political opportunities refer to the formal 
institutional structures of the political system and the extent to which 
they provide (or not) formal access for interest groups.54 An ‘open’ state 
facilitates the use of, for example, lobbying strategies that attempt to talk 
to those with power, whereas a ‘closed’ state incentivises the use of other 
approaches including, potentially, protest and litigation.55 But these 
formal institutional structures are only one part of political opportunities. 
Different authors offer diverse, inter-related dimensions of political 
opportunity, which can be used to explain differences in the development 
of, and actions adopted by, social movements.56 The receptivity of 
government to particular demands will, for example, influence interest 
group strategies. If the political environment is clearly conducive to a 
particular outcome, then insider lobbying strategies can be pursued 
rigorously, although they may even then be unsuccessful.57 And of course, 
government is not a monolith. Pieter Bouwen and Margaret McCown 
hypothesise that ‘increasing deadlock in one branch of government will 
encourage interest groups more to pursue strategies targeting the other 
branch’ and ‘the congruence between an interest group’s preferences and 
that of a branch of government will encourage it to develop influence 
strategies in that branch rather than the other’.58 In our study, for 
example, as noted in chapter 3 we see calls on parliament and government 
at different times, and receptivity in DEFRA, which is not necessarily 
matched in the Treasury. The substantive target of lobbying may also 
be relevant. For example, Page’s survey of interest groups found that 
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55 per cent of respondents agreed with the statement that ‘consultation 
on Statutory Instruments offers groups like ours a better chance to 
shape legislation than consultation on parliamentary bills’.59 Perhaps, 
he argues, the more technical nature of the issues covered in Statutory 
Instruments (SIs) (relative to Bills) enhances access to government. 
That would tend to converge with the discussion above (and indeed 
throughout) about the resources of information and expertise that are 
sought from NGOs by those making decisions.
A body of work on legal opportunities grew out of the literature on 
political opportunities. Like the work on legal mobilisation generally, 
this work focuses on the use of judicial processes by NGOs. Legal 
opportunities are the important features of the legal, political and social 
environment that either limit or incentivise the use of litigation by 
NGOs. Vanhala, who has written extensively on legal mobilisation, 
identifies, notwithstanding disagreement and discussion, three factors 
which matter across all jurisdictions and across all policy areas: legal 
stock (that is the body of substantive law within which NGOs frame their 
legal arguments); regulations that limit or allow access to the courts 
(rules of standing); and rules that decide who bears which costs of 
litigation.60 These do not exhaust the legal opportunity literature, which 
also reflects both the resources and organisational identity approaches 
considered further below.
We discuss our case study in the light of the literature on political 
and legal opportunities in chapter 3. We argue that the political and 
bureaucratic state of play gave rise to five sets of overlapping and very 
specific political opportunities for environmental NGOs during the 
journey to the post-Brexit Environment Bill, including hybrid political–
legal opportunities. However, legal and political opportunity theories 
cannot provide a full and complete account of interest group strategy-
making. Interest group strategy choice is influenced by a multiplicity of 
factors that consider not only the external political and legal environment 
but also the internal and social dynamics of the organisations seeking 
influence. We turn, first, to consider how internal resources can shape 
interest group strategy.
resource-based theories
Unlike political and legal opportunity theories, resource mobilisation 
theories focus on the internal resources of NGOs.61 These theories are 
founded on the assumption that movement actors behave rationally and 
will devise and agree upon mobilisation strategies that make the best use 
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of the resources they have and, conversely, minimise the need for 
resources which they do not have: ‘we make a conscious choice to lean on 
what we do have very specific expertise in’ (Interviewee 9). Our case 
study speaks strongly to how the availability of legal expertise (as an 
interest group resource) may constrain or enhance the use of law in 
advocacy by the environmental NGO sector, and relates the availability 
of that expertise to financial resources. Economic resources are important 
and those groups with a sound financial base will generally have greater 
opportunities around strategy selection. In the words of Florian Weiler 
and Jonas Reibmann, ‘whether an interest group is able to carry out 
effective lobbying activities is, to a large degree, a question of money’.62
Although the extent to which ‘lawyers direct [social] movement 
activity into legal activities’ is as yet unclear in the literature, resource 
mobilisation theories point to the fact that legal mobilisation (the use 
of law in advocacy) hinges, at least to some extent, on the availability 
of legal expertise within the organisation.63 A group with active legal 
professionals is more likely to turn to the courts than an organisation 
absent of lawyers.64 The presence of committed and able lawyers, 
alongside sources of financing and the presence of organisations 
dedicated to establishing rights are what Charles Epp terms ‘legal 
support structures’.65 Similarly, in discussing the use of law in advocacy, 
one interviewee stated that with relatively less legal resource they 
were ‘probably going to be making those [legal] arguments less’ 
(Interviewee 9). Importantly, this same participant noted that this 
‘doesn’t mean we won’t make them, where we feel comfortable doing it, 
but you know, it’s not going to be at the heart of what we’re saying, as 
other things might. And I think that’s natural’ (Interviewee 9). Chris 
Hilson notes that the professional and educational background of NGO 
personnel is important beyond law: ‘political lobbying is therefore 
likely to be a realistic strategy only for those with a professional 
background: policy-makers are less likely to listen to those from 
unconventional backgrounds who lack the relevant expertise or who are 
not used to speaking their language.’66
Although one of our interviewees recognised the environmental 
NGO sector as being ‘well tooled up’ legally, relative to other NGO sectors 
(Interviewee 5), ‘the absence of lawyers’ (Interviewee 1), a lack of legal 
expertise and capacity, came through strongly in our interviews. One 
of our interviewees observed that ‘a lot of these NGOs don’t have an 
in-house legal expert’ (Interviewee 12). For others, ‘most NGOs have 
limited legal capacity: either one or two lawyers, sort of medium-sized 
organisations’ (Interviewee 3) and ‘… if an organisation has a lawyer, 
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generally they will only have one or two. No-one has a massive team of 
lawyers I don’t really think’ (Interviewee 15). One interviewee had a 
‘sense that [legal capacity has] reduced’, partly because of financial cuts 
within the sector (Interviewee 6).
We are not able straightforwardly to conclude that NGOs are legally 
poorly resourced; we could equally focus on the very strong pockets 
of legal expertise within the sector, plus the potential availability of 
externally commissioned work, including from lawyers who are willing 
to work pro bono. The difficulty is that legal expertise within environ-
mental NGOs may be spread too thinly to support the use of law in 
advocacy. As discussed in chapter 5, a considerable amount of legal time 
is spent on other important work. Lawyers are often ‘very stretched. 
Because you know, there’s always more…. Because they’ll cover 
everything from the kind of big strategic stuff … to case law as well’ 
(Interviewee 2). ClientEarth may be distinctive in this respect: ‘other 
NGO lawyers […] often […] would be covering corporate issues and […] 
individual policy areas or legal strategies that they might deploy. So just 
their bandwidth is a lot less’ (unattributed).
Cost is clearly an important factor here, demonstrating the 
important link between financial resource and expertise.67 A study 
investigating the use of litigation strategies found lack of access to the 
courts as the least significant explanation for not using litigation; the 
high costs associated with, and duration of, litigation were more 
important.68 In the context of our work, cost was a constant theme: 
‘lawyers have been regarded as quite a rare and expensive commodity’ 
(Interviewee 3). As one interviewee told us, ‘pesky lawyers asking for 
more cash’ (Interviewee 13). Cost is an even more significant barrier if 
searching for an experienced lawyer: ‘yeah, they did look expensive’ 
(Interviewee 3). Of course, in-house legal expertise is one way in which 
NGOs can strengthen their ability to mobilise the law in advocacy. In 
addition, they may seek external legal advice to support their advocacy 
work. Here, ‘I think the biggest barrier to accessing external legal advice 
is cost’ (Interviewee 6). Another interviewee also recognised lack of 
financial resource as a factor:
I mean the costs as well. I think if you don’t have lawyers working 
for you, you need to be paying for lawyers. Even the ones who’ll do 
it at cheap rates or low rates, it’s been mind-boggling for me in the 
time I’ve been at [XXX] to see how much lawyers can charge 
(Interviewee 7).
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We return in chapter 4 to the possibility that the legal community in 
the environmental sector is relatively inexperienced. A lack of legal 
expertise at all levels of experience (early career professionals have their 
own strengths) will weaken the legal expertise available overall. One 
interviewee raised particular issues around funding legal strategies: 
funders ‘were not going to listen to a twenty-two-year-old or a thirty-two-
year-old […] with rare exceptions’ (Interviewee 1).
There are a number of market-based reasons why the sector may 
struggle to recruit, retain or develop that resource of (experienced) 
in-house lawyers. Straightforward expense is a factor of the competition 
on pay from other sectors: ‘Lawyers have other career avenues and civil 
society doesn’t pay that well, so civil society is not that attractive’ 
(Interviewee 1), and even for those who want to do public interest work, 
academic or civil service careers might be more available than in other 
disciplines. But there may also be questions about the quality of the work, 
linked also to the attraction of litigation. One interviewee queried 
whether law in advocacy (rather than litigation) was exciting and 
interesting enough for high-calibre lawyers to make up for both the lower 
salary and the more limited career opportunities. So a good case will 
‘maybe make their reputation, or certainly feel professionally vindicated. 
They can stand up alongside their peers. And we’re all human; this is 
what motivates’ (Interviewee 3). By contrast, other work, ‘the sort of day-
to-day stuff: oh, you know, quick look at this directive ... it’s just less 
exciting’ (Interviewee 3). But the relatively heavy use of law on Brexit 
may be different:
And this is a bit more glamorous, and you’re in with a lot of 
community of your peers, other lawyers, you know. They all meet 
each other a lot. So you’re visible in something which is clearly 
quite significant. And not only that, but other lawyers see it as 
significant, perhaps most important’ (Interviewee 3).
Career opportunities for lawyers inside NGOs may also be somewhat 
limited: ‘in terms of career progression, where you can go especially if 
you’re a small organisation, it’s not necessarily obvious how that would 
happen’ (unattributed); ‘you can’t within the organisation structure 
move to have more responsibility if you’re delivering legal services. You 
know, you tend to be sort of stuck at a certain level and that’s it’ 
(unattributed). One of our participants raised the concern that the sector 
is ‘not bringing on new environmental lawyers’ (Interviewee 14). Again, 
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ClientEarth may be an exception, even if it too has a relatively ‘young 
workforce’:
ClientEarth has attracted some really, really good talent and we’re 
really lucky in that. I would say two things about how we have to 
recruit and then develop the talent. One is around developing 
strategic thinking capability, and the ways of understanding an 
issue and then thinking how we can engage with and what a legal 
strategy might look like and what might be appropriate to an issue. 
And, really enabling and empowering people to develop those 
strategies in quite a dynamic way. And then the second area is also, 
we do have to be willing to learn new areas of law’ (unattributed).
One interviewee queried whether lawyers would be drawn to ClientEarth 
rather than anywhere else: ‘I think the only organisation that doesn’t 
struggle to fill its legal capacity is ClientEarth ‘cause, I think if you wanted 
to work as a lawyer in the green sector where would you go? You’d 
probably go there, wouldn’t you?’ (Interviewee 6). We did not hear any 
suggestions that ClientEarth has weakened legal capacity elsewhere in 
the sector, but it certainly dominates. Where legal mobilisation strategies 
are ‘owned’ by one or two organisations within a particular sector, this 
may disincentivise others from adopting similar approaches.69 A small 
number of our interviewees implicitly acknowledged this when discussing 
the role of ClientEarth within the environmental NGO sector. For 
example, making the point that it might be surprising that NGOs are 
maintaining legal capacity, one interviewee stated that:
I think at any time, especially with ClientEarth, around [XXX] could 
have said ‘We don’t really need to have internal lawyers any more. 
We can rely on ClientEarth’s and go to them and ask, get them to do 
the things that we need, we think are important’ (Interviewee 14).
This resonates with the results of an Environmental Funders Network 
survey of environmental groups, asking them which skills they thought 
they needed. Legal skills were low down on the list of priorities, and yet, 
paradoxically perhaps, ClientEarth was seen as the ‘most effective’ group 
in the same review.70
We return to ClientEarth in chapters 6 and 8. The purpose of our 
research has not been to examine ClientEarth, but their place in the 
environmental legal community is obviously significant. If one accepts 
that legal expertise is not just a technical service for campaigners, but has 
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a more substantive role to play in understanding and shaping the world, 
then one might conclude that it is not healthy for a single organisation to 
dominate the pool of legal expertise in the sector.
Like political and legal opportunity theories, resource-based factors 
cannot be the sole explanation for the strategy choices of interest 
groups.71 The literature raises significant questions about, amongst other 
things, the extent to which social movements behave with a clean 
instrumental rationality. Resource mobilisation theories neglect other 
important factors including, as introduced above and developed in 
chapter 3, the political context within which interest groups operate, 
and as discussed below, the self-understanding of an organisation. 
However, the theory remains an important (and common sense) way of 
thinking about why social movement organisations adopt one strategy 
over another.72
organisational culture and identity
Together, opportunity and access, and resource-based theories, can 
provide a strong account of interest group strategies. However, whether 
they are the ‘primary (or sometimes sole) determinants of strategy choice 
is questionable’.73 Organisational culture and identity is important: ‘the 
choice of tactics, and, crucially, how movements stage and pursue them, 
the roles they play in the development and expression of collective 
identity at the group level, the meanings they appropriate and give to 
them, must be accounted for with reference to movement ideas, cultures 
and traditions.’74 The strategies that interest groups adopt are rarely 
neutral constructs but are, rather, expressive of their collective identity, 
and in turn feed back into that collective identity.75
Our interviews confirm that although cost has posed a significant 
challenge in maintaining sufficient experienced legal experts for 
advocacy in the sector, it is not the whole story.76 As suggested above, 
there may be questions around the quality of work, organisational 
investment in the development of individual expertise and career 
progression of lawyers within environmental NGOs. These are linked to 
the way in which the sector understands the role of law and values legal 
contributions. An organisation’s understanding of themselves, and of 
law, is likely to be reflected in investment (or not) in law; and in turn, 
expertise in law reverberates in the understanding of law, in a self-
perpetuating cycle. We return to these issues throughout this monograph.
Vanhala, in developing an analytical framework for understanding 
why interest groups turn to strategic litigation, uses collective framing 
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and identity politics to bring together ad hoc advances in the literature 
on social movements.77 Similarly, Hilson considers how identity politics 
influences the strategies adopted by counter-cultural, sub-cultural 
and instrumental groups.78 Using Earth First! as an example, he suggests 
that counter-cultural groups, who define themselves and develop identity 
through confrontation, reject the norms that structure traditional 
political and legal interactions and thereby favour direct action over 
lobbying and litigation strategies. Instrumental groups will on the other 
hand pursue strategies that are most likely to deliver the desired 
substantive outcome. Hilson uses Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth as 
examples of sub-cultural groups that may favour protest but can and will 
use other approaches as and when appropriate.
Some participants acknowledged the importance of NGO identity. 
For example, one interviewee talked about how ‘the fundamental thing is 
probably that [the law is] not in the DNA of those organisations and their 
approaches’ (Interviewee 16). Similarly, another interviewee noted that:
I mean, it’s partly how comfortable the different organisations are. 
Some, as I said, are, very legalistic in their approach and what 
they’re actually doing, so like [XXX] for example, it’s very much at 
the heart of what they do. They’re naturally going to feel very 
comfortable in that space. And it’s part of their cause to use law in 
that way. It’s hard-wired into them (Interviewee 9).
Others bring out the self-perpetuating nature of a lack of legal expertise 
informing strategic decision-making: ‘civil society’s understanding of 
how to drive legal change, and the importance of legal change, was 
very, very limited. It was very much about litigation. But not about the 
much broader role of law in society. And how you talk about law, and why 
law is important’ (Interviewee 1). The same participant suggests that 
environmental NGOs ‘tend not to use lawyers, because they haven’t 
identified the need for a lawyer. Or there just aren’t enough lawyers 
there at the right time. And by not understanding at a very deep level’ 
(Interviewee 1).
We have already spoken to the significance of financial resources. 
The culture that underpins the source of the funding may also be 
important. One of our interviewees was concerned about the commitment 
of philanthropy to law:
you’re still driven by a very fickle, almost capricious world. Where 
they want results now. And policy investments can appear to 
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generate quick change. And it’s also a safe world, where they can 
make investments without having any unpleasant consequences. 
If you’re campaigning for laws, or you’re campaigning using 
litigation, it’s a much harder edged campaign. And the changes that 
you might win are much more fundamental. So the backlash is 
equally much more strenuous. And legal campaigns of any nature 
tend to be longer, harder battles. And philanthropy, it’s hard to keep 
philanthropy engaged in those marches (Interviewee 1).
And those NGOs that get the bulk of their funding from mass membership 
may face similar cultural challenges using law:
Just on anecdotal work – sometimes members will write to us and 
say, ‘Why on earth are you spending the organisation’s resources on 
legal resources rather than buying/finding new sites to protect a 
particular habitat? Your focus should be on protecting habitats 
rather than suing the government or writing legislation for the 
government and doing their job for them. Why are you talking to 
MPs all the time, when you should be shouting at them?’ That kind 
of thing (unattributed).
Conclusions
In this chapter, we set out to introduce and explore some of the key 
themes of our project. Much of this work is foundational, and we return 
to it in later chapters. A rich literature seeks to understand the factors 
that shape both the level of influence enjoyed by interest groups (interest 
group status) in the law- and policy-making process, and the strategies 
that they may employ. The literature tells us that both external (for 
example political and legal opportunities) and internal (for example 
resources and organisational identity) factors are important in NGO 
strategic thinking. There are multi-dimensional explanations and under-
standings of social movements and their actions and strategies, and 
no single theory can explain the choices that interest groups make in 
pursuance of their goals. We return to this complex set of influences 
throughout this book, starting in the next chapter with a detailed insight 
into the ever-changing political and legal opportunities (and hybrid 
political–legal opportunities) of the Brexit-environment process.
We are able at this point to offer some preliminary conclusions, 
based on our interviews, to be explored further in later chapters. First, 
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Greener UK (and the broader community) has cultivated a trusted insider 
status, and has favoured insider strategies of advocacy and lobbying 
when seeking to influence the Brexit-environment landscape. Second, 
the environmental NGO sector is ‘underweight’ (Interviewee 3) in legal 
expertise. This is not a straightforward conclusion, because as we discuss 
in chapters 4 and 5, we are also able to point to some strong and well-
utilised legal expertise in the sector. Nevertheless, with the exception of 
ClientEarth, legal resource is at least thinly dispersed across the sector. 
Third, there is a clear link between financial and legal resource, with 
lawyers and legal expertise viewed as an expensive commodity. But 
equally, organisational culture (‘identity, ideas and values’79) is also 
important, whether legal expertise is in the ‘DNA of those organisations 
and their approaches’ (Interviewee 16). We return to these questions 
in the context of our case study throughout this monograph.
Costs and culture are intrinsically linked, in a loop that we have 
observed throughout our research between financial resource, legal 
capacity and organisational culture. Essentially, a relative lack of legal 
expertise in an organisation might feed into a lack of understanding in 
that organisation as to what law can ‘do’; this in turn limits the financial 
resource allocated to legal expertise, meaning that legal capacity is not 
enhanced, and so reinforces a reduced role for law in shaping the cultural 
identity of the organisation – and on it goes.
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3
Brexit and the journey to the 
Environment Act – interrupted
Introduction
In the referendum of June 2016, 52 per cent of the UK population voted 
to leave the EU. This marked the beginning of a tortuous journey: ‘a 
pathological combination of chaos, gridlock, constantly unravelling 
negotiations, serial failures to find a way forward, and intensely 
adversarial intra- and inter-party divisions’.1 Three and a half years later, 
in January 2020, the UK left the EU. This chapter tells a (not the only 
possible) story of the process of Brexit, as it relates to environmental 
protection. Our case study runs from the referendum to the emergence of 
the Environment Bill, from June 2016 until June 2020. At the time of 
writing, the Environment Bill has been suspended due to the Covid-19 
pandemic, and the timing of its return to Committee is uncertain.
This chapter provides the context for our case study and highlights 
the political opportunity in which environmental groups operated in 
this period. It does not – and could not – tell the whole Brexit, or even 
Brexit-environment, story. Chapter 2 explained how scholars of political 
opportunity explore the external factors that shape NGO strategies,2 
alongside internal factors including ‘resources, identity, ideas and values’.3 
In our outline of the dramatic parliamentary and government context 
between June 2016 and 2020 (see also figure 1, page xxviii), we identify 
five significant, non-exhaustive, overlapping features that shaped politi-
cal opportunity, some of which we identify as ‘hybrid political–legal 
opportunity’, for environmental NGOs.
First, the relationship between parliament and the executive, and 
the shifts of power between them, have been extraordinary, and unique 
in post-war Britain. At times, parliament has been very strong, opening 
up particular paths to influence for environmental NGOs; at other times, 
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the executive has been dominant. Second, the need for crucial legislation, 
and colossal amounts of associated government and parliamentary 
activity, in order to take the UK out of the EU, created a particular set 
of incentives for NGO approaches to advocacy. Third, the increasing 
electoral significance of the environment for the governing Conservative 
Party led to some shared objectives between government (at least 
DEFRA) and the environmental community. This electoral significance 
extended also to other political parties, and to parts of parliament. 
Fourth, the 2017 Government’s interest in the environment became the 
then Secretary of State Michael Gove’s ‘Green Brexit’. A ‘Green Brexit’ 
embraced both an ‘equivalence’ narrative, and a distinctive ‘governance’ 
framing, discussed below. Both of these approaches to Brexit called 
on legal expertise for implementation. Fifth, the enormous rupture of 
leaving the EU, which was a technically as well as politically demanding 
exercise, placed great pressure on government. It provoked an appetite 
for expertise on the part of government, parliament and NGOs. The 
ongoing Covid-19 crisis plays through a number of these features of the 
political context (the relationship between parliament and government; 
the political salience of environmental protection; the strain on resources) 
in ways that are yet to develop clearly.
For much of the period of our case study, especially the two and a 
half years between the 2017 and 2019 General Elections, doors were 
there to be opened by environmental groups pursuing careful and quiet 
advocacy with the powerful. A different set of political opportunities and 
hybrid political–legal opportunities would have led to different results, in 
terms of what NGOs did, what they achieved, and our findings in the rest 
of this book. But political opportunity is complex, shifting more subtly 
and quickly than our five features can convey, with different aspects 
hampering or enabling environmental groups all at the same time. So 
this chapter demonstrates how very agile environmental groups need 
to be. This in turn feeds into questions of resources, and the need for 
different types of expertise, and different skills.
Before turning to the story of Brexit, the next section of this chapter 
examines in a little more detail the crucial ‘governance’ and ‘equivalence’ 
framings of Brexit. The governance framing of Brexit-environment 
understands the environmental impact of Brexit through the institutional 
architecture that sits over individual environmental rules and standards. 
These include institutions to render non-compliance with environmental 
law visible, and to enable those who seek to hold the powerful to account 
for their environmental performance. The equivalence framing takes 
seriously the constant reassurance by government that Brexit would 
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not involve any weakening of environmental protections, and that 
environmental measures would be at least as strong after Brexit as 
before: ‘Brexit will not mean a lowering of environmental standards’.4 
This fed into the governance framing. Frames are ways of seeing the 
world, and framing signals the intellectual and political labour involved 
in creating stable ways to see and understand the Brexit-environment 
issue.5 It was never inevitable that Brexit would be seen as a legal, let 
alone governance, problem. The Brexit-environment problem was not a 
simple fact waiting to be revealed and solved, but emerged in an active 
and constructive process.
Our attention to governance is not to suggest that environmental 
NGOs were neglecting other, substantive environmental issues. On the 
contrary. So for example, active advocacy around substantive sectors 
of environmental protection pressed for and responded to DEFRA’s 
25 Year Plan,6 and the wider Environment Bill.7 Nor, as conceded in 
chapter 1, does the Environment Bill exhaust environmental NGO action 
on Brexit; even looking only at legislative activity, the environmental 
community has engaged intensively on the Fisheries, Agriculture and 
Trade Bills. Also as discussed in chapter 1, we are focusing on the 
English and UK perspective, from Whitehall and Westminster, although 
environmental NGOs were active in the other three nations of the UK.8
Environmental law: life before and after Brexit
As we discuss in chapter 1, the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 introduced the 
category of ‘retained law’ to provide some continuity between the UK’s 
legal rule book the day before, and the day after, leaving the EU.9 But 
EU law has shaped UK environmental protection much more widely 
than through the legal provisions ‘retained’ through the EU (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018.10 The broader architecture of obligations and institutions 
that make those environmental standards meaningful has provided 
the starting point for the ‘governance framing’ of Brexit-environment. 
The ‘equivalence’ approach to post-Brexit environmental law, positing 
that levels of protection be at least as good after Brexit as before, feeds 
into governance as well as into substantive matters of environmental law 
(and practice).
We outline three ‘governance’ issues here. First, those aspects of EU 
law that attempt to enhance the effectiveness of law, in the sense of 
ensuring that national governments implement EU environmental law. 
Secondly, UK environmental law and standards have developed and 
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AND LEGAL EXPERTISE52
evolved collaboratively as part of the EU. And thirdly, in addition to 
governance, the environmental principles that have formed part of EU 
environmental law for many years will not in themselves constitute 
‘retained law’.11 For the purposes of our project, we need only comment 
very briefly on the provisions on each of these matters in the Environment 
Bill. The overarching concern about the governance and principles 
provisions of the Bill is the extent to which it leaves discretion and power 
in the hands of the executive; this is framework legislation, and whilst 
it could do great things for the next generation of environmental law, 
it could equally provide a framework for deregulation and environmental 
regression.
Some of the issues discussed here, especially the European 
Commission’s hard-edged enforcement role, may not fit tidily into an 
academic understanding of governance,12 which is often defined by 
contrast with either ‘law’ or ‘government’. The principles have generally, 
and properly, been dealt with separately in the debate (principles 
and governance). But governance is a capacious term, and here and in 
the Brexit-environment debate has generally been used to capture all of 
the background frameworks, institutions, approaches that make envi-
ronmental standards and rules work, and understood by contrast with 
specific environmental standards and rules.
enforcement and accountability
In a Union of many, diverse Member States, not only the EU institutions 
but also each Member State has strong incentives to ensure that the laws 
signed up to are well implemented by all. A range of implementation 
mechanisms have been developed, which we can broadly divide into 
direct enforcement, and implementation tools with a less direct impact 
on legal and political accountability.
The European Commission is famously the ‘watchdog’ of the EU 
treaties, with powers to take Member States to the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) for violations of EU law; the Court can impose 
significant fines in certain cases.13 The availability of fines does seem 
to have influenced the UK government, and may have empowered 
DEFRA in cross-government debates about the resources to be devoted to 
environmental protection.14 The CJEU does not accept practical, political 
or economic difficulties with implementation (unless provided for in the 
legislation) as a justification for failing to comply with EU law.15
This enforcement regime, scrutinising and sanctioning not polluters 
but their regulators,16 is probably unique to the EU system. Efforts to 
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provide something similar, to help them to hold government to account 
after Brexit, has been a major focus of environmental group activity. 
Whilst we acknowledge that ‘success’ can mean different things to 
different groups, the creation of the Office for Environmental Protection 
(OEP) under the Environment Bill is rightly considered a major victory 
for the sector. There has been remarkably little open dissent from the ‘in 
principle’ benefits of the OEP, although one of our participants expressed 
some caution: ‘you don’t have a regulatory body for old times’ sake […] 
I think it’s a legal habit. I think we’re used to having a thing called the 
European Commission. We’re used to having this external arbiter of 
compliance’ (Interviewee 1). The political enemies of the OEP are not 
making public attacks on its existence, but have many other ways to 
stymie its effectiveness. The OEP is just a distraction (or worse) if it is not 
adequately independent and resourced (with money, expertise, powers). 
The lengthy, detailed, technical arguments about the independence, 
resources and powers of the OEP from environmental NGOs do seem to 
have had some impact, as discussed in chapters 5 and 7, even if the sector 
does not have everything it asked for. This ability to divide up issues, as 
opposed to ‘all or nothing’ demands, leaves room for bargaining and 
negotiation, and may in this case have elevated the potential scope and 
impact of lobbying.17
The Commission plus Court enforcement regime is only the most 
visible part of the EU’s efforts to enhance legal implementation. EU law 
also makes a significant contribution to legal accountability within the 
Member States, relying on ‘the vigilance of individuals concerned to 
protect their rights’ as a central part of the supervision of implementa-
tion.18 Direct effect and supremacy mean that much EU environmental 
legislation can be relied on by individuals (and NGOs) in their national 
courts, even if a government has implemented it inadequately or not 
at all; domestic law must in any event be interpreted consistently with 
EU law whenever possible;19 and domestic courts are subject to duties 
to ensure effectiveness of EU law, and to provide adequate remedies 
if EU law is breached.20 In addition to these general EU principles, 
binding rules on access to justice are embedded in certain environmental 
directives.21 The Environment Bill does not address these issues. Access 
to justice remains scattered around domestic legislation, but without the 
protections offered by its earlier status in EU law; how the courts will 
develop remedies in the absence of EU law remains to be seen.22
Further, banal routines of planning, reporting and reviewing 
pervade EU environmental law. These can provide an architecture of 
transparency that sharpens the potential for civil society to hold 
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government politically to account, as well as providing information that 
may lead to legal accountability. Obligations to plan, report and plan 
again can be found in virtually any piece of EU environmental law.23 The 
reports are in principle scrutinised by the European Commission or the 
European Environment Agency, as well as being available to all Member 
States, the other EU institutions and the public. Their open publication 
provides an important opportunity for scrutiny, and external input for 
improved outcomes. The breach of legislation, and even risk of breach, 
is rendered visible; lawful derogations and exceptions must also be 
explicitly acknowledged and explained.
Planning, reporting and reviewing procedures also received some 
attention during the Brexit process, albeit much less than Commission 
plus Court enforcement. Analogies have been drawn with the Climate 
Change Act 2008’s architecture, and the provision of scrutiny and advice 
by the Climate Change Committee under that Act. The value of these 
mechanisms does seem to have been recognised. The Environment Bill 
would introduce a planning, monitoring and reviewing framework, for 
certain areas of environmental protection, with key roles for the OEP and 
Parliament.24 They are imperfect, but if well implemented, they enhance 
the ability of civil society to challenge the environmental performance of 
government and regulators.
Developing environmental law and standards
For a long time, discussion of the ‘governance gap’ was backward 
looking.25 But Brexit raises significant questions about the future of 
environmental protection, and how environmental standards and rules 
will be developed when the UK is no longer part of the EU’s expert 
structures and democratic processes. The EU approach to environmental 
standard-setting is far from perfect, but it does call on well-developed 
institutional arrangements, which provide for the pooling of expert 
knowledge, and some (limited) degree of stakeholder participation.26
A target-setting framework appeared for the first time in the 
Environment Bill published in October 2019. The Bill allows or requires 
the Secretary of State to set ‘long term’ (‘no less than 15 years’27) targets 
in a range of areas, and ‘it is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure 
that’ those targets are met.28 Interim targets are to be set in policy 
(not law). They are subject to a (tardy) framework of monitoring and 
review, but are not legally enforceable.29 These provisions are imperfect 
in many ways, but the key issue is the absence of any protections around 
their quality. A major source of concern for environmental NGOs has 
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been around ‘non-regression’, that is a guarantee that environmental 
standards will not slip after Brexit. The Bill does not require the targets 
to be set with non-regression in mind,30 although they are retrospec- 
tively reviewed by the Secretary of State according to whether they 
cumulatively ‘significantly improve the natural environment’.31 Further, 
the Bill explicitly allows for a weakening of existing standards, if the 
Secretary of State is ‘satisfied’ that meeting the target would ‘have no 
significant benefit’ or when, ‘because of changes in circumstances … the 
environmental, social, economic or other costs of meeting it would be 
disproportionate to the benefits’.32
environmental principles
The Environment Title of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (TFEU) contains four environmental principles (precaution, 
prevention, rectification at source, polluter pays); the environmental 
integration principle can be found in Article 11 TFEU. The home of the 
principles in the Treaty has given them a strong legal role in the deve- 
lopment and implementation of environmental law and policy in the 
EU and its Member States.33
The post-Brexit role of ‘the’ environmental principles has received a 
considerable amount of attention. The UK environmental community, 
given its high levels of engagement in nature conservation, was 
particularly sensitised to the strong interpretation of the precautionary 
principle for the purposes of the Habitats Directive,34 but the debate went 
much further than that. Going beyond the environmental principles 
contained in the EU Treaty, but still connected to trying to protect the 
achievements of EU environmental law, NGOs have also (as above) 
advocated for what was often called a ‘non-regression’ principle (but was 
probably closer to a presumption against regression).
Environmental principles are global phenomena. They are 
diverse and vary according to legal setting and approach. However, a 
number of general characteristics of environmental principles resonate 
across different legal and policy contexts, and are also apparent in EU 
environmental law.35 They have considerable symbolic power, providing 
overarching frameworks for environmental policy. They have legal 
effects, derived in the EU from the Treaties. They guide the making and 
interpretation of law and policy, and the implementation of law and 
policy by administrators, shaping the exercise of discretion by public 
authorities. They inform administrative or judicial review of public 
decision-making.36
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The Bill requires the Secretary of State to produce a ‘policy 
statement’ on environmental principles ‘explaining how the environmen-
tal principles should be interpreted and proportionately applied by 
Ministers of the Crown when making policy’ (clause 16). Ministers must 
‘have due regard’ to the policy statement ‘when making policy’ (clause 18). 
This approach to principles deprives them of their legal status and 
enforceability under EU law. Even the weak obligation to ‘have due 
regard to’ the policy on principles applies only to Ministers, and only in 
respect of policy-making, not to all public authorities in all relevant 
decisions as under EU law. Further, the principles are subject to new 
major carve outs, for example as to proportionality and with respect to 
the ‘allocation of resources within government’, so that they lose their 
systemic and overarching impact.37
The dynamics of political and legal opportunity: 
parliament and government 2016 to 2020
Theories of political opportunity, as discussed in chapter 2, focus on the 
external factors that influence NGO strategies. Factors such as internal 
resources, as well as identity, ideas and values, are equally significant,38 
as also discussed in chapter 2. This chapter outlines and explores 
the external political context for environmental NGO activity between 
the Brexit referendum in 2016 and June 2020. It has been a very 
strange time, which only got stranger with the ‘lockdown’ introduced as 
a response to Covid-19. 
Entire jurisdictions and political cultures are sometimes ascribed to 
a category of ‘open’ or ‘closed’, ‘receptive’ or ‘non-receptive’, to social 
movement influence. As Chris Hilson argues, this might be useful for 
comparative work, but a more focused study allows for the exploration of 
a political landscape as it applies to a particular group or issue, at a 
particular moment.39 We take a broad brush to the story of Brexit and the 
environment in this section, proceeding chronologically. We highlight 
the dynamics around the five overlapping features of the context outlined 
in the introduction to this chapter, around which NGO political 
opportunity coalesced:
1. The relationship and division of power between parliament and the 
executive, and the extraordinary shifts between them;
2. The crucial legislation, and colossal amounts of government and 
parliamentary activity, necessary to exit the EU;
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3. The political significance of environment and climate change for 
the governing Conservative Party and others;
4. The promise of a ‘Green Brexit’, which embraced strong ‘equivalence’ 
and ‘governance gap’ framings;
5. The technically as well as politically complex nature of Brexit.
We do not use these characteristics or features of the political environment 
to ascribe causal relations between external factors, NGO activity and 
outcomes, but rather to understand better NGO use and understanding 
of law and legal expertise. Any of these five issues opens space for 
advocacy and influence on the environment and sits comfortably in 
political opportunity theories.40
The first feature set out above is the most dramatic. The governing 
party generally has a majority in the UK Parliament, often a very hefty 
one. The absence of a significant, or indeed any, parliamentary majority 
for the Conservative Government between the elections of June 2017 
and December 2019 made for an alien experience,41 and provided 
a particular moment of political opportunity for environmental NGOs: 
‘… the politics were such and the parliamentary arithmetic was such 
that it was possible to win stuff in parliament’ (Interviewee 16). And, 
combined with our second characteristic, not only were the parliamentary 
votes all tight, but some of the legislation was utterly necessary to the 
Government’s key (virtually only) policy agenda:
if in normal times, if you get a bill that’s being held up by a bunch of 
amendments, you force it through. So parliamentary arithmetic 
doesn’t allow that at the moment. Or you just say, ‘Well the bill’s 
gonna fall’ and with things like the Withdrawal Bill, it can’t fall 
(Interviewee 13).
That situation changed dramatically after the General Election in 2019, 
when the Conservative Party won a large parliamentary majority, and 
easily passed the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, as discussed 
below. Our third and fourth characteristics were also at their strongest 
during the strange 2017–19 inter-election period, although there is less 
of a cliff-edge, as discussed below, in 2020. The complexity of leaving the 
EU remains constant.
Overall, these five features tend to incentivise an ‘insider’, advocacy 
approach to Brexit-environment.42 Had they been different, we doubt we 
would be telling the same story about environmental NGOs. Importantly, 
the external political context faced by NGOs also made particular 
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demands on law and legal expertise. The legal mobilisation literature, 
as outlined in chapter 2, focuses primarily on the three issues of legal 
stock (that is the body of substantive law), rules of standing before 
the court and rules on the costs of litigation.43 Looking at legal opportu-
nities beyond the court room, as we do here, requires a slightly different 
approach. Only the first (legal stock) of those three core opportunities is 
relevant.44 Additional legal opportunities might be found in phenomena 
that enhance the role of law in advocating for social and legal change. 
The intense legislative activity associated with Brexit, the governance 
and equivalence framings of Brexit and the urgent need for external 
expertise from Government and Parliament, all created opportunity in 
this sense. These are perhaps better described as hybrid political–legal 
opportunity, opening up space for law and or in politics, reinforced by the 
high status of law in the Brexit process generally.45 Importantly, whilst 
legal opportunity can be an alternative to political opportunity (‘a lack of 
[political opportunity] may influence the adoption of litigation as a strat-
egy in place of lobbying, and that the choice of protest as a strategy may 
be influenced by poor political and legal opportunities’46), this hybrid 
political–legal opportunity is not. On the contrary, it is part of the politi-
cal opportunity.
It is important to note that environmental NGOs are not passive 
victims or beneficiaries of the politics of the moment47 (although some 
of these features of the Brexit context are out of their hands). They 
contribute to shaping opportunity (legal, political or hybrid), for example 
in our case by becoming trusted and convincing expert interlocutors 
with government and parliament, by emphasising an equivalence or 
governance framing. Moreover, much of the governance work by NGOs 
aims precisely to shape both their legal and political opportunity structure 
after Brexit.48 The pressure maintained by environmental NGOs has been 
an important, understudied part of the Brexit governance story.
We do not use the language of opportunity to suggest that Brexit 
was welcomed by the sector, or by those we interviewed. On the contrary, 
almost all of our interviewees referred in one way or another to the 
opportunity cost of Brexit, which ‘squeezes out other areas of possibly 
more progressive, ambitious work’ (Interviewee 15), and has ‘sucked 
up a lot of resource, a lot of people’s time and effort’ (Interviewee 14). 
But on the other hand, it may also have reinvigorated the domestic 
environmental NGO community: ‘the Brexit debate, for all its manifest 
problems, has brought an energy and an expertise back. It has rekindled, 
you know’ (Interviewee 3). The opening of doors through a particular 
political context has also been recognised by many of our interviewees:
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People have never talked about the environment more politically, 
legally, in campaign terms, have never in my lifetime talked 
about the environment as much as they are now. So personally, 
I think it’s really exciting. So it comes at a cost, but I think it 
also comes with huge benefits, huge opportunities, if we don’t stuff 
it up (Interviewee 2).
june 2016 to june 2017: resistance to action on the environment
At the time of the referendum, David Cameron was Prime Minister, 
and Elizabeth Truss was Secretary of State for EFRA. The Cameron 
Government that called the referendum49 had a slim parliamentary 
majority of twelve seats and followed the first post-war coalition British 
government (2010–15, Conservative/Liberal Democrat). David Cameron 
resigned as Prime Minister, and as leader of the Conservative Party, the 
morning after the referendum. In the UK’s parliamentary system it is for 
the governing party to appoint a new leader, who becomes prime 
minister.50 Theresa May became Prime Minister after all other candidates 
to lead the Conservative Party stepped out of the race. She appointed 
Andrea Leadsom as Secretary of State for EFRA.
In this period, Government paid very little attention to the environ-
mental impact of Brexit, although Ministers and the Prime Minister 
continued to repeat the mantra that they would be ‘the first generation 
to leave the environment in a better state than we found it’.51 The 
five features of the Brexit context identified above had not really started 
to develop in a way that provided positive political opportunity for 
environmental groups. However, the governance and equivalence fram-
ings were emerging, and incentivised a particularly lawyerly sort of 
insider advocacy. Notwithstanding a lack of interest in environmental 
protection, an equivalence framing of sorts can be found in the emphasis 
on stability that underpinned the commitment to the EU (Withdrawal) 
Bill. The Prime Minister’s ‘Lancaster House’ speech in January 2017, for 
example, assured everyone that ‘the same rules and law will apply on the 
day after Brexit as they did before (sic)’.52
The significance of the EU’s broader legal architectures 
(governance) was emphasised by academics (including Maria) during 
two early inquiries by the Environmental Audit Committee and the House 
of Lords European Union Select Committee, and was picked up by 
Parliament, especially the House of Lords report.53 One of the distinctive 
things about Brexit may have been the extent to which academics, 
especially academics in law and political science, involved themselves in 
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the public realm. The engagement was across the board and included 
environmental issues. The academic contribution seems not to be 
particularly visible to the NGO community, although at an individual, 
day-to-day level, contributions are clearly appreciated. This is consistent 
with our conclusion in chapter 4 that intense specialisation in law may 
be undervalued, or perhaps more accurately just taken as read, and 
absorbed into common knowledge.
The Environmental Audit Committee reported on The Future of the 
Natural Environment after the EU Referendum on 4 January 2017. The 
inquiry was about agriculture and landscape, rather than environmental 
law more widely.54 It did, however, begin the governance journey, raising 
the prospect of ‘zombie legislation’ to describe EU law that is carried over 
into UK law, but not updated or enforced. Further, on equivalence and 
governance:
The Government should introduce a new Environmental Protection 
Act to maintain and enforce environmental standards after we 
leave. This is needed to ensure environmental standards are not 
weakened when we leave the EU – whether through leaving the 
Single Market, changes in trading status or through the creation 
of ‘zombie legislation’ resulting from our departure from EU 
governance and enforcement structures.55
The House of Lords EU Committee report of February 2017 emphasised 
the broad framework questions, what we are calling governance, very 
heavily, although this is not entirely reflected in the recommendations.56 
This report was notable for addressing reporting frameworks, linking 
them to legal accountability, citing the RSPB’s evidence:
Periodic monitoring and reporting to the European Commission 
on the implementation of laws such as the Birds and Habitats 
Directives, combined with robust EU scrutiny enforcement 
mechanisms, enables progress to be objectively assessed and 
Member States held to account if necessary.57
This report also demonstrated that the Government at this time had no 
interest in pursuing new mechanisms for accountability, and saw no need 
to replace EU governance. The report cites (implicitly critically) both the 
Minister, Therese Coffey, to the effect that ‘it is the role of Parliament 
to hold the Government to account’, and the Secretary of State, who 
said that ‘The UK courts are perfectly well able to deal with matters of 
enforcement. We won’t be needing to replace European courts.’58
???
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Government’s rejection of new approaches to heighten either 
political (‘it is the role of Parliament …’) or legal (the courts are ‘perfectly 
well able …’) accountability, and more broadly of any overarching 
‘governance’ response, was repeated and emphasised in the responses to 
both of these reports, and in the papers accompanying the European 
Union (Withdrawal) Bill.59 DEFRA repeatedly emphasised what was still 
being called the ‘Great Repeal Bill’ (which became the EU (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018), on the apparent assumption that retaining environmental law 
would be sufficient to secure environmental protection after Brexit.
A review of the Select Committee submissions, and other public 
documents, during this period suggests that although they were certainly 
working with the relevant ideas, environmental NGOs had not yet placed 
a governance framing at the centre of their work on Brexit. In written 
submissions to the Environmental Audit Committee inquiry, environ- 
mental NGOs expressed some concern about the loss of Commission 
plus Court enforcement, but were most focused on the potential loss of 
individual environmental obligations, such as those contained in the 
Habitats Directive. Greener UK’s Manifesto, with its calls for a new 
Environment Act, ‘necessary governance arrangements ... for robust 
implementation and enforcement’ and environmental principles, was 
published in February 2017, a week after the House of Lords report was 
published.60 Greener UK’s first published briefing picked up the language 
of the ‘governance gap’ in August 2017.61 It addressed monitoring/ 
reviewing/reporting,  implementation/compliance/enforcement  and 
transparency, as well as the limitations of existing approaches to judicial 
review and parliamentary scrutiny.
But the governance gap framing, and its hybrid political– 
legal opportunity, was emerging even before the Environment Audit 
Committee and House of Lords Select Committee reports. Oral evidence 
from environmental groups to the House of Lords Select Committee went 
further, with more discussion of enforcement and accountability, and 
some discussion of information and reporting; the RSPB’s representative 
even referred to the ‘governance gap’ to capture a range of relevant 
issues. And an internal briefing to the Greener UK Board in October 2016 
is concerned with accountability and enforcement.62 Academics were 
engaging strongly with the overarching issues in submissions to the 
inquiries, as suggested above. In summer 2016, Viviane Gravey and 
colleagues published a blog on the ‘governance gap’. It did not focus 
on the issues set out above, but it did focus on persistently dominant 
themes that go beyond substantive rules and regulations, most especially 
devolution.63
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Of the five overlapping features of the Brexit-environment 
context introduced above, we see the beginnings of a governance and 
equivalence framing, creating a hybrid political–legal opportunity that 
environmental groups are just starting to make use of. The highly (legally) 
technical character of Brexit is clear, as is the demand for technical 
and legal expertise in Parliament, if not yet openly so in Government. 
But the General Election in June 2017 shifts the political opportunity 
considerably.
june 2017 to january 2018: ‘green brexit’
The Conservative Party unexpectedly and dramatically lost their overall 
Parliamentary majority at the General Election of June 2017. Theresa 
May led a minority Conservative Government with the support of the 
Democratic Unionist Party until mid-2019.
With obvious simplification, three things happened as a result of 
the election, each of which fits into our list of the five features of the 
external environment for NGO advocacy. First, and perhaps most 
obviously, the influence of Parliament increased, and Government was 
not able to push through its legislative agenda. Because the legislature is 
more immediately subject to democratic pressures than the executive, 
increased capacity for parliament is generally thought to enhance the 
openness of a political system as a whole.64 Secondly, younger people had 
voted in large numbers for the Labour Party,65 and there was a perception 
in the Conservative Party that stronger environmental policies would 
appeal to younger voters.66 As a result, third, Michael Gove was appointed 
Secretary of State for EFRA. He was considered a political heavyweight, 
with considerable influence in cabinet and more broadly. Political 
opportunity for the environmental community was transformed, and the 
community (especially Greener UK) stepped into this space.
Michael Gove and DEFRA promised a ‘Green Brexit’,67 and accepted 
that the ‘governance gap’ was a problem. Michael Gove touched on this in 
his major speech in summer 2017, describing Brexit as the ‘unfrozen 
moment’ when things can be done:
I know that inside the EU, the European Commission and the ECJ 
have provided enforcement mechanisms and understandably, 
some are asking what could or should replace them. My view is that 
we have an opportunity, outside the EU, to design potentially 
more effective, more rigorous and more responsive institutions, 
new means of holding individuals and organisations to account 
for environmental outcomes.
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Michael Gove and his Department engaged energetically with environ-
mental NGOs. His appointment was described as ‘critical’ (Interviewee 
10), ‘the primary reason why this has all happened’ (Interviewee 11) and 
it ‘definitely made a difference’ (Interviewee 3).
The major impact of Brexit on even ‘business as usual’ DEFRA 
activity68 and the large reduction in staff numbers during the ‘austerity’ 
period between 2010 and 2016,69 had left DEFRA under-resourced. 
An enormous recruitment exercise in DEFRA followed the resurgence of 
interest in the environment. According to the Institute for Government, 
in October 2019 DEFRA had 75 per cent more civil servants, amounting 
to 1,700 new people, than at the time of the referendum, one of the 
highest increases in departmental staff numbers.70 Although many of 
these new DEFRA recruits had high levels of relevant knowledge and 
experience, many did not. They were learning on the job, about the 
workings of the civil service71 and about environmental law and policy 
and the workings of the EU. What became the Environment Bill is difficult 
specialist material, building on decades of legislation, case law and 
culture at EU level. It was a challenging set of issues for people new to the 
sector to get to grips with.
As discussed in chapter 2, how open a system is to particular 
interlocutors, and how receptive it is to their arguments, affects the 
approach that NGOs take. All five of the features set out above enhanced 
the space for environmental NGOs’ insider advocacy during this period. 
The political interest in the environment, combined with the huge 
amount of challenging Brexit-related work and considerable recent 
recruitment to DEFRA, may well have increased access to government 
officials for well-informed experts of various stripes. From the 2017 
election, DEFRA was relatively open to its environmental NGO 
interlocutors, and receptive to their arguments. And with the embrace of 
the equivalence and governance framings, it was receptive to the legal 
expertise of NGOs. Government is not a monolith, however, and whilst 
DEFRA was receptive, other departments were more resistant. For 
example, the Treasury and Department of Transport were particularly 
concerned about the impact of strong environmental governance (or 
interference as they saw it) on their freedom of action.72 Whilst ‘Brexit’ is 
notoriously difficult to pin down, parts of the pro-Brexit movement were 
opposed to the EU’s strong environmental regulations, perceived as a 
barrier to economic development. Inter-departmental tensions were 
present throughout.
The ‘unprecedented’ nature of the ‘access’ (Interviewee 6) to DEFRA 
was well understood by many of our interviewees. This interviewee 
attributed the access in part to the needs of DEFRA: ‘they genuinely need 
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the help and know that they want and aspire towards that challenge as 
well’ (Interviewee 6). S/he also understood that access did not just 
happen, but was earned by the sector, through different mechanisms 
including personal attributes (‘charm’) and personal relationship 
building, but also having ‘the weight of law’, as well as other forms of 
expertise, on their side. As discussed further in chapters 6 and 7, there is 
a definite perception that the ‘disciplined’ (Interviewee 3) collaboration 
helped and that ‘it was crucial for civil society to be able to speak with a 
united voice about what its priorities were in relation to Brexit’ 
(Interviewee 11).
But although some, including some of our interviewees, had good 
access to the government officials drafting the various iterations of the 
Environment Bill, much of this was informal and ‘by invitation’. This did 
come up indirectly in some of our interviews, and directly in the following 
comment from Interviewee 17:
What there wasn’t was a structured process with transparent 
access. What it generated was, for people who could find themselves 
in the room, an opportunity to shape and influence. Which I think 
is better than having nobody shape and influencing it other than 
civil servants in Whitehall.
It is inevitable that some important voices were excluded from these 
‘invitation only’ discussions.
Nor were our interviewees entirely relaxed about what they were 
getting out of this intense insider activity, and a number were ambivalent 
or uneasy about the sector’s relationship with politicians in DEFRA.73 
Given that most of our interviewees were directly involved in the Brexit 
process, and many enjoyed privileged access, it is plausible that we might 
have seen greater levels of concern among other NGO actors. One of our 
interviewees saw the DEFRA engagement ‘as simply a suckering exercise’ 
(unattributed); similarly, another was concerned that ‘a lot of civil society 
have sunk a lot of investment in a Gove-led Environment Bill, in a context 
where he ain’t going to be Environment Secretary in two weeks’ time’ 
(Interviewee 11).
january 2018 to late 2018: consultation and evolution
There were three important governmental/parliamentary occasions for 
environmental group engagement in the first half of 2018, the most 
visible elements of intense activity that shaped political opportunities 
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along the five dimensions set out above. First, the 25 Year Plan was 
belatedly published by DEFRA, without being preceded by any formal (or 
apparently much informal) consultation. Second, following up on a 
number of promises, DEFRA launched its Consultation on Environmental 
Principles and Governance After EU Exit (the EPG Consultation).74 A ‘Green 
Brexit’ and equivalence framing were central to government rhetoric for 
both of these exercises, for example assurances that there will be ‘no 
dilution of the environmental protections that we currently have within 
the European Union’.75 Third, the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 completed 
its passage through Parliament, from first reading on 13 July 2017 and 
Royal Assent in June 2018.
The 25 Year Plan had been promised in response to a 2014 Report 
by the Natural Capital Committee and was published in January 2018 
after numerous delays.76 Its origins are obviously unrelated to Brexit, 
but its publication and development rested in part on the ‘Green 
Brexit’ rhetoric. It is wide-ranging, with multiple environmental goals 
and priority areas. It covers many substantive environmental policy 
areas, some of which are now in the Environment Bill.77 The 25 Year 
Plan also links tightly to Part 1 (Governance) of the Environment Bill. 
Clause 7 provides that the 25 Year Plan is the first Environmental 
Improvement Plan (EIP) under the Bill; EIPs are to constitute a new 
English environmental policy programme, reviewed and revised every 
five years, under the Bill. The wholly aspirational and non-binding nature 
of the objectives in the Plan also laid the ground for advocacy around 
the targets chapter of the Bill. Finally, the 25 Year Plan promised that 
‘Government will launch a consultation in early 2018 on establishing a 
new, world-leading, independent, statutory body to give the environment 
a voice, championing and upholding environmental standards as we 
leave the European Union’.78 This was the EPG Consultation, which ran 
between May and August. As is apparent from the title, this was framed 
clearly around principles and governance.
Environmental NGOs engaged vigorously with the 25 Year Plan, 
and the EPG Consultation. Perhaps surprisingly, given its dry title, NGO 
membership also rallied around the EPG Consultation – there were over 
176,000 consultation responses.79 Two of the primary overarching 
criticisms of the 25 Year Plan relate to equivalence. First, many of the 
targets or aspirations in the 25 Year Plan either did not exceed or were 
weaker than existing EU standards; and secondly, the 25 Year Plan did 
not commit to legally binding obligations on government. The proposals 
in the EPG Consultation were welcomed in principle, but also strongly 
criticised. Improvements in the scope and depth of the measures were 
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made when the consultation was developed in the draft Environment 
(Principles and Governance) Bill, discussed below, although fundamental 
flaws (capable of severely undermining the provisions) survive to the 
time of writing. We discuss the progress of principles and governance in 
more detail in chapter 7.
At the same time as the EPG Consultation, the European Union 
(Withdrawal) Act 2018 was making its way through Parliament. As 
well as providing for the repeal of the European Communities Act 
1972, and creating the new category of ‘retained law’, discussed in 
chapter 1, this Act made three other important contributions to our 
story.
First, it provided for the introduction of secondary legislation to 
deal with ‘any failure of retained EU law to operate effectively’, or ‘any 
other deficiency in retained EU law’.80 This ‘tidying up’ exercise, designed 
to address provisions that no longer work once the UK is not a member of 
the EU (such as a role for EU institutions), was a demanding process for 
DEFRA civil servants, NGOs and Parliament. It has also provided fertile 
ground for the use of law and legal expertise, as civil society sought to 
ensure that government stayed within the powers granted under the 
legislation. It was:
literally a case of going through the relevant directives, you know, 
the European law, as applies to the UK now, regulations. So 
if they’re already directly applicable to us, we’ll go through 
the domestic regulations, look at it and say, ‘Okay, if this is 
maintained ...’ going through it line by line (Interviewee 15).
Interviewee 5 suggested that ‘the simple proposition is that in some 
instances, the Government has taken the opportunity – this is the 
sceptical version of it, obviously, this is the spun version of it – to not just 
implement but also undermine on the way through’.81
This process has arguably brought the insufficiency of NGO legal 
capacity centre stage, a factor we discuss in chapter 2 when looking at 
resource mobilisation theories. The sector has ‘done its best to cope with 
the deluge of instruments that Government’s put out’ (Interviewee 6), 
but ‘I suspect there was a capacity question because people didn’t grind 
their way through the regs’ (Interviewee 5); or a broader capacity issue 
around understanding what law might do (on which see chapter 5): 
‘I think people maybe didn’t know to grind their way through the regs’ 
(Interviewee 5 – emphasis added). We should be cautious given the 
extraordinary extent of the challenge,82 and both Greener UK and Wildlife 
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and Countryside Link coordinated work on the statutory instruments. 
This suggests, however, a degree of mutual reinforcement between 
available legal resource and valuing legal expertise, to which we return 
in subsequent chapters.
Second, section 13 of the EU (Withdrawal) Act required what 
became known as a ‘meaningful vote’ by Parliament on the terms of the 
UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Headed ‘Parliamentary approval of the 
outcome of negotiations by the EU’, section 13 provided that a withdrawal 
agreement with the EU can only be ratified if laid before Parliament and 
approved by the House of Commons. Whilst obviously not an explicitly 
environmental provision, this is what brought the four attempts by two 
Prime Ministers to pass an EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill back to 
Parliament, before finally the fifth attempt became the EU (Withdrawal 
Agreement) Act 2020. All of these Bills constituted political opportunity, 
within which the NGO community lobbied Parliament and Government, 
and all save the fifth attempt involved parliamentary arithmetic that gave 
the Parliament unusually direct power over whether legislation can pass. 
Debates were held and promises (or even amendments) were made 
around the first four bills on issues including deregulation and regression, 
and the impact of trade negotiations on environmental protection.
Third, and more directly relevant, section 16 of the EU (Withdrawal) 
Act 2018, headed ‘Maintenance of Environmental Principles, etc.’, is 
unprecedented. It provides that the Secretary of State ‘must’ within six 
months ‘publish a draft Bill’, ‘consisting of’:
(a) a set of environmental principles,
(b) a duty on the Secretary of State to publish a statement of policy 
in relation to the application and interpretation of those 
principles in connection with the making and development of 
policies by Ministers of the Crown,
(c) a duty which ensures that Ministers of the Crown must have 
regard, in circumstances provided for by or under the Bill, to the 
statement mentioned in paragraph (b),
(d) provisions for the establishment of a public authority with 
functions for taking, in circumstances provided for by or under 
the Bill, proportionate enforcement action (including legal 
proceedings if necessary) where the authority considers that a 
Minister of the Crown is not complying with environmental law 
(as it is defined in the Bill), 
 […]
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Subsection 2 listed a set of environmental principles. Although imperfect 
in its substance,83 introducing this amendment to the legislation tied 
government down, before its EPG Consultation was complete, providing 
parliament with the opportunity to deliberate on a draft Bill. By keeping 
environmental governance on the parliamentary agenda when we might 
have expected the high constitutional and political drama of Brexit 
to have overwhelmed all else, section 16 was a major achievement for 
environmental NGOs and their allies who had lobbied intensively around 
the future of environmental governance and principles post-Brexit. Many 
of our interviewees referred to the work around the 2018 Act as a key 
moment. Section 16 indicates the way in which the community (through 
Greener UK in particular) grasped the opportunity presented by the 
parliamentary logic, the political significance of the environment, and 
the existence of a Bill that could be amended. And they used that to 
create further political opportunity for themselves: the upshot of section 
16 was the draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill, around 
which they again worked hard.84
Late 2018 to mid-2019: legislative drafts and political turmoil
In November 2018, the UK Government and the European Council 
reached a draft Withdrawal Agreement and a draft Political Declaration 
on the future relationship between the EU and the UK.85 It contained 
the famous/notorious Northern Ireland ‘backstop’, more formally the 
Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland,86 which contained a number of 
significant environmental provisions. The Protocol was to enter into force 
at the end of the transition period only if not superseded by a trade 
agreement. Its purpose was to avoid a ‘hard’ customs border between 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland, given the history of 
violence along that border and the wish to support the peace process 
institutionalised by the Good Friday Agreement.87 Reflecting the second 
and fifth of our Brexit-environment characteristics, the environmental 
provisions in the Protocol, within a complex draft Treaty and a complex 
institutional environment, created a space for legal expertise.
Article 6 of the Protocol provided for the continuance of a ‘single 
customs territory’ between the UK and the EU. ‘With a view to ensuring 
the maintenance of the level playing field conditions required for 
the proper functioning’ of the single customs territory, it (inter alia) 
would have given effect to Annex 4 of the Protocol. Part 2 of the Annex 
contains environmental provisions. It introduces what amounted to a 
non-regression principle, requiring that ‘the level of environmental 
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protection provided by law, regulations and practices is not reduced 
below the level provided by the common standards applicable within 
the Union and the United Kingdom’ at the end of the transition period. 
It would have required the respect of four environmental principles: 
precaution, prevention, source and polluter pays. And it would have 
required the UK to ensure effective enforcement of those provisions, 
and to set up ‘a transparent system for the effective domestic monitoring, 
oversight and enforcement of its obligations … by an independent and 
adequately resourced body or bodies’.88 It is easy to see how these 
provisions provide a ‘legal hook’ (to quote our participants89), an 
opportunity for legal advocacy. It supported the case for the OEP, 
essentially providing an argument that these agreed conditions should 
provide a starting point for the future of environmental law in the UK.90
In December 2018, a draft Environment (Principles and Governance) 
Bill was published for pre-legislative scrutiny.91 The draft Bill had three 
main elements: a framework for a set of environmental principles;92 a 
requirement on the Secretary of State to prepare an EIP; and provision 
for a new public body, the OEP.93 Importantly, the draft Bill was only part 
of a Bill. Substantive environmental provisions were promised, but with 
no detail on what would be addressed.94
The Environmental Audit Committee and the EFRA Committee 
produced broadly consistent pre-legislative scrutiny reports. The EFRA 
Committee emphasised equivalence: ‘the overwhelming narrative from 
the evidence to our inquiry is that the draft Bill’s provisions for principles 
and governance are not equivalent to the current environmental protec-
tions provided by membership of the EU.’95 Evidence provided by lawyers 
(academics, barristers, Parliamentary counsel, NGO lawyers) is most 
heavily cited in the report. It is clearly not the case that only lawyers can 
participate; the Environmental Audit Committee cited a wider range of 
sources, albeit including lawyers.
The approval and implementation of the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement by the UK Parliament was to be provided for by the EU 
(Withdrawal Agreement) Bill. This Bill, or versions of it, and hence the 
2018 Withdrawal Agreement with the EU, was famously rejected by 
Parliament three times. As a result of an inability to get her legislative 
programme through Parliament, and a more general loss of authority, 
Theresa May resigned from her leadership of the Conservative Party.96 
Boris Johnson was chosen by party members to lead the Conservative 
Party, and hence became Prime Minister in July 2019. Michael Gove 
was moved from DEFRA to the position of Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster, which notwithstanding its archaic name is a powerful cabinet 
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role giving him oversight of the implementation of government policy. 
Theresa Villiers was appointed Secretary of State for EFRA. There was no 
significant shift of approach from the ‘Green Brexit’ rhetoric.
The next few months were extraordinarily fractious in Parliament 
and Government; by way of illustration only, 22 MPs resigned the 
Conservative whip on one day in September 2019; the Party then 
withdrew the whip from 21 more MPs.97 Brexit, or leave/remain, had by 
now become the primary political fault line, within political parties, 
government and parliament,98 and arguably also people at large. The 
environment, especially given the largely cohesive voice of the movement 
(see chapter 6) may have been a welcome way of speaking across the 
division. An Environment Bill was laid before Parliament in October 
2019. It is important to emphasise the scale of this Bill, with 130 clauses 
and 17 schedules, covering the governance issues set out above, and a 
wide range of environmental issues. Its contents are almost identical to 
the provisions of the Environment Bill 2020.
Prime Minister Boris Johnson and the European Council reached an 
amended draft Withdrawal Agreement and a draft Political Declaration on 
the future relationship between the EU and the UK in October 2019. The 
Northern Ireland ‘backstop’ was fundamentally changed, such that 
Northern Ireland will have a very different relationship with the EU from 
the rest of the UK, tying it more closely to the EU in order to avoid a hard 
border on the island of Ireland.99 The ‘level playing field’ and environmental 
provisions that had been in the first draft Withdrawal Agreement were 
removed, removing some of the legal ‘hooks’ mentioned above. The new 
EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill was rejected by Parliament.
December 2019 to june 2020: getting brexit done – interrupted
A General Election was called for December 2019, Parliament was 
dissolved and the Environment Bill fell. The election returned a working 
majority of 87 parliamentary seats for the Conservative Party.100 The 
rollercoaster debate over whether the UK would, after all, leave the EU 
was over. The executive began to reassert its accustomed dominance 
(and more101) over the legislature, meaning that the first of our political 
opportunity categories is completely changed, and along with it, the 
position for those NGOs attempting to influence environmental law and 
governance. The EU ‘equivalence’ framing also diminished. From the 
Government’s perspective, Brexit was ‘done’, and need not be discussed 
further, and any reference to EU environmental standards was resisted. 
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This was reflected in environmental NGO publications and behaviour. 
And Michael Gove had already moved on. The interest of civil servants 
in engaging with the sector was unabated, however, and environ- 
mental protection remained an important political and policy issue.102 
Environmental protection had been unprecedentedly important to 
voters in the run-up to the 2019 election,103 and Government rhetoric 
of high levels of environmental protection persisted.
The utterly changed parliamentary landscape, and its impact 
on their approach, was recognised by our interviewees. We quoted 
Interviewee 16 above (page 57) on the role of Parliament before the 
2019 election: ‘then once the election was called and there was a new 
composition in Parliament […] you weren’t gonna necessarily win that 
much in Parliament anyway.’ Interviewee 2 also noted that ‘the politics 
of it also have shifted, so obviously now we’ve a Government with an 
eighty majority, and so there is a realisation that, you know, getting the 
bill amended will be very difficult’.
Different approaches to these altered (reduced) political opportu-
nities are contemplated. The ‘inside-track approach’ may
become less effective as an approach overall, because of the 
changing nature of Parliament […] So you need to then be able to 
say, ‘Okay, we need to switch into a different mode now which is 
more, let’s say, campaign-heavy’ (unattributed).
As we note in chapter 2 (page 31), several of our interviewees suggested 
that ‘outsider’ campaigning work may be a gap in Greener UK’s portfolio. 
From the perspective of political opportunity theory, our inability to 
extend our research to explore the sector’s activities throughout 2020 
may be a limitation. However, alongside a sharp focus on the progress of 
the Environment Bill, Greener UK (and its members) are considering 
more ‘campaigning’ activity, although not necessarily on governance.104 
Others saw insider work as no less significant, just different, for example 
emphasising Government over Parliament: ‘There’s a lot more trying to 
work with Government, you know, obviously you can’t try and influence 
amendments by getting a small number of back bench Tory MPs to side, 
or to vote with the Labour amendment, for example’ (Interviewee 2). But 
although the ability of Parliament to stop Government pursuing its 
agenda through legislative votes has more or less gone with the new 
majority Government, the influence of Parliament does not disappear. 
Even a parliament in which government has a large majority may enjoy 
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some influence at different policy stages, in behind-the-scenes discussions 
and in government efforts to anticipate parliamentary reactions.105 A 
changing approach to Parliament is recognised by Interviewee 9:
we shouldn’t expect really any amendments to be made frankly. 
What we need to do is to create an environment where we can 
persuade the Government of our arguments, if possible, and that 
can be much more about making sure that the debate is the one that 
you want to have, rather than the actual accuracy of every specific 
amendment.
This suggests a continued role for strong and focused insider lobbying, 
which is clearly also happening.
Some crucial features of political opportunity have closed down for 
environmental groups since the end of 2019. According to much of the 
literature, simply put, such a lack of political opportunity might drive 
a group towards litigation over lobbying. The relationship between 
political and legal opportunity is less straightforward in our case. 
Litigation may not be available as a response to the ‘governance gap’, 
but more importantly, our hybrid political–legal opportunity is about 
the role of legal expertise within a political space, and so the closing 
down of that political space also limits the impact of legal expertise. 
There will nevertheless be continued engagement with Parliament and 
Government during the passage of the Environment Bill, as suggested 
by Interviewee 9 above. Further, in a topic we return to in our final 
conclusions to chapter 8, Royal Assent to an Act is not the end of the 
story. Even a perfect Environment Act will require careful scrutiny and 
attention if it is to do the best work for the environment. Interviewee 
16 suggests that ‘the lawyers can actually have quite a strong role in 
trying to make what’s there work a lot better’.
The EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Bill returned to Parliament in 
the days after the election, passed swiftly through Parliament, and 
the UK left the EU on 31 January 2020. In an indication of the way 
that concessions made in debate may fail to stick, the Government’s 
parliamentary majority, and largely supportive back benches, meant that 
the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 differed from the one rejected 
by Parliament in October 2019. Clause 31 of the earlier version of the 
Bill, which provided for Parliamentary involvement in the negotiation 
of the future relationship with the EU, was deleted. Government 
would have been required to seek approval of its negotiating objectives, 
and to report on progress every three months. Trade measures can have 
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a very significant impact on the environment, and this space for 
Parliamentary scrutiny would also have provided political opportunity 
for the environmental sector. Secondly, in debate on the October 2019 
Withdrawal Agreement Bill, the Prime Minister had undertaken to 
include a legally binding ‘non-regression’ clause.106 There was no sign of 
that in the 2020 Act.
And thirdly, the EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018 provided that decisions 
of the EU and UK courts would continue to be binding; only the Supreme 
Court107 could depart from retained EU case law.108 Section 26 of the 
EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020 inserts a new subsection to 
the 2018 Act. This allows a minister to make regulations during the 
Implementation Period, having consulted the senior judiciary, which 
provide for any relevant court or tribunal not to be bound by retained EU 
case law, and the test to be applied in such a case. The regulations can 
also set out the considerations relevant to applying that test. As well as 
raising broader constitutional questions,109 this potentially undermines 
the stability that the 2018 Act aimed for, and allows government to pick 
and choose the areas of law that it wishes to maintain. It may also limit 
legal opportunity in the conventional, court-oriented sense, as well as in 
advocacy – legal stock could become less favourable. And the regulations, 
which are subject to affirmative procedure in parliament, will make 
considerable demands on the legal resources of NGOs.
The Environment Bill was published on 30 January 2020, with very 
few changes from the Bill published in 2019, and had its second reading 
in the House of Commons on 26 February. The second reading debate 
was wide-ranging across the issues covered by the Bill. There were very 
few references to the EU, to Brexit or to equivalence – the process had 
been more or less entirely domesticated. The Public Bill Committee sat 
seven times before proceedings were postponed due to the pandemic. 
It heard oral evidence from witnesses representing business, NGOs, 
local government and government regulators, in an impressive effort to 
consider all of the broad topics covered by the Bill, at the obvious cost of 
depth. The Committee had debated the first six clauses of the 133 clause, 
19 schedule Bill when its meetings were suspended. At the time of 
writing, proceedings are yet to recommence.
Regardless of what happens to the Bill as a result of the response to 
Covid-19, it is worth thinking about the impact of the virus on political 
opportunity. There is of course a risk that the economic harm done by 
the lockdown will trigger a ‘recovery at any cost’ mentality, in which 
environmentally progressive measures are postponed and many of those 
with power are not interested in hearing from environmental groups. 
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Even if we assume that the Environment Bill, or parts of it, is not openly 
abandoned or weakened, a rushed and poorly scrutinised Bill is made 
more likely by the virus, because time and space in Parliament is limited.110 
The quality of formal engagement of civil society with Parliament is 
uncertain, and informal contacts with parliamentarians and staff may be 
even more difficult. DEFRA is working remotely, with its own challenges 
around engagement. Many of the civil servants engaged on the Bill have 
been transferred to Covid-19 work, amplifying existing resource issues in 
government. And the lockdown is likely to hit environmental groups 
(along with almost every other sector of the economy) rather hard. The 
world is very uncertain:
I think we all thought, well this’ll be a stable parliament, there’ll 
be stable timetables, we’ll know kind of how everything will 
work now. And obviously the current world events have thrown 
everything up in the air again and thrown it all out the window […] 
we are in extraordinary, new extraordinary times (Interviewee 2).
Conclusions
Public life in the UK has been divided and fractious since the run-up 
to the 2016 Brexit referendum. In this chapter, we have explored 
the features of our case study through the lens of political opportunity. 
Our case study confirms the literature’s emphasis on external political 
opportunity for shaping NGO activities and success, and we are confident 
that the story we tell would have been different had the external context 
been different. However, political opportunity is not determinative, 
and we return also to the internal organisational context throughout 
this book, especially resources (including expertise), identity, ideas 
and values.111
Although some of our interviewees observed that the drama made 
working life difficult for many, for the two and a half years between the 
General Elections of 2017 and 2019 the political opportunities were 
highly receptive to the insider, expert approach pursued by the sector. 
Brexit has brought the demand for expertise to the centre of power, with 
government and parliament both highly receptive, or even demanding, 
of expertise. And some aspects of the external context, what we have 
called hybrid political–legal opportunity, emphasise legal expertise. 
So although the public drama of Brexit illustrates the complexity and 
dynamism of the circumstances in which environmental NGO advocacy 
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takes place and highlights the difficulties of making generalisations about 
NGO advocacy, it has illuminated the ways and circumstances in which 
environmental NGOs use law and legal expertise.
Political opportunity is dynamic and its shifts and changes are 
difficult to pin down or represent. Environmental groups experience 
open and closed, receptive and unreceptive, political features all at the 
same time. They need to be agile and quick to respond. This in turn feeds 
back into questions of group resources.
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4
Law and legal expertise
Introduction
Our aim in this project is to enhance understanding of the use of ‘law’ and 
‘legal expertise’ by environmental groups. We start from the observation 
that something recognisably composed of ‘legal expertise’ is sometimes 
called on by environmental groups (and others) when they advocate 
social, policy or legal change.
We begin this chapter by discussing some very well-known 
challenges to and critiques of expertise as a mode of decision-making, 
which we suggest apply as much to legal expertise as to the areas of 
regulatory science that are the focus of the legally-oriented science and 
technology studies (STS) literature. Starting from the proposition that 
expertise alone provides a problematic basis for decision-making, we are 
concerned in particular that over-emphasising technical legal debate 
might render crucial normative disagreement inaccessible, bracketing or 
postponing the underlying debate.
This discussion complicates our central analytical category of ‘legal 
expertise’, drawing on rich and diverse literatures. Legal scholars of many 
stripes are interested in what is special about the knowledge and practice 
of law; scholars from a range of disciplines have paid attention to who 
or what constitutes an ‘expert’ or ‘expertise’; the making and nature of 
knowledge are central concerns of STS. We do not attempt to synthesise 
or summarise the diverse literature, but bearing in mind the purpose 
of our project, exploring the complexity and contestedness of ‘legal 
expertise’ is crucial. We leave to one side the jurisprudentially interesting 
and complex question of what ‘law’ is. The diversity of laws, sources, 
actors, methods and materials is crucial to our discussion in this chapter. 
For the purposes of identifying the use of law by environmental groups, 
however, in this and the next chapter, we focus on formal state, EU and 
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international law. We do recognise that the line between soft and hard 
law is blurred, and that legal material may embrace policy in interesting 
ways. Exercising legal expertise may involve more than ‘using’ formal law.
We then turn to the identification of ‘expertise’. Legal expertise is a 
complex phenomenon. The literature suggests that what legal expertise 
is, who holds it and is entitled to speak on it, is constructed during the 
process, by both the expert and the broader community, ideally openly 
and deliberatively. An abstract a priori definition of expertise would be 
unhelpful (if it is even possible), not just for the reasons discussed below, 
but also because we are as interested in how our participants understand 
and use legal expertise as we are in an abstract idea of what it ‘is’. 
But as a starting point, which is not inconsistent with even the contesting 
positions discussed in this chapter, we understand expertise, with 
Liz Fisher, as a matter of sufficient ‘knowledge, skills and experience’.1 
These three interlocking criteria are neither decisive nor final, and 
other constructions are possible.2 They do however provide a useful 
analytical starting point for the final section of this chapter, in which we 
draw on our interviews to explore how the environmental NGO sector 
understands legal expertise. As should be clear from our discussion in 
this and following chapters, there is considerable legal expertise in the 
environmental NGO community, which has been impressively marshalled 
and deployed in response to the shape of political–legal opportunity 
during the Brexit process. However, we conclude here that the relative 
scarcity of legal resource discussed in chapter 2 is matched by a weak 
understanding of the complexity and diversity of legal expertise, and 
even a little complacency about how well equipped the sector really is.
The fragility of expertise
Categories we use to make sense of the world, such as fact/value (or 
expertise/politics, or science/society, or knowledge/power) are partially 
socially and politically constructed. Nor are they neatly severable. Any 
tendency to assume that the first of each of these pairs can be extracted 
in a neutral, objective way from the world, and simply inserted into the 
second, is convincingly challenged by decades of work stressing the social 
context and commitments of experts and expertise, and rejecting the 
autonomy of ‘facts’ from society. As Yvonne Rydin puts it, the consensus 
that bright lines can be drawn between nature and society, and that 
knowledge (or expertise or science) will hold a mirror to nature for the 
benefit of society, no longer holds.3 Our understanding of our physical 
LAw AnD LegAL expertise 81
and social worlds are thickly entwined. And just as ‘the facts’ cannot be 
taken for granted, as something that exists independently of society, ‘out 
there’ and waiting to be discovered, nor can ‘the social’. Society (or value, 
politics, power) is also partially constructed by ‘facts’, by what and how 
we know about the world.4 These binaries are blurred.
Our understanding of law is not innocent of values and politics. 
Although we may assert propositions of law, law is also an element of 
social life and an instrument or representation of power. Law is not ‘a 
datum, a fact, unproblematic and one-dimensional’;5 the meaning and 
role of law is constructed rather than found. The challenges that this 
poses to the ‘truth’ of legal propositions are well represented in legal 
scholarship, with considerable scrutiny of objective presentations of 
law.6 That law is partially constructed as a result of exogenous forces 
(rather than entirely autonomous and self-contained) is, with varying 
emphases, commonplace, alongside an openly normative and critical 
approach to law’s persistent autonomy and influence.7 Law itself can 
construct meaning, establishing facts about the way the world works.
As well as this scholarly take, as academics we experience the 
contestedness of law in unrealistic or simplistic external expectations of 
us as ‘lawyers’, when we are sometimes expected ‘to identify “the law”, 
stripped of complexity and preferably in the form of a rule of obligation 
that is specific to a limited social setting’.8 Beyond the academy, legal 
experts might be more inclined than others to recognise (if only implicitly) 
the contingent and contested nature of legal arguments.9 Further, legal 
professionalism’s claims may be ‘precarious’10 in a way reminiscent of the 
broader fragility of expertise. In practice and in scholarship, what the law 
‘is’ is contestable: ‘an applicable legal norm on anything but the most 
banal question is like to be complex, nuanced and contested’.11
Scholarship on expertise highlights the elusiveness of ‘objectivity’, 
either in the sense of legal understandings that simply exist and can be 
relied upon by all people everywhere regardless of their position or 
interests, or in the sense of an utterly disinterested state of mind.12 While 
discussing our project, we heard from one legal practitioner (not an 
interviewee) that legal arguments from NGO lawyers in the Brexit debate 
(in Select Committees and the like) cannot be taken particularly seriously 
because of the lawyers’ commitment to the cause. To an extent, this is a 
version of the ‘only the left have politics’ school of thought (is it true that 
those who are uncommitted to environmental protection are neutral 
or objective?).13 The concern about disinterestedness or objectivity is 
interestingly paradoxical, however, because the last thing practising 
lawyers expect is even-handedness; on the contrary, partisanship is 
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demanded of lawyers, whatever their personal beliefs, when representing 
clients in our adversarial system.14 But there is something in it. Although 
practising lawyers are expected to commit professionally to their clients’ 
agenda, irrespective of its ethics,15 there is also an associated expectation 
of ‘affective neutrality’, an ‘emotional distance from clients’,16 perhaps 
enabling ‘neutral’ advice.17 One of our interviewees suggested that as a 
lawyer ‘even if you’re part of a campaign group and your morals and your 
goals are there, you’ve got to be detached [...] and be realistic and 
not read into things’ (Interviewee 10). NGO lawyers, or other lawyers 
committed to environmental values (including us), might be perceived to 
breach this norm of detachment.18
Our practitioner may have been alluding to different expectations 
as to partisanship in different settings, including appearing as an ‘expert’ 
before a Select Committee or in discussions with government. But if the 
partisan legal expert may, when engaging in policy-making, be expected 
to ‘check her clients at the door’, the idea that we could leave behind our 
‘conceptual frameworks’, our whole way of understanding the world, just 
takes us back to the elusiveness of objective expertise.19 Nevertheless, 
an expectation that experts (including legal experts) should be even-
handed and open-minded is more plausible than the suggestion that we 
should be ‘objective’. It speaks to behaviour as much as to knowledge, 
skills and experience, in a gloss on our tripartite division of expertise 
above.20 Sheila Jasanoff’s discussion of objectivity as a hard-won social 
achievement is not intended as a criticism (or indeed as praise).21 It 
describes the social labour involved in producing something (knowledge) 
that is good enough, and socially sensitive enough, for the purposes it 
is required.22
And our practitioner’s concern about commitedness speaks also to 
credibility in these fora, which in fact resonates with a number of our 
interviewees: ‘mostly if you get something from barristers it’s because you 
want to be absolutely certain about the credibility of it’ (Interviewee 14); 
see also chapter 5. If the recipients of expert contributions simply 
think ‘Well, they would say that, wouldn’t they?’ (Interviewee 10), that 
contribution is not going to be helpful. A number of interviewees shared a 
tactical understanding that advice from an ‘establishment’ (Interviewee 5) 
barrister who is not associated with the environmental movement would 
be more effective than advice from the usual suspects.23
The elusiveness of value-free arguments leads to multiple insights 
on the fragility of legal expertise as uniquely influential in decision-
making. Another longstanding tenet of STS emphasises the importance 
of deciding which facts matter: the salience of factual propositions 
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is a social question.24 Scientific risk assessment’s facts about ‘safety’ 
might close down arguments by underestimating or underemphasising 
its normative underpinnings, and presenting certain outcomes as 
inevitable:25 the safety of (for example) chlorine-washed chicken may 
not be the most publicly salient issue; the concern could equally be with 
animal welfare, the survival of valued forms of farming or associated 
broader environmental pollution.
This is not new to lawyers, whose concerns about juridification 
or excessive legalisation are longstanding.26 It speaks somewhat to the 
ways in which propositions about law, for example in the debate on the 
environmental principles discussed below, might close down political 
arguments, in just the same way as propositions about ‘safety’. A legal 
way of seeing the world may be similarly self-perpetuating: ‘strategic 
legal action expresses, reflects, and often deepens reliance on legal 
frames of meaning-making’.27 As we suggest throughout this book, the 
availability of legal expertise contributes to the perceived need for legal 
expertise. The description of litigation as ‘a careless way to do politics’ 
(which we understand as replacing ‘is it right?’ with ‘is it lawful?’) by one 
of the participants in Lisa Vanhala’s study of environmental litigation, 
may reflect recognition of this phenomenon in the environmental NGO 
community.28
This raises significant questions for the role of law in advocacy 
around the environmental implications of Brexit. Prolonged disagree-
ment over whether the EU ‘environmental principles’ are binding 
on administrative actors in routine administrative decision-making 
illustrates some of the issues. EU and domestic case law galore provides 
authority for the proposition that the principles must be applied by 
administrative decision-makers in all relevant cases.29 Government, 
however, has insisted that the principles are not binding in EU law,30 and 
that hence its limited vision for the principles is ‘equivalent’ to the 
EU regime.31 Perhaps the disagreement is in the more subtle question 
of what we mean by ‘binding’:32 although they must be applied, the 
environmental principles do not dictate a single answer in all (or possibly 
any) cases. Perhaps the difficulty is that (our) expertise contradicts lived 
experience: on occasion we were told that people working in relevant 
areas have never heard of certain of the principles – so how can they 
possibly have been bound by them all along?33 Or perhaps government 
is emphasising doubt in order to avoid acknowledging a diminution in 
environmental protection.
This may be a fairly simple, if troubling, case of expert disagree-
ment, or even a deliberate manipulation of ambiguity. Regardless of 
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the authenticity of the ‘technical’ disagreement, the ‘legal’ argument 
might simply be too narrow a framing. Is this really a discussion about 
the (apparently objective, expert) question of whether the post-Brexit 
statutory arrangements on environmental principles have a similar 
legal impact to existing EU provisions? Or is it really about the normative 
question: are environmental principles a positive addition to the legal 
landscape, and if so, should they look more or less as they do now? 
Interviewee 7 agreed:
But actually the argument, for example, of equivalence with the 
Commission or the principles working equivalently, that’s more a 
political and a policy argument than a legal argument. There’s no 
reason why the UK has to do things the same. So I think it’s actually 
kind of more useful to be clear that what you’re making is a political 
argument rather than trying to sort of wrap it by saying, you know, 
pretending it’s a legal argument when it’s not.
More fundamentally, the legal argument takes Brexit for granted, never 
engaging with the rights and wrongs of leaving the EU, or the process 
that brought us here: ‘there’s a lot of effort working on Brexit but not 
spending that effort to oppose Brexit’ (unattributed). It also takes 
for granted the persistence of formal regulation and environmental 
protection measures in a post-Brexit UK. A focus on legal equivalence 
postponed34 engagement with the possibility that opposition to the EU 
in some cases opposes precisely the EU’s legal institutions, including 
its environmental rules and regulations, and domestic government’s 
accountability. And indeed it brackets all of the longstanding concerns 
about the quality and effectiveness of EU environmental protection 
measures. Arguing from law occupies the space in which some might 
have argued against Brexit, and others might have argued for or against 
the regulatory state. It may be part of an effort (conscious or unconscious) 
to close down the deeper questions.
The closing down of the discussion of reasons and deeper objectives 
is problematic, especially if it means that government decisions or actions 
(like dismantling environmental protection), which should be subject 
to debate, are done by stealth. But we do not suggest that it is always 
to be denigrated. It was an understandable response of a bruised NGO 
community, who probably saw little alternative to engaging with a 
Secretary of State and Prime Minister who, as discussed in chapter 3, 
from mid-2017 were promising so much. Large parts of the NGO 
community were also keen to maintain ‘neutrality’ on Brexit, in part 
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because of concern about lawfulness under charities law,35 but also 
because of concern about alienating NGO members. This came up in a 
number of interviews: ‘Almost certainly half of the environment groups’ 
membership voted leave. Because it’s broadly representative of where 
the public’s at’ (Interviewee 11). Put in this context, the legal focus by 
NGOs may be an effort to step back from political controversy, on the 
basis of putatively and provisionally shared values of lawfulness and high 
levels of environmental protection. A valuing of lawfulness may underpin 
and strengthen the use of legal expertise in advocacy: ‘people hate to see 
the law broken’ (Interviewee 2).
As discussed in chapter 3, the equivalence framing was driven by 
the concern that Brexit would reduce environment protection, and by a 
response to that concern through ‘Green Brexit’ Government rhetoric. 
Fear about the loss of EU environmental rules and standards, but also 
about the erosion of the broader architecture of EU environmental law 
discussed in chapter 3 (the governance gap), took centre stage. Law also 
had a high status in the broader debate about how to leave the EU, 
exemplified perhaps by the two Supreme Court Miller judgements,36 and 
the associated sensitivity of political actors and the public to legal ways of 
thinking about Brexit.
The focus on governance, equivalence and law by environmental 
NGOs was a legitimate (if contestable) decision. Non-legal approaches 
to equivalence would have been possible, for example by focusing 
on equivalence of outcomes or policy rather than law. Once the debate 
had been framed as primarily about equivalence, and equivalence as 
about legal standards, policy- and law-makers, but also media and the 
environmental NGO community itself, became hungry for legal expertise.
Identifying expertise
In this section, we ask what we mean by ‘legal expertise’.37 What law is, 
what lawyers do and should do, their role in society, is, as one might 
expect, addressed in a range of academic legal work; arguably virtually 
the whole of legal scholarship. For example, in environmental law 
specifically, Liz Fisher characterises environmental law scholarship as ‘a 
form of expertise’.38 She is primarily preoccupied with scholarly self-
reflection, the skills and approaches needed in the complex, plural and 
dynamic field of environmental law. Fisher positions legal scholarship 
within Richard Sennett’s idea of craft as care for the thing in itself, 
for quality.39
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An emphasis on the significance of the social context for expertise 
pervades otherwise distinctive approaches (in law and beyond).40 
Expertise is conceptualised as a practice, as a social process,41 as 
‘sociable’.42 ‘Tacit’ knowledge43 or expertise (‘the taken for granted, the 
unspoken, the unspeakable’44) can only be acquired, and is created and 
exercised, within a community.45 Expertise is not a ‘thing’ that exists 
in isolation, but speaks only from and within a community. Closely 
linked to this is an emphasis on institutional context: for example, 
Jasanoff emphasises the institutions of the state and of administration 
for ‘regulatory science’;46 Fisher, the institutions of and surrounding 
universities.47 The set of institutions are part of what sustains expertise 
as a meaningful category. Gil Eyal finds ‘expertise’ not in individuals or 
specific institutions, but in a more diffuse network, which ‘produces, 
reproduces and disseminates expert statements or performances’, 
so that attention must be paid to ‘the mechanisms that secure the 
cooperation of … other parties involved’.48 Eyal blurs the boundaries 
between producers and users, which is also apparent in our case study: 
the NGO community is not simply a producer of expertise, but also an 
avid recipient of expertise from academics and practitioners (who in 
turn learn from NGO expertise);49 policy and law-makers are not simply 
recipients of expertise, but are also holders of relevant expertise. All 
share in the production, development and use of expertise.
Expertise is frequently presented as relational, that is related to a 
third party, who is often the lay or novice ‘other’.50 This allows a pared-
down approach to experts, as being people who know (a lot) more about 
a relevant issue than non-experts. It also turns attention to the function 
of expertise in any particular context (better at what than whom?).51 The 
relation however might also be with peers, that is being addressed as an 
expert by other experts.52 Harry Collins and Robert Evans’ ‘normative 
theory of expertise’,53 which Sergio Sismondo also calls ‘realist’ (by 
contrast with a constructionist approach),54 depends not on recognition 
by the lay other, but on those who are expert in assessing that expertise, 
a ‘meta expertise’. As suggested above, expertise on this approach has an 
objective core, and that core is capable of being defined and policed by 
meta-experts, who in our case may include the community of legal 
experts.55 Collins and Evans have been criticised for their evasion of some 
of the key conclusions in STS: for reifying the distinction between facts 
and values (seeing the technical dimension and the political dimension 
as self-evidently severable), and for glossing the difficulty of identifying 
the publicly salient questions for which expertise purports to provide the 
answer.56 As discussed above, expertise can only do any work in the world 
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if accepted by the relevant audience as reliable and relevant or socially 
useful, and to that extent it must be relational. Placing the validating 
role with other experts only, so that the expert community is the sole 
place for identifying and policing expertise,57 can only be contingently 
helpful. Nevertheless, a ‘common sense’ insistence on the distinctiveness 
of expertise can be helpful, and certainly resonates with our interviewees, 
who in most cases simply assume that they will know an expert when 
they see one.
From any of these perspectives, the role of the professions in 
defining legal expertise might be a short cut to identifying expertise: 
a qualified/practising solicitor or barrister embodies expertise. From a 
social or institutional perspective, the professions create and sustain 
expertise; the legal profession’s formal (expert) gatekeeping might 
be a form of meta expertise. Professions are commonly understood as 
being organised predominantly around abstract knowledge, ‘a particular 
body of esoteric knowledge’,58 in some cases by contrast with ‘craft’ 
as technique,59 although skills and experience (and technique) are also 
significant for the professional gatekeepers. The professions are also 
differentiated from other occupations by reference to their obligations 
and commitment to the public interest, ‘the public good, rather than 
lawyers’ self-interests, or the interests of government, or […] private 
interests such as powerful clients’.60
Ideas of professionalism in law are complex, contested and 
constructed,61 from the conceptual and practical questions as to ‘which’ 
knowledge, skills and experience suffice for entry,62 to how seriously 
lawyers take the (anyway contested) public interest.63 We do not seek 
to add to the rich literature on the role, ethicality or competence of 
the legal profession, valuable as it would be to examine NGO lawyers 
from that perspective.64 It is however clear that, unless one takes a very 
thin realist perspective, a reliance on professional (or for that matter 
academic) credentials simply displaces the debate, from what constitutes 
‘expertise’ to what criteria must be satisfied for professional or academic 
accreditation, and whether our ‘expert’ possesses them.
Looking to professional identity may nevertheless, as suggested 
above, be a common-sense short cut as to ‘good enough’ legal expertise 
on some occasions, and is referred to by a small number of our 
interviewees. When commissioning external assistance, professional 
credentialing (specifically ‘QC-ness’, so high status65) seems to be 
important, as suggested above; the advice of a QC can be reassuring, ‘to 
check that I’ve not, like there’s not some sort of secret lawyer thing that 
I’ve missed’ (unattributed).
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But this high-status professional qualification is clearly not 
perceived by our participants as the only way of being an expert or 
demonstrating expertise, and we agree. We, and some of our interviewees, 
observed individuals who had become experts in areas (either law or 
areas of law) in which they were not trained.66 Interviewee 13 asserted 
strongly that non-lawyers have lawyerly skills: ‘It’s policy folk and 
advocates trying to engage in legal process and I’m not necessarily saying 
that practising lawyers or legally trained academics are any better at it’. 
A number of NGO actors with a legal background, whom we have 
clearly seen treated as legal experts by others within the community, 
do not have professional or academic legal qualifications. When we 
pressed one such individual, whom we thought to be highly legally expert 
(and who was talking expertly about legal issues at the time), s/he 
clarified: ‘I wouldn’t describe myself as a legal expert. I might, if I were 
feeling bold, describe myself as a constitutional expert on a good day’ 
(unattributed). S/he was not the only interviewee whom we considered 
to be extremely skilled users of law, but who (somewhat to our surprise) 
had no formal legal qualifications, and we witnessed what we interpreted 
as an unnecessary reluctance to claim legal expertise on a number of 
occasions.67 Institutionalisation and socialisation in law, within the NGO 
community, seems to be at least as significant as external qualifications.
Formal professional or academic accreditation only takes us so 
far theoretically and is far from decisive in practice. Importantly, we 
have not come across any public challenging of individuals’ or groups’ 
‘expert’ credentials; qualifications and experience are not significantly 
questioned, even while what is said (the content of the expertise) may 
be strongly challenged, internally (within the NGO community) as well 
as publicly: ‘I think it was important to have enough pockets [of legal 
expertise] that they could disagree with each other as well and have 
a proper debate’ (Interviewee 8). Nor have we witnessed any serious 
questioning of self-identification as being equipped to talk expertly 
about law. Norms of professional etiquette (or basic politeness) seem to 
allow performances of lawyerliness to ‘stick’ in political debate, by stark 
contrast with the challenging of the embodiment of expertise in courts 
and public inquiries.68 Although some do emphasise the importance 
of different types of practical experience (perhaps a very gentle challenge 
to our academic expertise), as discussed below, what boundary work69 
we see in our empirical material is largely consensual and not easily 
perceived.
There may however be some complacency among our interviewees 
about how easy it is to pick up requisite legal expertise. Interviewee 
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13’s quotation above hints at this. One of our interviewees, a very 
experienced EU and domestic lawyer, clearly had something of an 
internal organisational battle to be allowed to speak for the organisation 
on Brexit. This perception is reinforced by the possible undervaluing 
of legal specialisation, discussed in the next section. Contributions 
based on lengthy specialisation seem to be largely taken for granted, 
simply appropriated into a (sometimes simplified) ‘common knowledge’.70 
Those whom we refer to above as non-lawyer experts had years of 
immersion in different legal environments.
Knowledge, skills and experience
Our tripartite gloss on ‘expertise’ is not decisive or complete, but it is a 
useful way of delving more deeply into our participants’ understanding 
of legal expertise. Knowledge, skills and experience are intertwined, and 
their relative importance will vary according to context.
In terms of knowledge, the diversity of the ‘legal’ adds to the 
complexity of expertise. Knowledge and expertise are not synonyms, but 
we do not intend to draw sharp lines between them: both are contestable 
and complex, both are constructed rather than found, and both shape, as 
well as being shaped by, society.71 Complicated as ‘knowledge’ might be, 
a simple list of things a legal expert might need to know about for the 
Brexit/environment debate immediately brings out the conditionality of 
any claims to expertise in ‘law’.
Environmental law itself is a large and diverse category, from soil 
contamination to air pollution, plastics to neonicotinoids. Jurisdictionally, 
EU, UK and devolved environmental law are most obviously relevant, 
and already diverse. International environmental law is also significant. 
There has been a recurring assumption that international law is what will 
be ‘left’ in terms of external commitments once the UK leaves the EU,72 
and an insistence that the UK should comply with international law, even 
if not strictly bound to do so by domestic law.73 Further, ‘discourses of 
diffusion’74 from one jurisdiction to another pervade environmental law 
in general and Brexit-environment in particular, bringing potentially any 
other jurisdiction into the debate. The preoccupation of civil servants, 
legislators and environmental groups with successful working examples 
from other jurisdictions or areas of law (the ‘discourses of diffusion’) 
risks trivialising expertise, calling for a quick search and shallow 
understanding of somewhat random cases. Whilst this has manifested 
most commonly in behind-the-scenes communications between civil 
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servants and environmental groups,75 we also see it publicly. For example, 
DEFRA’s Consultation on Environmental Principles and Governance After 
EU Exit outlines domestic and international or foreign governance 
arrangements.76 It may be helpful and well-intended as ‘evidence based’ 
policy-making, and can be a useful tool of persuasion,77 but it is often 
superficial.
And environmental law is only the start of the story. The condition 
of the environment and the effectiveness of environmental measures are 
fundamentally linked to the institutions that surround environmental 
law, including the governance issues introduced in chapter 3. The 
intricacies of trade law (EU and WTO as well as bilateral treaties), and 
their relationship to environmental protection have been recurring 
themes, as have EU and UK constitutional and administrative law.
The subtleties of what ‘law’ involves are sometimes lost in political 
advocacy, but they can assume considerable importance as debates get 
more detailed, and some may be left behind. In our interviews, we heard 
very little engagement with this breadth and diversity of legal knowledge, 
and indeed a certain dismissiveness of legal specialisation. On occasion 
gaps in expertise were raised, most often trade,78 and looking beyond 
Brexit, Interviewee 17 suggested that NGOs ‘need a few regulatory 
specialists, who worry about regulation, not litigation. About regulatory 
design’. S/he was ‘really surprised’ at ‘how disinterested NGOs were 
with the construction, the intervention choices, the construction of law, 
whether it would be effective. Whether it had any chance of delivering 
environmental outcomes’. Interviewee 17 was talking about the world 
beyond Brexit, and we might note that this question of the construction 
and effectiveness of law has been precisely (although at a high level) 
what has driven much NGO activity around Brexit. This suggests that 
when sufficiently roused, when the issue is put straight in front of 
decision-makers, resources of expertise can be found.
As might be expected, those few who did engage in a meaningful 
way with the complexity of legal expertise were experienced and 
sophisticated users of law. Interviewee 1 was critical:
NGOs tend to recruit in a much more willy-nilly way [than 
universities or businesses]. So a policy crisis or political crisis like 
Brexit will suddenly flare up, and they won’t look around themselves 
and say, ‘Hmm, we need to have particular people to help us to win 
this battle.’ That is not how the sector organises [...] So they just 
drift into these situations. And rather than saying, ‘Okay, who are 
the best people in our sector in the UK, to get around the table to 
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really help us to think this through?’ That conversation I suspect 
never occurred.
This is sweeping. Several of our interviews suggest that Greener UK 
thoughtfully sought skills in, for example, parliamentary affairs, and in 
‘law’ generally, including at Board level.79 But it does resonate: discussions 
with those of our interviewees working in environmental NGOs on Brexit 
did seem to confirm an ad hoc approach to the allocation of human 
(expert) resources to Brexit. We were struck in particular by how few 
NGO actors working on Brexit seemed to have much prior expertise in EU 
law. When asked, only two volunteered EU experience as a reason for 
their identification to work on Brexit, with one additional interviewee 
conceding some EU expertise when pressed. Again, Interviewee 1 
expressed surprise that one particular NGO ‘didn’t put a much more 
senior Europeanist and UK-ist into that setting … their choice of lawyer, 
to assist the most senior people thinking on this, was the wrong person’. 
This also resonates with Maria’s ad hoc, but lengthy and on occasion 
intense, involvement with Greener UK’s Brexit Scenarios Group (see 
chapter 1); it seems to have been helpful, and a more formal invitation/
relationship would probably not have been appealing, but it was not a 
strategic use of academic pro bono effort.
It strikes us that NGO lawyers are expected to be generalists who 
can turn their hand to specialising in almost anything,80 and it is rarely 
appreciated how difficult it is for a generalist to engage in some of the 
more specialist debates at the right level. One interviewee expressed 
mixed feelings about specialist legal knowledge or training; ‘I think it’s 
often an advantage [not to have] a traditional legal background in lots of 
ways. Because it means that, sometimes I feel that lawyers have been 
trained in a certain way, think that things are immutable which I don’t 
think are’ (Interviewee 7). This is just the clearest example of a widespread 
ambivalence towards intense legal specialisation.81 Our sense that legal 
specialisation is undervalued was reinforced by the way in which many 
of our NGO participants talked about Wildlife and Countryside Link’s 
deep expertise in substantive environmental policy areas. This policy and 
scientific expertise was presented as inaccessible to generalists, necessary 
and distinctive – by contrast with the way our interviewees talked about 
legal specialisation.
However, Interviewee 7 later acknowledged that: ‘I think sometimes 
for the team doing some of the more kind of nitty gritty work, I think, 
actually, a deeper understanding of the, specifically EU law, would be 
valuable. But I mean you can’t have everything.’ We discussed resources 
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in chapter 2; here, resources are not just a practical limit on what 
expertise is available, but also spill into the very understanding of what 
constitutes expertise. This is reinforced by Interviewee 16 in particular, 
who commented that expanding legal resource allows an expansion into 
more ‘niche’ areas. And the expertise available, in turn, shapes not only 
what NGOs do, but what they think they ought to do, and hence what 
resources they think they need, in the circle between NGO resources and 
NGO culture that pervades our monograph.
More specifically, there is much truth in the idea that all sorts of 
people and types of knowledge (and skills and experience) can contribute 
usefully to this debate. Certainly, a legal NGO Brexit community 
composed entirely of EU environmental lawyers would have provided 
a very thin form of expertise. This size and the scope of knowledge 
required not only further destabilises any vision of legal expertise 
as monolithic or easily defined, but also emphasises the importance 
of collaboration, and of an ecosystem of knowledge within a social or 
institutional framework for expertise, as discussed in chapters 6 and 7. 
Bringing together legal experts otherwise spread thinly around different 
organisations can generate more than the sum of its parts, as they discuss, 
debate and learn, deepening their knowledge and skills, as well as 
sharing specialisation. Non-specialist perspectives can be helpful, and 
expertise can be acquired by those not trained in an area, who can 
facilitate ‘a richer, discursive’ process.82 But this requires what Collins 
and Evans call ‘interactional expertise’, sufficient expertise for meaningful 
communication with experts in an area, for example so that trade and 
constitutional law experts, environmental law experts and experts from 
other disciplines can work together. This is not a trivial form of expertise, 
and the challenge of attaining it may be underestimated in the sector.
Further, we are not just concerned with different bodies of 
knowledge. There may be different skills associated with different areas 
of law, such as reading cases from different jurisdictions. Varied skills in 
written and oral communication for different purposes and audiences 
are part of the ‘expertise’ of law, and came up a lot in our interviews.83 
Legal experts are often expected to be skilled with words, so both 
written and oral communication might be part of the legal repertoire. 
This might be in drafting skills, where ‘presentation’ can be persuasive: 
‘so the language is right, the way that it cross-referenced was right, detail 
was shoved into a schedule […] I felt that we’d be taken more seriously’ 
(Interviewee 12). This comment is about draft legislation, but legal 
drafting of other documents might be equally relevant to being taken 
‘seriously’ (and see chapter 5 on the perceived ‘authority’ of law).
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Oral communication might also be important. Some of the literature 
characterises lobbying as essentially adversarial, but consensus-seeking 
approaches are also significant, depending in part on institutional 
context.84 Legal skills might be helpful in either case: lawyers’ expertise 
might include skills in putting arguments in the strongest adversarial 
form, or in managing disagreement in a collaborative way, or both 
simultaneously. One interviewee commented that ‘lawyers with litigation 
backgrounds understand how to structure that kind of confrontation 
so that it’s not sort of shouty and you know, it’s more meaningful’ 
(unattributed). S/he also went on to say that legal training ‘makes you 
very rigorous about how you analyse material … How you combine that 
with evidence … And then how you construct arguments’. This is an 
important role for law, although maybe only lawyers see it as a uniquely 
legal skill. Another participant makes the point that science can also 
provide a ‘quite rigorous sort of way of thinking about things which 
I actually think helps when you’re thinking about campaigning or 
lobbying or influencing, ‘cause a lot of it is down to the discipline of how 
you do it’ (unattributed).
Experience is also significant and is linked to the gaining of both 
knowledge and skills. Experience reverberates in two different ways: 
first, experience in terms of the length of time an individual has spent 
developing their expertise; secondly, experience in terms of practical 
hands-on experience, by contrast with academic or theoretical expertise.
We are struck by how relatively early career (to use the academic 
label) many of those working in the sector are.85 Among many of 
our interviewees, there is a perception that, overall, the sector lacks 
experience: ‘if we were to some kind of review of the sector, if you did like 
a SWOT [strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats] analysis or 
something, experience would be something that was scored quite lowly’ 
(Interviewee 6). Interviewee 1 observed that ‘Most people working in 
NGOs are very young.’
We explored some of the possible reasons for the relative lack of 
experience in chapter 2 (page 41). The significance of experience is made 
clear by Interviewee 3: in discussion with public bodies, ‘if we had a 
lawyer, they had to be quite a high-calibre lawyer. It was no good having a 
junior’. Interviewee 1 is concerned by ‘a lack of historical perspective. 
That huge ... that what we have experienced in the last seventy years or 
sixty years are potentially an aberration.’ Whilst this comment might seem 
distant from our topic, it may reflect a concern about the ways in which 
the sector understands Brexit. On the other hand, one interviewee also 
recognised that although ‘maybe lessons aren’t being digested as well’, a 
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young sector can bring benefits: ‘You know, they will have weathered 
fewer attempts at this. […] perhaps fewer people who are jaded and you 
know, defensive about what’s gone before’ (Interviewee 9). Further, and 
interestingly, as Interviewee 2 pointed out: ‘No-one has expertise in 
leaving the EU ... so all of us have sort of weirdly fallen into this role and 
have become experts, I guess, as much as you can be, as it’s happened.’
And on that, ‘Brexit’ has now been going on for rather a long 
time. We have observed at a personal level that some individuals 
who were fairly inexperienced at the beginning have developed into 
very accomplished NGO actors. Our reading of submissions to Select 
Committees, discussed in chapter 5, suggests that the role of law has 
increased as the Brexit process has advanced, with noticeably more 
sophisticated legal analysis feeding into advocacy. There are various 
possible explanations. The community may be learning more about the 
law of Brexit, or the debate might have been increasingly framed as a 
legal debate, rather than a political or policy debate. It might also be that 
as we have moved closer to legislation, it has seemed self-evident to those 
making strategic decisions in NGOs that law has a role. (Although on 
that, importantly, it is perfectly possible, as we see in the next chapter, 
to engage in the scrutiny of a draft Bill from a policy rather than legal 
perspective.)
Several of our interviewees pointed to the value of experience of 
working in the legal system, and whilst acknowledging that much can be 
learned from speaking with experts and reading texts, emphasised the 
importance of practical experience of law:
unless you’ve been through one, or five or seven [judicial reviews] 
or whatever, or at least sat in a court or read the documents 
beforehand, so seen the type of submissions, but I think more 
importantly sat in the court and seen some High Court judges 
falling asleep, others asking terrifying questions, others asking 
questions where you realise they’ve not read anything before that 
day …’ (unattributed).
Another participant emphasised that hands-on experience in how law 
works can enhance understanding of what legal demands might actually 
achieve in operation: ‘So I’ve been in rooms where ministers have been 
discussing, for example, what their legal duties are, how that should 
translate to their actions now’ (unattributed).
As suggested above, we sense a naivety or dismissiveness in the 
sector about the highly specialised nature of diverse areas of legal 
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expertise. This is partly self-perpetuating, as a community of generalists 
muddle through (that is not supposed to be denigrating) specialised 
areas, without having the space to reflect on what more they might do, or 
how differently another specialisation might see a problem, and possible 
solutions. It may also be related to the sometimes unrealistic expecta-
tions of law that we referred to earlier, an expectation from those on the 
outside that there are simple answers to legal questions, a trivialisation of 
legal expertise that is reinforced through the discourses of diffusion also 
mentioned above.
We do not suggest that legal arguments are necessarily more 
important than arguments based on other forms of expertise. We share 
with our interviewees the view that other areas of expertise, from 
economics to parliamentary procedure to relationship building, are 
also crucial. We are however concerned that the sector seems to have 
neglected the space for legal expertise, at least until very recently, other 
than in judicial or quasi-judicial fora.
Conclusions
This is a necessarily untidy part of our work. We have complicated one 
of our central analytical categories: leaning on a vast and important 
literature on expertise, we hope that it can at least be taken as read 
that we do not take our discussion of ‘law and legal expertise’ to be 
unproblematic. To be clear, the point is not that ‘anything goes’ – ‘we’re 
all experts now’ or ‘it’s all politics anyway’.86 But neither the literature nor 
our interviews provide a settled abstract expectation of what constitutes 
‘good enough’ expertise.
The legal expertise that is relevant for Brexit is expansive and 
diverse, most obviously in the sorts of knowledge at stake, but also in 
skills and experience. There are pockets of impressive legal expertise in 
the sector, which have, as is discussed further in the next chapter, been 
well used in the Brexit debate. But there are gaps and weaknesses in the 
appreciation of the complexity of law, and what it can do, and sometimes 
a superficial understanding of what is at stake. Legal expertise is generally 
understood in a fairly broad-brush manner. The amount of expertise in 
the sector is partly shaped by resource constraints, but the expertise that 
is to hand in turn shapes the understanding of what legal expertise is and 
what legal resources the sector needs in the area. This emphasises the 
significance of the NGO community that surrounds those using law, and 
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the recipients of the expertise; categories that overlap in our case. We 
return to these issues in chapters 6 and 7.
Our argument in this book is not that law should be privileged as a 
source of argument about social change. We are especially concerned 
that legal expertise, like other forms of expertise, may ‘inadvertently’ (or 
advertently presumably) ‘[suppress] full-fledged expression of normative 
questions, political values and democratic aspirations’.87 Some of our 
participants seem to implicitly or explicitly recognise the possible dangers 
of using law to settle debates, and many acknowledge the importance 
of other expertise. However, legal expertise certainly has a role to play in 
advocacy. Foreshadowing our discussion in the next chapter of the 
‘equalising’ potential of legal expertise, environmental groups’ inter- 
locutors and antagonists do have access to legal expertise.
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5
Mobilising law in practice
Introduction
In this chapter, we explore what it means to mobilise law in advocacy, 
and why law might be mobilised: what do NGOs do with law or legal 
expertise, and why? As discussed in chapter 2, whilst there is a consider-
able literature on NGO use of litigation, broadly defined,1 the literature 
on the role of law in lobbying and advocacy is limited:2 ‘studies of legal 
mobilization in social reform struggles almost always involve litigation 
campaigns’.3 Indeed, by comparison with other areas of legal practice, 
there is little work on what environmental NGO lawyers ‘do’.4 Law 
is, however, a significant part of our social and political world, and as 
discussed in chapter 3, the Brexit process provided a number of hybrid 
political–legal opportunities for environmental NGOs, creating spaces 
within which law can be used to argue for change. Legal expertise may 
sometimes be in a strong position to influence policy:
law is a critical discipline. […] it’s whole economy, it’s enduring, it’s 
adaptable. It holds the consensus, it reflects the consensus, it drives 
the consensus, it mobilises every part of the state, every part of 
society. It is a mirror back to society. It’s just, it’s endemic 
(Interviewee 1).
We begin this chapter by looking at the range of legal activities undertaken 
by and in NGOs. We are struck by the amount and variety of legal work 
in environmental groups; advocacy is not a priority for legal experts. 
We think it is significant that legal expertise seems to have a limited 
leadership or strategic role in most UK environmental groups, and we 
pursue that a little further in the following section. Richard Moorhead 
and colleagues describe the jockeying for position between lawyers and 
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others in their organisation as ‘a tournament of influence which in-house 
lawyers sometimes (perhaps often) expect to lose’.5 We conclude that 
environmental NGO legal experts only occasionally even participate in 
that tournament.
We then explore more literally what legal mobilisation looks like 
in advocacy, relying heavily on our analysis of submissions to Select 
Committees and the Environment Bill Committee. Environmental groups 
take four key approaches to legal expertise in these highly formal fora. 
Law is used as a path to credibility and authority; ‘legal hooks’ are used 
to provide evidence for arguments; the manifestation of government 
promises or commitments are assessed within broader legal architec- 
ture and frameworks; and government promises or commitments are 
compared with the best from elsewhere. Part of the role of legal expertise, 
and one of the challenges with its use in advocacy, revolves around 
communication, which we touched on in chapter 4 (pages 92–93), and 
now turn to separately.
In this and earlier chapters, we have observed weak and patchy 
engagement in environmental groups with the potential of legal 
expertise. However, there has been significant legal input into the public 
debate on Brexit-environment. We conclude from this that there is some 
sense, if underdeveloped, of the importance of legal expertise, enabling 
the community to grasp hybrid political–legal opportunity at a time of 
crisis. Finally in this chapter, we discuss the possible value of law and 
legal expertise in the Brexit-environment debate, including the perceived 
power and authority of law among our interviewees. We share the sense 
of many of our interviewees that legal expertise had considerable, if 
not uniquely significant, influence in the playing out of the Brexit-
environment debate. Combining the heavy use of law that we discuss in 
this chapter with the sector’s influence as discussed in chapter 7 reinforces 
this conclusion.
NGO lawyering
The purpose of this chapter is to explore what environmental groups do 
when they ‘mobilise’ law. The legal mobilisation literature developed 
to explore the role of law in social movements and social change. As 
discussed in chapter 2, ‘legal mobilisation’ means different things to 
different scholars. Although we often see expansive definitions of ‘legal 
mobilisation’,6 empirical work and theoretical analysis in the area focuses 
almost entirely on litigation (broadly defined7). Much of the literature 
MobiL is ing LAw in prACtiCe 101
addresses what prompts or incentivises social movements’ turn to law. 
Chapters 2 and 3 on the internal and external shaping of NGO activities 
around Brexit, and the following chapters, build on this literature.8 
Whilst some urge a narrow conceptualisation and definition of ‘legal 
mobilisation’,9 it is important to explore the broader use of legal expertise 
by environmental groups to achieve their objectives.10 Legal mobilisation 
embraces ‘any process by which individuals or collective actors invoke 
legal norms, discourse or symbols to influence policy or behaviour’.11 We 
explore the mobilisation of legal expertise by environmental groups 
in their advocacy or lobbying, to shape environmental law and policy after 
Brexit.
‘Corporate work’ (Interviewee 3) and ‘case work’ (Interviewee 12) 
seem to take up a considerable amount of legal time. Corporate work 
involves looking after the organisation’s affairs, such as employment, 
property, charity law. Case work might include legal work associated 
with managing sites and complying with regulatory and contractual 
obligations, responding to planning and licensing applications, ensuring 
compliance by others with their legal obligations or using the law to 
defend protest and protestors. It is important not to overemphasise the 
lines between different types of legal work.12 Some case work will be 
closely connected with either litigation or lobbying/advocacy. Scrutiny 
of others’ compliance, for example, might carry an implicit or explicit 
threat of litigation. Equally, as noted by one of our interviewees:
Understanding actually whether governments are exercising their 
discretion correctly when there’s policy or law is quite important. 
Because you might not want to litigate about that, but you 
might actually want to go and talk to government and say, ‘We don’t 
think you’re carrying out your role in the way that you ought 
to’ (Interviewee 14).
If differing views on ‘good’ implementation are not subject to judicial 
resolution, scrutiny of compliance could be used to create a demand for 
action, through communication with government, agencies, media, 
membership and general publics.
The breadth of activity is striking when we listen to NGO lawyers 
talk about their work. This reflects in-house lawyers’ general experience 
of ‘a more embedded, varied role; less legally specialised, but involving a 
broader set of skills’.13 It is also clear how stretched they are. As Rosie 
Sutherland of the RSPB put it at our closing event, they spend a lot of 
time in a ‘firefighting role’.14
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In different contexts, different legal activities, such as engaging 
in committees setting regulatory standards,15 will be appropriate. 
ClientEarth has not been a specific subject of our research, but its range 
of activities gives a useful perspective on what legal expertise might 
contribute to advocacy. For example, it tries to influence financial and 
corporate decision-making by taking an activist approach to the legal 
frameworks around pension schemes, insurance, banking and investing.16 
It seeks to shape and then exploit disclosure obligations, to influence the 
understanding of climate ‘risk’ in the financial sector. Again, this could 
fall within a broad definition of litigation, in the sense that there may be 
an unspoken threat of legal action. But it can also be considered as an 
advocacy mechanism by which the law is used to shape stakeholders’ 
understandings of legal obligations, influencing expectations of what 
compliance looks like. In more general terms, Lisa Vanhala and Jacqui 
Kinghan also identify a range of ‘legal tactics’ for NGOs, including:
providing expert legal advice; developing and coordinating legal 
research and strategy; providing financing or aid in finding sources 
of financing for use of the law; sponsoring or coordinating non-
legal research that may support particular legal claims; providing 
publicity about legal issues and developments; and developing 
or participating in legal networks and facilitating the exchange 
of ideas.17
Although begging the question as to the line between law and non- 
law (for example when does ‘research’ become ‘legal research’?) this 
reinforces the breadth of work for legal expertise.
Leadership and strategy
The possibility that legal expertise might play a role in leadership 
and strategy-making within an organisation or the sector was rarely 
mentioned by our participants. In chapter 2, we discuss the importance 
of the culture and ‘fit’ of a strategy within an NGO. The inclusion of legal 
expertise18 in leadership would shape the way the organisation engages 
with law in all of its activities. Opportunities and challenges may be 
visible to those with legal expertise that may otherwise not be visible. Its 
absence may affect an organisation’s general understanding of itself.
Our sense is that generally, legal expertise makes at most limited 
contributions to strategy within NGOs. For one interviewee, this relates to 
the positioning of lawyers within interest group governance structures: 
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‘if I showed you the [organogram] they have, the lawyers are so buried 
under the massive edifice of policy people, they have no influence’ 
(Interviewee 1). For another, ‘leaders of NGOs and culture-setters 
at NGOs in the UK – and this is fairly true in the rest of Europe, in 
my experience – are not lawyers. And they’re more communicators, 
political animals, scientists, for the most part’ (Interviewee 3). One 
interviewee described NGOs as not necessarily understanding ‘the value 
of having legal advice and structure, as part of their advocacy thinking’ 
(Interviewee 14).
Beyond our own participants, the late Phil Michaels, legal lead at 
Friends of the Earth, when interviewed about ClientEarth by Martin 
Goodman, said that he was more comfortable with the campaigner-led 
approach, in which ‘campaigners ask lawyers what they can contribute to 
the wider objective’.19 He said that it was ‘the right call’ for Friends of the 
Earth’s campaign on the Climate Change Act 2008 to be campaigner 
led.20 We do have some sympathy for any concern that law can overwhelm 
other ways of thinking about the world, as noted in chapter 1 (page 10), 
and we recognise the critique that the use of law may be inherently 
conservative, inherently status quo preserving. Although law can be 
activist or radical,21 law tends to the pragmatic and incremental. But 
Michaels’ concern that lawyers can slow things down is a fairly limited 
objection, and starts from the assumption that lawyers are serving rather 
than leading.
An educational role for NGO lawyers was raised by Interviewee 10, 
in which they ‘kind of educate [campaigners] when to ask a legal 
question, […] thinking, “Look, I’m now entering a period where actually 
some legal questions ...” ’. Education could imply a sort of leadership, and 
certainly has the potential to shape the ways in which an organisation 
understands the world. But it seems to be understood as a more supportive 
and instrumental role, in the sense of taking legal expertise to deliver 
objectives that have been set elsewhere, rather than contributing to those 
objectives. This may be apparent in Interviewee 15’s description of NGO 
lawyers’ role as ‘translators’ in the passage of the Environment Bill:
when you actually go through the Bill […] actually having a legal 
mind look at it and translate it […] it’s very useful for other teams 
across organisations who work more just on the ecology side of 
things to understand what the implications are, and then they can 
say what the problems are.
We do not wish to suggest that this instrumental, supportive role is 
anything less than crucial. But from the perspective of our work, an 
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absence of legal expertise in the leadership of environmental groups 
means that a relatively shallow engagement with what law might do is 
hardly surprising. Less legal expertise in the strategic brain of NGOs links 
with some of our other observations in a mutually reinforcing loop. It 
both contributes to and reflects a relative absence of individuals with 
long legal NGO experience (contributing to strategy is a long game22), 
as well as a certain flatness in appreciating the complexity and diversity 
of legal expertise: it sees legal expertise as purely technical (chapter 4). 
The same non-linear relationship may apply to the availability of legal 
resources (chapter 2), where over-stretched legal capacity may be both 
the result of and contribute to a relatively weak engagement with the 
strategic need or potential for legal expertise. And as above, the place of 
legal expertise in leadership is also closely connected to the discussion in 
chapter 2 (pages 43–45) of whether using law is ‘in the DNA’ (Interviewee 
16) of an organisation, or ‘part of their cause’ (Interviewee 9).
Whilst the caveats below are significant, the relative silence from 
our participants on legal expertise in leaders is surprising. This is a 
sophisticated and well-resourced sector (relative to other public interests), 
whose area of interest is utterly dominated by complex regulation. 
Our concern at the outset had been that our interviewees, because of 
their involvement with Brexit, might be more sensitive than the sector 
as a whole to the significance and complexity of legal expertise. So 
the limitations we see here are likely to be more acute elsewhere.23
But there are three caveats, which give us pause for thought. 
First, there are exceptions, including NGOs with lawyers in senior organ-
isational positions, outside lawyers who are ‘embedded in [NGO] 
thinking’24 (Interviewee 5) and ‘examples of […] lawyers having played 
quite pivotal roles in advancing some of the strategies of their organisa-
tion’ (Interviewee 16). Interviewee 1 would even nuance the idea that 
the Climate Change Act campaign was without law:
Friends of the Earth called for a Climate Act without all being a 
team of lawyers, but the fact that Friends of the Earth already had, 
at the time they went into the Climate Act campaign, they had a 
very strong legal unit, was no accident, I suspect. It was endemic to 
how they thought (Interviewee 1).
Second, Brexit was probably an exception, due to the particular 
opportunity context discussed in chapter 3. Legal expertise became a 
central (although not the only) feature of the sector’s response. The 
‘governance gap’, whilst not accessible only to lawyers, was packed with 
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legal questions and legal knowledge, and a level of expertise (knowledge, 
skills, experience) was necessary to identify and allow the sector to make 
the most of the governance (and equivalence) framing. Nor is it simply 
a question of rules that could (prior to a learning process) be looked up 
by anyone with a basic legal competence: Todd Aagaard’s observation 
that ‘law operates first and foremost within a legal system’ may seem 
a little self-evident, but this is an example of what it might mean.25 
Not only do we see complex legal issues raised in Select Committee 
submissions, as discussed below, but we see a certain insistence and 
repetition, educating parliament and government as well as the environ- 
mental NGO sector itself.
Focusing so much resource on lawyerly issues after the referendum 
was a strategic issue for the sector. Law ‘was sort of embedded in 
the strategy and so, in a way, that was very nice […] that was a big 
change I think, was to see, for the law, for the lawyer to have a seat at 
the strategy table’ (Interviewee 16). Throughout much of the Brexit-
environment process, legal expertise does seem to have been relatively 
well embedded in the Greener UK Board.26 Whether this was coincidental, 
or someone noted that legal expertise was necessary at a senior level, 
is not clear. Amy Mount, former Head of Greener UK, suggested at 
our closing event that it had been a ‘pivotal decision for Greener UK 
to have a space on the Board for a legal brain’.27 In either case, it is at 
least consistent with the proposition that legal expertise in strategy-
making and an understanding of the significance and complexity of legal 
expertise may go along with a considered and sophisticated use of legal 
expertise in advocacy. A central role for legal expertise was not necessarily 
recognised by all organisations, or at all stages. We mentioned in chapter 4 
(page 89) that one of our very experienced lawyer participants had 
to persuade colleagues that s/he was the right person for Brexit; it 
might be that s/he could see how lawyerly this was going to be, before 
colleagues.
Third, ClientEarth is of course an outlier. ClientEarth has been 
around for a while now, but did introduce a new way of thinking about 
and doing law when it arrived in the UK. To really get to the bottom of 
what ClientEarth does, and how that affects the sector, would require an 
additional research project. But ClientEarth:
built up the programmes and then the lawyers in those areas get 
the space to figure out what a legal strategy could be and what 
ClientEarth could offer, what they could offer really, as a public 
interest lawyer in that space (unattributed).
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ClientEarth’s work also suggests that some funders of UK environmental 
groups (although the extent to which ClientEarth considers itself UK is 
open to question) are thinking strategically about law.28
Again, we are not arguing that lawyer-led is necessarily superior: 
‘you have to kind of remember that the law’s only one tool in the box’ 
(Interviewee 11). Law does though have something to offer.
Mobilising law in advocacy
The previous two sections look at the range of legal work in and for 
environmental NGOs. Our focus is on what Interviewee 12 calls ‘policy 
advocacy legal advice’, and Interviewee 14 ‘the legal advocacy side of 
things’, both speaking generally rather than just about Brexit (although 
we should note that we introduced our project to interviewees in terms 
of ‘advocacy’ by contrast with ‘litigation’). This is closely related to 
leadership and strategy: whether law is invited into advocacy, shapes 
advocacy or is absent from advocacy is in part determined by leadership. 
And our discussion of NGO lawyering above includes some of the legal 
activities that might form part of an advocacy campaign.
We found that many of our NGO interviewees struggled to explain 
literally what they do with law, even if they said that they use law or legal 
expertise in their work, or we witnessed their high legal accomplishment. 
That is hardly a criticism, since our interviewees are not interested in 
conceptualising expertise, but in influencing outcomes. Policing precisely 
what is legal work and what is not would anyway require some tricky 
boundary work, and a sharp line between law and politics is hard to 
maintain.29 But the absence of reflection on what they do with law does 
reinforce a sense that law may not be well appreciated, and brings out 
that self-perpetuating nature of a lack of legal expertise informing the 
understanding of legal expertise: ‘civil society’s understanding of how to 
drive legal change, and the importance of legal change, was very, very 
limited. It was very much about litigation. But not about the much 
broader role of law in society. And how you talk about law, and why law 
is important’ (Interviewee 1).
When asked about what they do with law, many of our interviewees 
began by talking about law and legal change as an output of their 
campaigning. When turned towards legal expertise as an input, they 
instinctively thought about courts, compliance and litigation, reflecting 
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the sorts of bias towards ‘cases’ discussed in chapter 1 (page 9): 
a ‘natural tendency to equate the functioning of the legal system as being 
purely, if you like, enforcement’ (Interviewee 4). One of the consequences 
of a focus on litigation may be that law is understood as antagonistic 
and adversarial,30 when it need not be. This may in turn mean that law 
is under-valued as a whole because of a ‘fear of losing their fluffier 
membership base’ by being adversarial (Interviewee 13).
When we emphasised our non-court room context, some attention 
was paid to the use of law to frame submissions on and amendments 
to legislation. Most of our participants did not elaborate. Interviewee 3 
described ‘the shaping of amendments, the debating of them, the 
legitimacy of them, you know, the technical integrity of them etc’. 
Amending legislation is we think seen as technical support for campaigners, 
rather than a particularly central element of an NGO’s objectives. Many 
interviewees, for example, saw the role of legal expertise on the ‘monster’ 
(Interviewee 3) Environment Bill’s ‘substantive’ policy elements (water, 
waste, etc.) as being to respond to the needs of the policy experts. This 
does not engage with the centrality of law to much of the Bill’s content, for 
example the way ‘net gain’ fits into and potentially shapes and is shaped by 
the planning system and property law more broadly.
We do interpret Interviewee 2’s approach as recognising a more 
significant role for legal expertise in legislative work: legal expertise is 
used ‘to point to safeguards’ that are needed for the Bill to work, avoiding 
‘[leaving] too much to secondary legislation, or to policy, then obviously 
you’re leaving an awful lot to government intent’. In the context of the 
Environment Bill, Interviewee 16 went further:
The question of architecture that I mentioned before [‘the 
overarching framework of the bill, the legal architecture around 
the design of targets and how it would all fit together’], thinking 
that through. The other would be sort of a pure, in a drafting 
context, thinking about amendments and language. And then 
there will also be the types of issues that lawyers typically get into 
around enforceability of some of the provisions and how effective 
are they ... You know, I think that some of pieces of the Environment 
Bill were pretty ambiguous or waffly.
Another interviewee recalled a group of lawyers, through Wildlife and 
Countryside Link (Link), drafting ‘a whole Marine Act because the 
government at the time was saying that they couldn’t introduce a Marine 
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Act … that dealt with all of the different sectoral issues that came up’, 
which was then used ‘as a tool to go to government, and say, “Here, here 
it is”’ (Interviewee 14).
More generally, when pressed on what NGOs do with law, discussion 
turned to law’s detail, perhaps reflecting a cliché about law and lawyers. 
The use of legal expertise involves ‘a lot of textual study, a lot of textual 
analysis’ (Interviewee 3). Law has clearly been used in the study and 
analysis of both domestic and EU legal texts, with a view to developing 
the ‘legal baseline … for what would be lost from the EU’ (Interviewee 6). 
Further:
… a lot of work looking in detail at, both at case law from the EU 
as to how influential the exercise of discretion has been, and 
how much is about judicial culture versus the letter of the law. 
And domestically looking at some, you know, well-trodden but 
important questions around procedural versus substantive aspects 
of judicial review (Interviewee 13).
This is not trivial. As Aagaard puts it, ‘lawyers can look at a legal principle 
or piece of statutory or regulatory text and see things – ambiguities, 
contingencies, interdependencies, implications – that others will not 
see’.31 There was little in our interviews, however, on the way that 
legal expertise can open up the big picture, how individual rules and 
regulations function as part of a system. The crucial ways in which law 
shapes the rules of the game seems not to be much appreciated within 
the community. Interviewee 17 suggested that NGOs should ‘have a more 
open mind to looking at the system as a whole. And the intervention, 
design and the reason for failures in systems’.
Several of our participants offered a ‘fact checking’ (Interviewee 15) 
function for legal expertise. This may sound a little dismissive, and 
whether its complexity and significance was fully appreciated in the 
sector is open to question. ‘Fact checking’ might be in part about ‘the kind 
of intellectual demands’ of the work on Brexit, which means that people 
want ‘the confidence of having that access to lawyers’ (Interviewee 3), 
the worry about the ‘secret lawyer thing’ (unattributed). It goes beyond 
that, to establishing the accuracy of statements made by politicians and 
others (Interviewee 15), which resonates with the perception of the 
power and authority of law, discussed below. More generally, and perhaps 
hinting at the discussion in chapter 4 (pages 80–85) about distance and 
objectivity, arguments in law can also be seen as a sort of evidence base, 
‘Saying “No, we’re not just having a whinge, here are all the reasons, 
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here’s all the evidence, here are all the details as to what we’re worried 
about, concerned about, complaining about”’ (Interviewee 7). This 
resonates with Boukalas’ suggestion that law, including arguments based 
on underpinning legal principles or ideals, can be used to legitimise 
demands.32 This is articulated by two of our interviewees as ‘legal hooks’. 
‘We talk about hooks all the time. We look for what the hooks are for us 
to achieve our objectives’ (Interviewee 7); environmental groups look for 
‘legal hooks and legal arguments, either from international or European 
law, to justify our policy asks, where we feel that domestic legislation 
isn’t good enough’ (Interviewee 12).
The purpose of our analysis of submissions to Select Committee 
inquiries and the Public Bill Committee is to provide some additional 
insight into the use of law and legal expertise in advocacy. As discussed 
in chapter 1, we explored environmental NGO submissions to four 
Select Committee inquiries (one of which was a joint inquiry, leading to 
separate reports from the Environmental Audit Committee and the 
EFRA Committee), plus the Environment Bill Committee, as follows:
– Environmental Audit Committee, The Future of the Natural 
Environment after the EU Referendum 6th Report of Session 
2016–17 HC 599;33
– House of Lords European Union Select Committee, Brexit: 
Environment and Climate Change, 12th Report of Session 2016–17 
HL Paper 109;34
– Environmental Audit Committee, The Government’s 25 Year Plan 
for the Environment 8th Report of 2017–19 HC 803;35
– Joint call for evidence, Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Committee, Pre-Legislative Scrutiny of the Draft Environment 
(Principles and Governance) Bill, 14th Report of 2017–19 HC 
1893;36 
– Environmental Audit Committee, Scrutiny of the Draft Environment 
(Principles and Governance) Bill 18th Report of 2017–19 HC 1951;37
– Written and oral evidence submitted to the House of Commons 
Public Bill Committee on the Environment Bill.38
Given the purpose of our analysis of Select Committee submissions, it 
might be objected that the terms of reference for these Select Committee 
inquiries tend towards the legal and technical in any event, or that 
inquiries into legislation or steps on the road to legislation self-evidently 
require legal expertise. It is true that these inquiries bring out the lawyerly 
contribution, and so allow us to explore the role of legal expertise in NGO 
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advocacy more easily than normal. But the inquiries’ terms of reference 
were not all focused on law and did not necessarily invite particularly 
lawyerly responses. Even the inquiries about the draft Environment 
(Principles and Governance) Bill39 received submissions with little or no 
legal content; the same applied to the Public Bill Committee, albeit to a 
lesser extent. It is perfectly possible to respond from a wholly policy-
focused perspective, arguing about what should happen rather than 
legally how it should be done. It is not even necessary to refer directly to 
the draft Bill; some responses refer to what others say about it (including 
the Government itself in the Explanatory Notes), and only a handful 
analyse the draft clauses in detail. The existing legal situation can be 
referred to in a general way, if at all. So it is certainly not the case that 
because the public debate is about legislation, a law-heavy approach will 
necessarily be taken; there is nothing tautologous about querying the use 
of law in advocacy around legislation. But of course, many of the NGO 
respondents do engage in detailed analysis of law or proposed law.
Our analysis of the submissions to the inquiries turned around 
environmental group advocacy. We excluded a number of categories of 
submissions from our analysis: government/NDPB/advisory or statutory 
bodies, such as Natural England or National Parks;40 trade groups and 
professional representative bodies; individual businesses and ‘business’ 
coalitions (including those focusing on the environment, such as the 
Aldersgate Group); individuals submitting evidence in their own names; 
academic bodies or organisations, such as Brexit & Environment;41 NGOs 
who do not specialise in environmental matters, such as 38 Degrees; and 
local NGOs, such as the Devon Hedge Trust.42 We fully analysed only written 
submissions, with two exceptions: the House of Lords inquiry, which did 
not make a call for written evidence, but invited oral evidence; and the 
Public Bill Committee, to get a broader sense of input at this crucial stage.
We analysed over 130 written submissions, which amounted 
to several hundred pages of material, going beyond the organisations 
represented by our interviewees, and beyond England. Reading the 
submissions, we identified explicit references to laws, and considered the 
level of detail and apparent sophistication of those references (ranging 
from simple lists to very refined analysis), explicit assessments and 
analyses of existing or proposed law, explicit calls on broad legal 
frameworks and understandings, as well as discussions where a profound 
understanding of the law seemed to be implicit. The contribution made 
by legal expertise, the level of legal sophistication in submissions, 
increases over time. We suggested in chapter 4 (page 94) that this may 
be in part because the community has learned more about the ‘law 
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of Brexit’, and we refer to the possible educational role of NGO 
lawyers above. Moving closer to legislation may also have meant the role 
of legal expertise has become more evident to those making strategic 
decisions in the sector; the instinctive expectation as above that this is 
what lawyers do.
Turning back to the submissions to our committees, we see four 
main approaches to law, all of which are explored further below: law 
is used as a path to credibility and authority; ‘legal hooks’ are used 
to provide evidence for arguments; the manifestation of government 
promises or commitments are assessed within broader legal architec- 
ture and frameworks; and government promises or commitments are 
compared with the best from elsewhere. There may be a certain amount 
of collaboration in the construction of environmental NGO submissions 
to Select Committees. Many of those involved in writing the submissions 
of individual organisations will have discussed the issues at length in 
Greener UK (especially), Link and other spaces such as workshops and 
conferences. Although we do not believe that individual NGOs consulted 
each other in detail on their submissions (we cannot rule it out), Greener 
UK certainly shared its submissions with its member organisations.
First, many submissions begin with, or include somewhere, an 
explanation of the legal context as background.43 This may be as much 
about establishing credibility as providing information and, when read in 
bulk, these parts of the submissions have a certain throat-clearing 
quality.44 The necessity of credibility for achieving ‘insider group’ status is 
discussed in chapter 2. Environmental groups or collaborations get 
legitimacy from their large memberships. ‘But you also get legitimacy 
through the sort of whether you’re competent, whether you’re plausible, 
whether you actually understand what’s going on’ (Interviewee 3). The 
rehearsal of legal context reinforces the message that interest group 
access provides law- and policy-makers with valuable expertise. It may 
also relate to the perceived authority of law and lawyers, to which we 
return below.
Second, simple references to one or more from a very long list 
of existing legal provisions is extremely common. The terms of reference 
for the Environmental Audit Committee Future of the Natural Environment 
Inquiry45 turned around agriculture and the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP), rather than broader environmental law. But submissions from 
environmental NGOs consistently referred to and discussed EU environ-
mental legislation, making it clear that the CAP, and any opportunities 
from leaving the CAP, sit in a framework of protective EU law. The 
Habitats and Birds Directives were most frequently referred to, rightly 
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given both their significance for agriculture, and the fact that compliance 
with the nature conservation legislation was at that point considered 
to be the least likely to form part of a post-Brexit trade deal.46 But in 
addition, many of our environmental NGOs are especially interested 
in the nature conservation legislation, managing sites or seeking the 
protection of particular species or habitats. This reinforces our argument 
that the type of expertise available to an organisation does not simply 
reflect what the organisation thinks it needs; it also, in the mutual 
reinforcement mentioned above, partly drives what it thinks it needs. 
In some respects this is simply a sensible use of resources. As Interviewee 
9 puts it, ‘our overall approach to advocacy and one that we try to do 
within ourselves is we try to make use of our expertise … What is our area 
of knowledge, what have we got direct experience of, and what is specific 
to our cause’ (Interviewee 9). But it also means that the expertise in the 
sector influences what gets attention and the nature of the debate. It is 
plausible therefore that the fact that many of our environmental groups 
manage nature conservation on the ground leads to a focus of advocacy 
and campaigning on conservation issues, and a neglect of (as suggested 
in chapter 4) ‘Cinderella’ issues such as trade,47 or chemicals.
Turning to ‘legal hooks’, simply mentioning relevant legislation, as 
many submissions do, demonstrates a fairly thin expertise (if it can be 
called expertise at all).48 Legislation is sometimes referred to in a way 
that suggests that although the respondent’s expertise lies elsewhere, 
they feel an obligation of some sort to make a legal contribution – the 
credibility point above.49 More often, there is at least a general sense of 
the value or otherwise of the legislation, and sometimes a very detailed 
analysis, referring to particular legal provisions and arrangements. 
We see ‘legal hooks’ being called on in Select Committee submissions, 
most often with EU law and equivalence-based arguments, but going 
beyond that to argue that certain things must be done for a lawful 
system of environmental protection. For example, the draft Withdrawal 
Agreement 2018 (which in the end was never ratified) would have 
required ‘effective, proportionate and dissuasive’ sanctions for failure to 
comply with environmental law; this was used to argue that there was a 
gap in the draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill.50 Case 
law (surprisingly given its starring role generally51) is only occasionally 
mentioned, and rarely discussed in any detail. The focus for case law is 
often limited to litigation that the organisation itself had been involved 
in. The ClientEarth air pollution litigation is an exception, raised on 
a number of occasions in written submissions and by our interviewees. 
It was mainly used as a recent cause célèbre, rather than as a perfect 
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example of the significance of broader EU systems and structure for the 
implementation of environmental law,52 suggesting a relatively shallow 
approach to its legal significance.
As to our third approach to the use of law in advocacy, we 
see consultation respondents referencing ‘bigger’ legal frameworks 
and institutions, most commonly in the discussion of enforcement. 
Again, this runs from the broadest of statements about the very well-
known Commission-plus-Court enforcement regime,53 to extremely 
careful assessment of tricky legal questions. A good example is the 
detailed discussion of judicial review in some NGO submissions to the 
Environmental Principles and Governance (EPG) element of the 25 Year 
Plan inquiry.54 A number of submissions were underpinned by serious 
knowledge of, for example, costs, remedies and procedural issues, some 
going so far as a comparison between the intensity of review by the Court 
of Justice of the EU relative to domestic judicial review.55 There were 
many examples of these sophisticated approaches to legal regimes. 
In its critique of the definition of environmental law, Greener UK 
explained how the OEP could engage with international law, without 
undermining the UK’s ‘dualist’ system. WWF’s explanation of the 
necessity of an overarching objective if the proportionality obligations in 
the draft are to function effectively, is another useful example.56
When the NGO community uses references to individual legal 
provisions, or bigger overarching frameworks, the purpose seems to be to 
highlight what could be lost in Brexit, and how to avoid that. This is in 
many cases supplemented by a vision of what the world could look like. 
At this point, we are as likely to see a substantive environmental vision as 
a legal one. But a legal prescription of what should be done is not unusual, 
for example WWF’s submissions on a due diligence obligation for public 
and private bodies.57 This certainly gets stronger the closer we get to 
legislation, unsurprisingly, from general calls for legislation in the early 
inquiries, to detailed proposed clauses towards the end, alongside less 
lawyerly narratives of the work law must do.
Fourth, and running through the other three points, comparison 
is a very frequent tool of appraisal, which can call on detailed and 
careful representations, but can also be a degraded form of expertise, 
as discussed in chapter 4 (page 89), a quick and random reference to 
different systems. Comparison is made to EU law (most obviously through 
the ‘equivalence’ approach), international law or other jurisdictions’ 
domestic law. Recurrent government rhetoric that its environmental 
laws will be ‘world leading’ provides a lever for comparison with 
any progressive approach,58 including perhaps most powerfully, the 
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situation that existed in the UK at the time, before leaving the EU. 
Domestic approaches in other areas are also important, and the UK’s 
Climate Change Act 2008 is frequently discussed in Select Committees 
and broader debate.59 Its target-setting, monitoring and reviewing 
process, with the significant roles for the Climate Change Committee and 
Parliament in holding Government politically accountable, and binding 
targets for (possibly60) legal accountability provides a model of sorts. 
Again, it can be referred to in the most generic way, but the benefits and 
limitations of this regime can be thoroughly brought out with the 
assistance of legal expertise. Interviewee 2 provides a good overview of 
how this sort of comparison works:
it’s extraordinary to me the government would point to new 
world-leading piece of legislation that doesn’t have those existing 
[Climate Change Act] safeguards in it, to the point that when 
we were pulling together amendments around what advisory 
functions would look like, we pulled the ‘comply or explain’ model 
from the Climate Change Act to point to it, to say, ‘This is not 
unusual, it’s not an unusual ask, you know, for government, there is 
legal drafting we can point to, there is a law, you already comply 
with it, it’s not a problem’.
The Government’s claim to be taking a ‘world-leading’ approach to the 
environment was taken seriously, expanding political opportunity, which 
is taken up by environmental groups, and also legal opportunity, such as 
the legal stock61 provided by the Climate Change Act. This is a further 
dimension of the hybrid political–legal opportunity, a political space for 
legal argument, discussed in chapter 3.
Although these four approaches stand out, there is no formulaic 
approach to the use of law in advocacy. Even groups that share some 
important characteristics may use law in different ways and at different 
times. It is worth comparing a small number of submissions in a little 
more detail: submissions from UK Environmental Law Association 
(UKELA) and ClientEarth, which both see environmental law as their 
raison d’être, and from RSPB and WWF. We make these comparisons 
simply to emphasise that there are many ways to use legal expertise and 
to craft an argument with legal expertise. The availability of legal capacity 
does not dictate the same response, or a highly legal response at all.
We introduced ClientEarth, a well-resourced campaigning organi-
sation with law at its heart, in chapter 1 (page 4). UKELA is a group com-
posed of lawyers from other bodies (academics, private practice, NGOs) 
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whose stated ‘aim’ is specifically ‘to improve understanding and aware-
ness of environmental law – to make better law for the environment’.62 
Whilst the use of ‘strategic, focused and influential interventions that 
promote dialogue and have identifiable impacts on UK environmental 
law’63 is one of its core aims, UKELA does not have a campaigning arm. Its 
activities revolve around reports and seminars, rather than litigation 
or public campaigns. Both UKELA and ClientEarth have considerable 
resources of legal expertise.
UKELA’s written submissions to Select Committee Brexit-
environment inquiries are surprisingly non-committal and lacking in 
detail. They tell inquiries that they have not yet formalised a position or 
approach to Brexit, or particular parts of the story. By contrast, ClientEarth 
provided consistently careful, detailed submissions that are highly legally 
oriented and legally sophisticated. They are very focused on precisely 
what should be done (legally), frequently using their own more detailed 
reports as references and authority. ClientEarth display and perform 
their legal expertise, and expect to be taken seriously. It is possible that 
the UKELA response to inquiries are a little ad hoc compared to more 
formalised and resourced groups, because they depend on someone being 
available on a voluntary basis.64 It is also likely that UKELA’s big investment 
in Brexit was in the highly detailed and authoritative reports produced by 
its Brexit Task Force,65 rather than responses to the many consultations 
that Brexit stimulated. UKELA officers are frequently invited to give oral 
evidence to Select Committees, either in their own capacity or as UKELA 
officers, when they are much fuller.
The RSPB and WWF submissions to pre-legislative scrutiny make 
another interesting comparison.66 Neither is explicitly a ‘legal’ organisa-
tion, both are well resourced and expert, both have some in-house legal 
resource. Both produce extremely knowledgeable, thorough, detailed 
and compelling submissions. They make compatible and broadly similar 
points, but they are different in tone. WWF’s submission is much more 
direct, for example including more detailed analysis of draft clauses and 
proposed changes. RSPB’s submission spends a little less time on the 
draft clauses, and on what should be done legally, and more on generally 
what law needs to achieve. However, both organisations respond to the 
‘is there anything else’ question with their own priorities: RSPB focuses 
on nature and biodiversity, WWF on global footprint and due diligence.
Our exploration of Select Committee submissions in this section is 
necessarily impressionistic, because we were deliberately not looking 
for a simple set of ‘legal’ criteria. And notwithstanding what we have 
said about the relative lack of legal expertise in the sector, some very 
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sophisticated legal expertise is apparent in the responses to Select 
Committees, and increasingly so as time progressed.
Law and communication
As discussed in chapter 4, legal experts are often expected to be skilled 
with words, in both written and oral communication. Legal presentation 
might be helpful in being ‘taken more seriously’ (Interviewee 12). Legal 
communication skills might be helpful in both facing up to and defusing 
conflict, and might help with being ‘very rigorous about how you analyse 
material … [H]ow you combine that with evidence … And then how you 
construct arguments’ (unattributed).
Several of our interviewees talked about the sensitivity ‘of commu-
nicating to different audiences’ (Interviewee 8). Government (ministers 
and civil servants) and legislators (Members of Parliament and parlia-
mentary staff) are key interlocutors for NGOs. Some interviewees 
differentiated between government officials and MPs, arguing that the 
latter may be more strongly influenced by the political than the legal 
argument. Interviewee 7, for example, suggested that:
If you’re talking to some government officials for example, you 
might want to start talking about compliance with international 
law and talking about the requirements that are out there […] But 
actually with MPs, obviously, a much more political argument is, 
tend to be, and you know, it’s not that clear cut. So it’s about saying, 
‘Well, here’s what we think is the best thing to be doing.’ Whether 
that’s for thinking about what the UK’s place in the world is or the 
government has promised or the sort of world we want to, you 
know, society will be building, etc.
As discussed above, however, the legal dimension was very strong in 
Select Committee submissions, albeit not to the exclusion of political 
arguments.
The use of law to communicate with the public (including NGO 
members) was a dominant theme in our interviews: ‘there’s a difference 
between talking to parliamentarians versus talking to the general 
public, very much so’ (Interviewee 8). One interviewee emphasised the 
effectiveness of legal argument when communicating to their broad-
based membership:
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And so actually communicating what we stand to lose in terms 
of that, I think, was really important. Because I think for our 
membership […] they understand the importance of protected 
sites. But the reason why they understand they’re so important is 
because they’re legally protected. […] we used [the Withdrawal 
Bill] in advocacy quite a lot. And I think, it was weird because it’s 
obviously a piece of procedural legislation, but actually I think, 
because it was in the press so often, people talked about it quite a 
lot. So we used that, we engaged with that from kind of legal point 
of view (unattributed).
The same interviewee discussed the use of ‘legal challenges that we had 
been involved in’, and went on to say of law that:
It’s ultimately the way that you can unlock quite a lot of stuff. […] 
I think is really snappy and punchy. And they get it – people hate to 
see the law broken; it doesn’t matter who’s breaking it, you know. 
I think it talks to them in that way.
This perception that law can be a powerful way of speaking to 
memberships and broader publics is perhaps borne out by the press 
briefings, blogs and other public communications by membership 
groups such as the WWF, the National Trust and the RSPB,67 and by the 
surprisingly large public response (over 176,000 responses68) to the 
unpromisingly titled DEFRA Consultation on Environmental Principles 
and Governance,69 our ‘geeky lawyer issue’70 (Interviewee 16).
However, most of our interviewees saw the communication 
challenges posed by ‘the pretty impenetrable language and institutions 
that surround law’ (Interviewee 7) as one of the key limitations on the 
use of law by NGOs. ‘It has to be understandable in a jiffy’ (Interviewee 
13), but law is ‘complicated and not many people understand when you 
talk about the law’ (Interviewee 6). This will be a particular challenge for 
membership organisations who are seeking to use their membership base 
to promote legal change, and to fund their activities: ‘I think it’s dry, it’s 
hard to make it exciting. There’s a whole vocabulary that doesn’t make 
sense to most people. […] I think it’s a big challenge for us to make salient 
what we’re campaigning on’ (Interviewee 8). Philanthropy may have its 
own blind spots, and although philanthropy does support law (not least 
ClientEarth71), ‘selling the word governance to philanthropy was like 
selling something incomprehensible to an audience with the attention 
span of a gnat’ (Interviewee 1).
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The impact of legal expertise
Assessing whether particular arguments (for our purposes, those based 
on legal expertise) are impactful, in the sense of attributing clear causal 
links, is even more difficult than looking at NGO influence generally, and 
it is simply not attempted in the literature.72 We do not purport to make 
such a direct assessment. We do, however, attribute influence in the 
Brexit-environment debate and influence on the existence and shape of 
the Environment Bill to the sector generally, and Greener UK in particular, 
in chapter 7. Given the role of law and legal expertise in the debate 
about Brexit, and the way that the strange political and political–legal 
opportunities of the Brexit process made legal arguments particularly 
visible, this provides some indirect evidence of the influence of law and 
legal expertise. Further, our interview data, albeit necessarily speaking 
to perceived rather than proven influence, suggests that arguments 
based on law and legal expertise had some impact on politicians and 
civil servants.
Most of our participants thought that the role of Michael Gove as 
Secretary of State was central to the Government’s acceptance of ‘the 
governance gap’, although without generally tracing his appointment 
back to the 2017 General Election, as discussed in chapter 3. But they 
also saw legal expertise as making a contribution, especially on the 
governance gap: ‘[O]ur sort of geeky lawyer issue was actually recognised 
not only by our colleagues, but also, in the sector, by the Secretary of 
State and the Government. So that was sort of, yes, the lawyers did play 
a role in that’ (Interviewee 16). One participant, whilst acknowledging 
the difficulty in ‘measuring’ the impact of legal argument suggested, in 
the context of the governance gap, ‘I don’t think it was as simple as saying, 
“Well these lawyers say we need to do this, so therefore it should happen.” 
[…] But I think it must have cumulatively had some input’ (Interviewee 
10). Legal arguments were ‘necessary but not sufficient’ (Interviewee 8) 
and were part of a broader package of submissions made and tactics 
employed by NGOs throughout the process:
I think [arguments based in law] played a central role but they 
weren’t the only role … But that wasn’t the only thing that we did to 
win that [equivalence] argument so I think, with all of this I’d say 
that, you know, the legal mobilisation is a huge part of what we’ve 
done and how we’ve achieved it, but it’s only a part and it’s part of 
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a package and if you get the whole package, then you’re more likely 
to succeed and win those legal arguments (Interviewee 6).
Interviewee 2’s comments emphasise the way in which the legal and 
political combine, when s/he says of the Climate Change Act arguments 
discussed above that Government ‘kinda get the legal argument because 
obviously they still point to that piece of legislation as being world-
leading climate legislation’.
Several of our interviewees pick up the significance of context 
to the appropriateness and persuasiveness of law. The use of law in 
argument had impact ‘… in different amounts in different areas’ 
(Interviewee 13). With respect to the OEP, this interviewee suggests that 
arguments based in law have the biggest impact on questions relating to 
litigation mechanisms and remedies (as opposed to the funding and 
independence of the OEP):
But there law has played a much greater role and has been a lot of 
work looking at, in detail both at case law from the EU as to how 
influential the exercise of discretion has been, and how much is 
about judicial culture versus the letter of the law. And domestically 
looking at some, you know, well-trodden but important questions 
around procedural versus substantive aspects of judicial review 
(Interviewee 13).
We raised the disagreement over the EU legal approach to the envi- 
ronmental principles, with Government insisting that its approach to 
principles does not involve a reduction in their role or strength, in chapter 4 
(page 83). This argument was carried out in legal terms, around the 
very complicated question of the status and role of the principles in 
EU law. The environmental sector, and this heavily legal approach, 
succeeded in getting principles into the Bill, certainly got principles into 
the debate, and convinced sections of parliament, particularly the two 
Select Committees which carried out pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft 
Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill.73 But the detailed legal 
approach failed to get any meaningful concessions on the future place 
of the principles in UK law.
Reinforcing our thoughts on credibility above, the power and 
persuasiveness of law is a strong theme in our interviews. Law has ‘a 
certain authority’ and ‘mystique’ (Interviewee 10); NGOs can use ‘legal 
skills to lay into some fairly sort of soft political stuff’ (Interviewee 3); 
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‘you know, if you’ve got legal arguments behind you, you’re kind of more 
likely to succeed’ (Interviewee 6); ‘a more powerful bargaining tool, if 
you like’ (Interviewee 6). The value of legal expertise did seem generally 
to be accepted in the broadest terms. Only one of our participants gave a 
hint of scepticism about law and lawyers generally. Of course our sample, 
dominated by those working on Brexit including lawyers, and our 
presence as interviewers, might limit what we draw from that.
Consistent with our findings in chapter 4 that legal expertise, its 
significance and its complexity are understood in a broad-brush way, 
where the power of law comes from is unarticulated. Further, the lawyer 
and the law were more or less interchangeable in the observations made 
by our participants; getting a lawyer into the debate was seen as a 
powerful step however. Revealingly, two of our interviewees talked about 
law as being their strongest option for making a difference: ‘I guess I 
wanted to save the world. So I thought, “Okay, how do I do that?” Thought 
about it and talked to people about it and realised that law would 
probably be quite a thing’ (unattributed). The phrase ‘saving the world’ 
was offered knowingly, but certainly not facetiously. Along similar lines, 
another participant ‘didn’t become a lawyer to become a lawyer; I became 
a lawyer to do that kind of law’ (unattributed).
Given these assumptions about the potency of law, the idea of NGO 
law being a question of equalising arms permeates the interviews, 
specifically with respect to government. Interviewee 2, for example, 
suggests that government can sometimes bring a lawyer in to try to close 
down debate, and the NGO brings a lawyer ‘to try and level an argument 
or level a disagreement’. At our closing event in June 2020, Kierra 
Box of Friends of the Earth suggested that lawyers provide ‘a kind of 
organisational confidence’, in the same way as a chief scientist or a chief 
economist would.
The nature of our research (and perhaps of Brexit, where the 
environment versus economy discourse has not so far been especially 
strong) means that equality of arms with corporate lobbyists was 
not raised in our interviews.74 But the ability to match corporate legal 
input may also be significant,75 and the inclusion of the perspective 
of environmental groups on as equal a footing as possible is crucial.76 
Understanding both the detailed implications of law, and the overarching 
frameworks and institutions that govern outcomes, can provide a 
different way of seeing the world, and a different way of changing the 
world. Law and legal experts play a significant role in shaping the rules of 
the social and economic game, in determining the way things get done. 
Environmental NGOs need to be part of that debate.
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Conclusions
We reach two ostensibly conflicting conclusions in this chapter. On 
the one hand, we see an underdeveloped and variable engagement with 
the potential of legal expertise, including legal expertise in leadership. 
But on the other hand, we see significant legal input into the public 
debate on Brexit-environment, employing the hybrid political–legal 
opportunity that we identified in chapter 2. We conclude from this that 
there is some sense, if underdeveloped, of the importance of legal 
expertise and that the sector was impressively able to round up their 
thinly spread capacity at a moment of crisis. Collaboration in the sector 
played a major role in bringing out legal expertise, a subject we pursue in 
the following two chapters.
When asked about legal expertise and law, our interviewees from 
NGOs all began by talking about law, or legal change, as an output of 
their activities. When asked what legal expertise can contribute to their 
objectives, most talked instinctively about litigation and courts. When 
pressed beyond litigation, most had relatively little to add. Our sample is 
especially sensitised to the role of law, since it is composed of lawyers and 
others working on Brexit, and we have explored the highly professional-
ised end of the sector, focusing on big organisations. Moreover, the envi-
ronmental arena is dominated by regulation. So we were surprised not to 
see more pervasive and far-reaching reflection on legal expertise trick-
ling through our interviews. We conclude that there is limited 
consideration of what legal expertise can do in argument, with at best a 
patchy and ad hoc involvement of legal expertise in strategic thinking. 
Given the nature of our sample, we suspect that we could safely extend 
these findings further into the sector.77
Whilst we do not attempt to claim clear causal links between the 
use of legal expertise in argument and outcomes or effects, we should 
note that other types of expertise more conventionally used (and assumed 
to be useful) by environmental NGOs (policy expertise, science) would 
be equally difficult to isolate for the purposes of assessing influence. 
There is certainly plenty of work for law to do, and we have explored 
some of the roles for law in this chapter. For Brexit, legal expertise 
was needed to take the first steps in pulling apart and articulating the 
ways that systems and structures enhance environmental measures, and 
later to provide the necessary detailed analysis of how parts of the system 
fit together.
Our argument is not that lawyers should take over and determine 
the strategic direction of environmental NGOs, in the ‘tournament of 
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influence’78 within an organisation. We are sympathetic to the concern 
that law may stifle other approaches, and in some cases may be unduly 
conservative and incremental; although in the disruptive context of 
Brexit, law’s stabilising approach may have been especially appropriate. 
However, especially in the environmental sector, it is a significant way of 
understanding the world and how to change it, and it is one of the 
approaches available to convince influential audiences. Without wishing 
to see an arms race, if government and economic actors are ‘tooled up’ in 
law (Interviewee 5), then environmental NGOs need to be.
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The lobbying literature frequently depicts a competitive, cut-throat 
environment in which interest groups, even those who share similar 
concerns, seek to protect their organisation and compete against each 
other to claim credit for success with members and interested publics.1 
This extends to the environmental sector: ‘there’s ferocious territoriality 
between NGOs. And that gets in the way of a lot of conversations’ 
(Interviewee 1). There are also plenty of opportunities for NGOs to act 
on their own and lobby successfully, and parliamentary work might even 
be ‘much easier to do if you’re just doing it in a single organisation’ 
(Interviewee 3). It is perhaps surprising then that NGOs would act 
together in the public interest at all.2 But groups do choose to lobby 
in coalition, and the strength and quality of collaboration on Brexit 
(especially through Greener UK) emerged as an absolutely core theme of 
our interviews.
An interesting body of theoretical and empirical work considers the 
why, when and how of interest group collaboration.3 This literature 
identifies a complex and interrelated set of push and pull factors that may 
influence NGO decisions on whether to lobby as a single interest group or 
to join other NGOs and lobby in coalition. Drawing on both the literature 
on interest group coalitions and our interview data, we seek in this 
chapter to understand the opportunities and challenges for collaboration 
around Brexit-environment. By contrast with most of the literature, we 
are not seeking to explain why individual groups choose to collaborate or 
not, or how individual groups contribute to the collaboration. The intense 
collaboration that developed around Brexit-environment is explored to 
help us understand the role of coalitions in advocacy by the environmental 
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NGO sector, and their contribution to the use of law and legal expertise in 
that advocacy.
We begin by considering the characteristics of coalitions, using 
examples from the English environmental sector to illustrate the diversity 
of coalition groups. A coalition is, in essence, an agreement ‘between two 
or more autonomous groups to collaborate in advocating for a common 
policy position.’4 But we mean something more than simply taking the 
same position on an issue; collaboration involves ‘the conscious exchange 
of resources and information, some division of labor, or the coordination 
of advocacy efforts with the aim of influencing policy outcomes.’5 
We occasionally refer to less formal and more ad hoc approaches to 
collaboration, but our interest in this chapter is really formal coalition 
working. Our Brexit-environment case study also provides us with a rare 
opportunity to observe ‘grand coalitions’, coalition groups working with 
other coalition groups to achieve shared goals.
We then turn to the challenges and rewards of collaboration.6 
Although it is difficult to separate out the ‘swings and roundabouts’ 
(Interviewee 14), we begin with the positive reasons for collaboration, 
and the value that our participants experienced in collaborating around 
Brexit. Here, we can see the power of collective resource. Collaboration 
has enhanced the efficiency and effectiveness of lobbying and has 
strengthened the role of law in advocacy through the pooling of legal 
expertise. It has also deepened that expertise by creating a space for 
reflection and deliberation. Greener UK’s work with other coalitions 
emphasises the potential for joint working to enhance collective resource, 
notwithstanding the difficulties of forming such alliances.
We then explore the costs and challenges of collaboration, including 
as experienced by our participants. Deciding whether or not to collaborate 
is clearly difficult, and building a successful coalition is challenging. 
The literature and our case study tell us that shared goals, necessitating 
compromise and concession, are important if collaboration is to work. 
The seismic nature of Brexit has led to a set of shared goals around 
principles and governance, overcoming pressure to maintain individual 
organisation identity. Interests would also seem to be more or less 
aligned around the broader substantive aspects of the Environment Bill, 
although more compromise has been necessary, and certain areas such 
as environmental targets have been more problematic.
Much environmental group advocacy in the aftermath of the 
referendum was channelled through the Greener UK coalition, and 
Greener UK was consistently raised, unprompted, in our empirical work. 
Many, although not all, of our interviewees were involved, in some cases 
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heavily, with Greener UK. That should be borne in mind when considering 
our conclusions in this and the following chapters (although we expect 
that we would have heard any concerns and complaints loud and clear). 
However difficult it is to identify success, and however incomplete 
and imperfect the outcome is, at the time of writing, collaboration 
was generally agreed to be ‘an absolute bright side of what’s going on’ 
(Interviewee 13). We assess Greener UK’s profound influence on the 
Brexit process and the Environment Bill, along with the factors that 
made it successful as a collaborative enterprise, in chapter 7.
Collaboration and environmental groups
There is a strong history of collaboration between environmental 
groups,7 and the result of the referendum on leaving the EU seems to 
have intensified coalition working across the sector.8 Coalitions come in 
different shapes and sizes. They may be long-lived or short term. They 
may be realised through formal institutional structures or may revolve 
instead around more informal understandings in which ‘we kind of 
recognise each other’s unique areas of expertise and skill’ (Interviewee 9). 
This same interviewee noted that this informal way of working in 
coalition ‘makes us stronger altogether if we can, you know, complement 
each other quite consciously’.
There are a number of significant coalitions in the environmental 
area, some of which have been set up with the explicit purpose of working 
on Brexit. Greener UK, a coalition of environmental interest groups set 
up to work on the environmental impact of Brexit, has featured heavily 
in this book so far, and we explore its impact and successes in chapter 7. 
Green Alliance, which hosts Greener UK, was a suitable home for a formal 
collaborative arrangement that would focus on leveraging influence 
through advocacy; they were ‘very well placed at Westminster to lobby 
on broad, strategic issues rather than maybe the very specific kind of 
policy ones that we’d been working on before’ (Interviewee 2).
Other than Greener UK, Wildlife and Countryside Link (in England9) 
was mentioned by some of our participants as an important coalition 
of environmental groups. Much of Link’s governance work has taken 
place in its specialist Legal Strategy Group. Although that work was 
largely channelled through Greener UK, Link made independent contri-
butions to the debate. In some cases (for example in written evidence on 
the pre-legislative scrutiny of the draft Environment (Principles and 
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Governance) Bill10) that evidence explicitly complements Greener 
UK submissions. Other specialist Link groups, such as Blueprint for 
Water, have provided the central collaborative framework for some of 
the sectoral environmental (waste and resources, water, nature and 
biodiversity, etc.) parts of the Environment Bill, building on work they 
were doing in these areas before 2016, including in preparation for the 
25 Year Plan (see chapter 3).11
The Brexit-environment debate has provided fertile ground for 
coalitions to work with other coalitions. These ‘coalitions of coalitions’ 
include, perhaps most significantly for our purposes, Greener UK’s 
relationship with Link.12 This relationship has led to the pooling of 
complementary areas of expertise. Although it brought with it some 
tensions and challenges, discussed further below, the relationship has 
been described by Ruth Chambers of Greener UK as ‘a genuine and deep 
partnership’.13 It has intensified over our period of study into something 
of a ‘conjoined grand coalition’ (Interviewee 6), with Link groups now 
working closely with Greener UK on the Environment Bill.
In the words of one of our interviewees, Greener UK ‘had to be 
different to Link, otherwise what was the point of it?’ (Interviewee 6). 
Both groups are coalitions of environmental NGOs. Greener UK was 
established specifically to consider environmental protection post-Brexit, 
whilst Link is longer-standing and focuses on nature and wildlife. Twelve 
of the thirteen Greener UK member organisations are also members of 
Link. Link has 57 members comprised of large and small NGOs who have 
environmental and animal welfare considerations at their core.14 Link is 
therefore a much bigger and broader coalition than Greener UK: part of 
its purpose ‘is to bring together all of these relatively small specialist 
groups. You know some of them quite species-specific. Trying to make a 
big tent and to bring everybody together for that purpose’ (Interviewee 
3). This provides it with a very deep expertise on particular policy issues.
Some coalitions are more heterogeneous in nature and bring 
together both NGOs and business groups who share common interests 
in a policy area. A coalition comprised of diverse organisations with 
different characteristics can be beneficial, because it ‘potentially relies on 
a wide range of constituencies and therefore mobilizes a varied set of 
political resources and expert knowledge that enable it to address a 
broader set of policymakers’.15 When we asked our interviewees about 
collaboration beyond the environmental NGO sector, both the Aldersgate 
Group16 and Broadway Initiative17 were frequently mentioned as relevant 
business–environment coalitions, with whom the sector has worked.18 
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Greener UK and individual NGOs have also worked with others including 
academics and research institutions. We return to these ‘new, unusual 
partnership’ (Interviewee 2) ways of working below. All of these working 
partnerships (formal or informal) have enriched the environmental 
sector’s discussion around Brexit-environment. In the words of one of our 
interviewees, ‘our ability to be able to draw on legal experts, on academics, 
on business and really shape some quite crucial and helpful arguments 
has been, I think, a real benefit’ (Interviewee 2).
Given that we are concerned primarily with law and legal 
expertise, it is worth pausing for a word on ClientEarth, and its revealing 
place in collaboration in the sector. We have not studied ClientEarth 
in particular, and claim no specific conclusions as to its approach or 
role. But ClientEarth was raised unprompted in our empirical work, and 
some of the comments made do point up the challenges of collabora- 
ting, the importance of context, and the intensity of the Greener UK 
collaboration.
As outlined in chapter 1 (page 4), ClientEarth is a relatively 
recent addition to the UK/European NGO community, set up in 2007. Its 
approach was also innovative, ‘not a wholly new approach, but a new 
approach at scale and with a kind of slightly different idea about how to 
strategically use the law for the environment and how that could work 
with the environmental movement’ (Interviewee 16). This new beast 
clearly created:
quite a lot of angst amongst the rest of the green sector […] 
they kind of were caricatured at the beginning. Which was like 
basically a bunch of gung-ho American lawyers who didn’t really 
get all the sensitivities around all the political context, political 
strategies, who were just going to sue everything that moved 
(Interviewee 11).
Apparently the tension came from both sides, in the sense of both 
resistance to ClientEarth from the established NGOs, and the approach 
by ClientEarth to the rest of the sector. Interviewee 1, for example, told 
us that s/he was surprised that the arrival of ClientEarth on to the UK/
European scene was met with ‘suspicion, extraordinary turf jealousy, 
very sharp elbows’, and also remarked on the deliberate exclusion of 
ClientEarth from some key decision-making fora: ‘they just simply would 
not let ClientEarth into that conversation. And to ClientEarth’s great 
credit, they just said, “Well okay. Sod it, we’ll just do our own thing”’. 
But it was clearly not one-sided: ‘Now it wasn’t helped, it has to be said 
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[…] by ClientEarth’s way of interacting with other NGOs. […] Not 
collaborative, unwilling to attribute shared effort to achieved outcomes’ 
(Interviewee 1). Both sides of this dynamic come out more generally in 
several of the interviews,19 and although we exclude some of the more 
salacious tales we heard, ‘I have to be honest, the start of that relationship 
was really, really tricky’ (Interviewee 12).
For current purposes, it is interesting and important that the role 
of ClientEarth in collaboration around the Brexit/Environment Bill 
process seems to have been far more positive, with ClientEarth clearly 
seen as ‘a very valuable partner’ in that effort (Interviewee 16, plus 
personal observations). Using their legal expertise in law-making to 
‘kind of shape things, even before and ever you get to [the litigation] 
kind of space, I think that they’ve probably learnt that this is a very 
productive space to be in’ (Interviewee 6). ClientEarth has been heavily 
involved in the legal element of the Brexit work, both in the Greener UK 
groups and on the Board.20 Without referring to ClientEarth or Brexit 
specifically, Interviewee 11 suggested that ‘I think you’ve seen a bit of 
a shift in how the legal groups work in the sector, interact with the 
rest of the sector, as they increasingly work with the grain of the rest 
of the [sector]’. One of our interviewees from ClientEarth noted ‘the 
opportunity [provided by Brexit] to work in a different way with the 
other UK environmental organisations has been really incredibly 
valuable’ (unattributed). Although this participant and others highlight 
Brexit, it is clear that Interviewee 11 does not attribute the ‘high level of 
collaboration and working now’ to Brexit specifically. Other things might 
be going on. Most obviously, as ClientEarth has evolved, not only have 
their personnel changed and different personalities come to the fore, but 
the rest of the sector has grown accustomed to the lawyers. And the 
recognition of the legal complexity of Brexit, and ClientEarth’s visible 
ability (along with others) to make a contribution, does seem to have 
contributed to change.
Collaboration as an opportunity: individual v  
collective resource
The literature on NGO coalition-building reveals a multitude of reasons 
for NGO collaboration around shared goals. Much of the literature 
assumes that by working together in coalition, interest groups enjoy 
greater access and influence.21 In the words of one of our interviewees, 
‘the most effective way to kind of get the voice of the environment heard 
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would be to work in coalition’ (Interviewee 2). Coalitions enhance the 
impact and efficiency of lobbying through the sharing of information, 
expertise, access to power-holders and other resources (including 
financial and human). They will also ‘send a credible signal that their 
policy views enjoy broad support’.22 For some, especially smaller groups, 
collaboration may be the only way in which they can survive and maintain 
some degree of influence in a growing, competitive environment.23 
For others, working in coalition can enhance the impact and efficiency 
of lobbying and may move NGOs into areas of interest that are ‘not 
necessarily their natural home’ (Interviewee 15). In this section, we 
focus on the power of collective resource with a particular emphasis on 
law and legal expertise.
As discussed in chapter 2, resources (people, money, information, 
expertise, etc.) are ‘highly interrelated and indispensable for successful 
advocacy efforts’24 and are a key factor in determining NGO status, 
strategy and influence. Influence itself is a crucial resource, and agreement 
across the sector can contribute very powerfully to that influence. 
Jan Beyers and Iskender De Bruycker suggest that ‘advocates bundle 
their political weight and signal to policymakers that their views enjoy 
political support beyond their own organization’.25 External observers 
will attach significance to the membership of a coalition.26 This influence 
may be especially strong in heterogeneous coalitions of business and 
environmental groups where ‘there is something extremely powerful, 
particularly for the current Government in showing that industry and 
business are of a like mind to the environment sector’ (Interviewee 9). 
This same interviewee points to the role of such coalitions in promoting 
their cause to both publics and the media. S/he also commented on the 
way that working with broader business/interest group coalitions has 
provided additional political opportunities and greater political reach, as 
did Interviewee 2:
So we’ve been able to go to meetings with Treasury for example, as 
a united voice calling for the same thing. And it’s been much harder 
for kind of government to say, ‘We hear you green NGOs, but 
business are telling us something else.’ Because we’ve been singing 
from the same hymn sheet.
With respect to more homogenous groups, and Greener UK in particular, 
some of our interviewees explained how speaking with a single voice 
makes life simpler and more efficient for those they are seeking to 
influence. For example:
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I think sometimes there’s a tendency within government to do 
stakeholder engagement in quite a lazy way. So they do it in a fairly 
kind of lowest common denominator, ‘let’s have a group, let’s have 
a group of groups so that we don’t need to talk to everyone’. […] 
that’s how DEFRA likes to work (Interviewee 6).
Similarly:
And there’s clearly a demand on the DEFRA side in particular, 
I think less so in other government departments, to engage with a 
representative group from the NGOs. And of course that could get 
to be a more influential factor than it should be over time, you 
know, it could become a bit of a lazy short cut for ... instead of 
dealing with a whole panoply of stakeholders in the sort of optimal 
way, you could say, ‘Well let’s just talk to Greener UK and people 
who we know and see all the time’ (Interviewee 3).
This sense from two interviewees that a call on the coalition alone is a 
‘lazy’ approach speaks to a real dilemma for individual organisations 
trying to maintain their own profile, as explored below.
Working in coalition can also be more efficient and effective 
for its member organisations, because at a practical level, lobbying is 
an expensive strategy, and ‘coalition formation enables participants to 
share those lobbying expenses’.27 All NGOs, large and small, face resource 
constraints.28 One of the most powerful arguments in favour of collabo- 
ration therefore is that it enables groups to pool their resources, thus 
enhancing the likely effectiveness and efficiency of lobbying. This 
collective resource can be important in a number of ways. First, lobbying 
will be most effective when groups have ‘relevant and detailed knowledge 
about the legislative process surrounding the issue targeted by a group’s 
advocacy efforts’.29 Possessing this type of political (and procedural) 
intelligence at the right time provides groups with a strategic advantage 
but is difficult to gather, especially for smaller groups. Collaboration can 
address access and skills, as well as resource deficits in this respect:
And also having just one contact – XXX – with MPs. It means 
that each organisation didn’t have to duplicate public affairs 
work as well. So it meant that I could do my […] job, without 
necessarily having to get dedicated resource from public affairs 
[…] Because there’s already that dedicated resource from Greener 
UK (Interviewee 15).
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Similarly, ‘[T]here’s no point five of us having meetings with XXX, when 
we can just go with XXX and have that, that single stand-alone meeting’ 
(Interviewee 12).
And practically, ‘It meant there was no duplication of work. I mean, 
for one lawyer to draft all the amendments necessary ... along with 
the actual day to day workload as well. […] To share it out that way 
has been very useful’ (Interviewee 15). Collaboration, especially 
under an umbrella coalition that dedicates specific resources to working 
in partnership (such as Greener UK), can maximise the efficiency of 
lobbying activities, facilitate the sharing of workload and avoid duplica-
tion of effort.
We saw this also in Greener UK’s work with Link. Broadly speaking, 
Greener UK has been leading work on the first part of the Bill around the 
OEP, governance, principles and the target-setting framework, with Link 
focusing on the sectoral (waste, water, nature, etc.) elements of the Bill. 
Greener UK’s leadership on the governance elements of the Bill was 
widely acknowledged by the time the sectoral elements of the Bill were 
revealed by Government, and Greener UK had distinctive expertise in the 
necessary strategic political activity. Link’s broad-based membership 
brings with it some distinctive strengths. Several interviewees emphasised 
Link’s detailed policy expertise: ‘it has got lots of the kind of really 
experienced, fabulous techie, nerdy people who have been working on 
this stuff for years’ (Interviewee 12); ‘within Link, the expertise in certain 
policy areas really runs very deep’ (Interviewee 16). By working together 
in this way, Greener UK and Link could play to their strengths in terms 
of expertise. This collective resource was clearly important, especially 
given the ‘monster’ scale of the Bill (Interviewee 3). Further, ‘there was 
a sense, especially because there’s a big overlap in membership, that 
you needed to make the two coalitions sort of work together at key 
points’ (Interviewee 16).
By working in coalition (and with other coalitions), groups can 
pool their expertise in any given areas and thereby enhance the advocacy 
efforts of the collective.30 This resource exchange approach has arguably 
been especially powerful with respect to law and legal expertise during 
Brexit. As discussed in chapter 3, the post-Brexit governance debate 
was framed for a lengthy period as largely about ‘equivalence’, which 
in turn was framed largely as legal equivalence, making political and 
other actors hungry for legal expertise. Furthermore, this expertise is 
(with the exception of ClientEarth) dispersed thinly across the NGO 
sector, especially if one considers how diverse and specialist the relevant 
legal expertise can be (chapter 4). Our interview data points strongly to 
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the fact that one of the positive consequences of collaboration, which 
was probably not anticipated when Greener UK was set up, has indeed 
been the pooling of legal expertise: ‘being able to draw on the pockets of 
expertise across the sector was very important …’ (Interviewee 8). 
Collaboration makes legal expertise available to the sector, as a service 
or resource. In Link for example, ‘the idea is that that Legal Strategy 
Group does its own policy area […] but also is a resource for the 
working groups’ (Interviewee 12); and of ClientEarth: ‘we try not to be 
a service provider in that sense, because we do have our own strategy 
and we’re not sort of taking instructions from others. And we can’t do 
that but we do, you know ... the work does serve the wider coalition’ 
(unattributed).
This extends to making particular specialisation available, for 
example, the relatively limited trade law expertise in the sector. One of 
our interviewees said that ‘I think there needs to be more sort of pooling 
of resources. Because there’s no sense in [XXX] hiring trade experts and 
sort of keeping them to themselves or whatever. So it should be an 
organisation like Greener UK then gets in someone like that’ (Interviewee 
15). This, however, obviously clashes with organisational competition, 
discussed below; if there is money available for, and recognition available 
from, trade expertise, NGOs may well want to ‘own’ it.
As well as pooling expertise, collaboration can also deepen that 
expertise. Bringing a number of otherwise dispersed legal experts 
together to discuss and debate proposals and ways forward, seems, both 
intuitively and according to our interview data, to have more potential 
than individual lawyers working independently. It is not only more 
efficient; the result is more than the sum of its parts, because combining 
legal capacity may shape a more deliberative forum in which lawyers 
have the ‘opportunity to sort of actually bounce these things around, if 
you like’ (Interviewee 15). This can enrich debate and discussion:
I mean it’s brought together lawyers from different organisations 
who, yes, would have talked together and worked together before. 
But certainly in my view, in order to get your head around a lot of 
this stuff, you need to have a sensible conversation with someone 
who’s actually thought about it a bit and you can talk about it 
(unattributed).
We would argue that this can only improve the quality of legal argument 
in advocacy: ‘I think it was important to have enough pockets that 
[lawyers] could disagree with each other as well and have a proper 
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debate. I think I would have been nervous if it was just one person and 
that’s an advantage of pooling’ (Interviewee 8).
We can also point to a number of ways in which collaboration can 
indirectly strengthen the place of law and legal expertise in advocacy, 
both in the short and longer term. Deeper and broader legal capacity may 
strengthen the perceived value of legal argument both within and across 
environmental NGOs. For example, one interviewee noted that it ‘sort of 
raises the profile [of law] within organisations’ (Interviewee 15):
[F]or one lawyer to raise an issue in an organisation like XXX, it’s a 
bit of an uphill struggle, because you’ve got a team of ten people 
working on species, a team of ten people working on fresh water, 
and then one lawyer, it’s very difficult to actually drive the direction 
and the agenda in an organisation like that. So when everyone 
came together for Greener UK, even though actually within each 
organisation it might have been two or three people who are 
practically engaged with Greener UK, because you’ve got that 
umbrella organisation, that has all the logos attached, even within 
XXX, it raises the profile of the work you’re doing. And draws other 
people into it as well (Interviewee 15).
It is of course too soon to say, but it is plausible that this may, in time, 
influence the culture and identity of interest groups, placing legal 
expertise closer to the forefront of NGO action,31 in the loop between 
resources of expertise and culture discussed throughout this book.
Of course, collective resource benefits are not limited to legal 
expertise. Collaboration through Greener UK has promoted cross-
disciplinary working where there is ‘actually quite a nice combination of 
lawyers and non-lawyers sort of working together very much, where 
there’s a bit more interplay between, between the two. And I think that 
doesn’t happen quite so much in my experience’ (Interviewee 3). And 
a depth and breadth of expertise can be enabled in collaboration that 
may not be possible in a single organisation. For example, ‘and actually 
through this Brexit process I think a lot more organisations have got to 
grips with [using parliamentary processes] and have become adept at 
using those procedures to get what they want, which is a very welcome 
development actually’ (Interviewee 13).
One other point is worth making. In using this ‘resource exchange’ 
approach, it could be argued (perhaps intuitively) that large, resource-
rich groups are less likely to work in coalition with others. After all, they 
have the resource (money, expertise, etc.) to lobby as an individual 
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organisation and, in turn, will have neither the need nor desire to 
share the credit for any lobbying success.32 However, empirical evidence 
indicates that as groups grow in capacity, they are more likely to pursue 
lobbying coalitions.33 This could be because bigger groups are more 
regularly invited to join coalitions, and better resourced groups are more 
able to absorb the additional costs of collaboration. Both possibilities 
could be applied to the Greener UK coalition, whose members, on paper 
at least, appear to have considerable resources of expertise.
Collaboration as a challenge
There are clearly multiple benefits to interest groups working together 
in coalition, and we return in more detail to the attributes of Greener 
UK that enhanced these benefits in the next chapter. In this section, 
we seek to understand the quite significant risks and challenges of 
collaborative working. We consider these under two broad and intercon-
nected headings: alignment of interests and compromise; and profile, 
competition and identity. Both of these challenges are felt more acutely, 
perhaps, when small and large organisations work together in collabora-
tion. When talking about Link, for example, one of our interviewees 
noted that there is:
some tension between the big organisations, you know, the WWFs 
and the RSPBs and the little ones, if you like. So the big ones are not 
going to want to be bound by things going on in Link. But on the 
other hand, every now and again they’ll be wanting to do things 
together (Interviewee 3).
It is important to recognise that the advantages of working in coalition 
may be more apparent in the context of NGO advocacy as opposed to 
other types of strategic NGO intervention. Two of our interviewees 
alluded to this, using litigation and campaigning as examples. For one 
interviewee collaboration on case work, including judicial review, is ‘a 
nightmare because organisations want to do their own press work, they 
want to get their policy messages into their […] proofs of evidence, you 
know, that I find really challenging’ (unattributed).34 In Greener UK’s 
collaboration with The Climate Coalition on The Time is Now Campaign, 
one interviewee noted that:
an area where perhaps it’s more difficult, because it’s things that are 
more done by organisations and more relate to their membership 
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and their brand and how they speak to their members. So it’s maybe 
one of the areas where it’s more challenging to get collaboration, 
whereas on some of the inside track stuff, the advocacy, it’s easier 
(Interviewee 16).
Alignment of interests and compromise
Collaboration is much more likely if interest groups are able to adopt a 
jointly agreed position when lobbying power-holders. But finding a 
shared policy goal, as well as agreeing upon the strategic approach to 
be taken, is not always easy: ‘an alignment of interests is really hard’ 
(Interviewee 17). This can lead to tension and compromise. These points 
were made by a number of our participants. There is a danger of ‘lowest 
common denominator viewpoints’ (Interviewee 13) emerging from 
coalition. Where interests are aligned and concessions are made, this can 
in turn impact on the extent to which individual coalition members can 
pursue their intended goals to the full. According to one interviewee, 
‘sometimes it just means that coalition itself, because we’re a product of 
consensus, can only go so far on some of these issues, publicly at least’ 
(Interviewee 6).
The environment sector was described by one as ‘generally … 
a consensual sector’ (Interviewee 13), with a shared overarching 
commitment to environmental protection and nature conservation. It 
has, however, been ‘vexed over the years by, sort of, badge waving’ 
(Interviewee 13). This is perhaps unsurprising. Individual organisations 
inevitably focus on their own particular issues and interests:
[T]here’s just difference of emphasis. So if you’re the Wildlife Trust, 
you think the most important bit’s the nature restoration target. If 
you’re ClientEarth, you think the most important bit is the World 
Health Organisation clean air targets. If you’re Friends of the Earth, 
you think it’s, you know, climate, or whatever. So there’s differences 
of emphasis (Interviewee 11).
Some of our interviewees recognised this in speaking to their own 
organisational position:
But it does also mean that when we’re sitting in a meeting and we’re 
trying to agree a strategy, that there may be times when we as XXX 
have to be a bit awkward and say, ‘Do you know what, we can’t 
support that. We’re really sorry, that’s going beyond what we’re 
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comfortable with saying as XXX. You know, can we find a 
compromise? Do we have to step back from this on this occasion?’ 
(Interviewee 9).
Compromise and concession are therefore important parts of building 
an effective coalition: ‘you have to make significant compromises all the 
time about things that you think are important to your organisation that 
others in the coalition may not think are so important’ (Interviewee 14). 
Reaching consensus may also be more difficult in larger coalitions. 
In comparing, for example, Greener UK and Link, ‘I think it’s much 
easier for the big NGOs to operate as a coalition through Greener UK 
than Wildlife Countryside Link, purely because it’s a smaller group 
that needs to reach agreement’ (Interviewee 15). It may also be more 
difficult for coalitions of interest groups and business organisations to 
reach consensus, although in these more heterogeneous coalitions, the 
underlying purpose of and approach to collaboration may be different:
I think there’s less desire to find common ground, like if there is 
common ground, great – there’s common ground, let’s talk. 
If there’s not common ground, well we’re not entering that 
relationship to try and necessarily convince them all to find that 
common ground … The possibility to change – not change – or 
to work with NGOs to find that common ground is more pressing 
I suppose (Interviewee 7).
Another interviewee, in talking about Greener UK’s work with business 
groups commented that:
the way that we’ve approached working with those collaborations 
is to, I guess, number one, keep the channels of communication 
open so that everyone knows what they’re doing. Number two, try 
and find as much common ground as possible, and number three, 
just be really open and transparent about, you know, any areas 
where we may not always agree (unattributed).
Pre-empting our discussion of Greener UK in the next chapter, our 
interview data is indicative of at least broad agreement around the big 
Brexit picture: ‘I think the NGO community probably is largely at a 
consensus on the overall impact of Brexit. I think it considers it’s bad for 
the environment, because of the way in which European environmental 
law has been designed and implemented’ (Interviewee 17). For one 
Lobbying in CoALit ion 139
interviewee, Brexit itself seems to have led to an ‘exceptional willingness 
to bury, you know, individual organisational interests’ (Interviewee 3) 
and was seen as so fundamental to the sector that groups put aside their 
individual interests and worked in collaboration:
It’s an emotional issue as well as an intellectual one for people. 
I think there is a sense that most NGO people, they’re on the same 
side on this really ... So that whatever differences they have, it 
was just totally fundamental. And I think there were not major 
differences of view about it. And I think everyone knew that the 
environmental progress we’d made was at threat, you know. That 
was a bigger problem than their own issues. So, yes, I think it was a 
bit of a watershed in that way (Interviewee 3).
Only one of our interviewees suggested, albeit tentatively and whilst 
acknowledging consensus within Greener UK, that ‘other NGOs lobbying 
in that space. I don’t feel they have that strong consensus’ (Interviewee 17). 
Nevertheless Brexit would appear to again be ‘special’, with members of 
the Greener UK coalition (at least) setting aside fundamental differences 
in light of the threat posed by the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. The 
referendum result imposed on the sector an issue that was extraordinarily 
salient for them, and where most of the community was already ‘on the 
same side on this really’ (Interviewee 3).
Alignment over the big picture, and even much of the detail, of 
governance and principles after Brexit seems to have been relatively 
unproblematic. Speaking in July 2019 one interviewee commented that: 
‘I don’t think that so far it’s been particularly bad. Because particularly 
when we were working on the Withdrawal Bill, to some extent what 
we needed to do was get the environment inserted into that piece of 
legislation. So we all needed to work together’ (Interviewee 2).
In addition to the governance elements, however, the Environment 
Bill was widely perceived as the opportunity of a lifetime for getting envi-
ronmental values and objectives into primary legislation. We expected to 
see more challenges around collaboration on the substantive elements 
of the Bill:
I think the Environment Bill will potentially lay some of those 
tensions a bit more open, because it’s a big, important piece of 
legislation. It’s very broad. And trying to get all of the coalition to 
agree on what the priority is on that legislation, at the expense 
of anything else, I think is going to be ... (Interviewee 2)
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And there certainly were some tensions. But overall, our interviews 
suggest that even collaboration around the more substantive (water, 
waste, nature) elements of the Environment Bill remains largely 
consensual. We should be somewhat cautious about this conclusion, in 
part because our participants were much more circumspect about Link 
than they were about Greener UK. Furthermore, the very narrow framing 
and segmentation of the environmental issues may limit the number of 
individuals and organisations with a strong view on each separate part of 
the Bill. Related to that, and importantly, at the time of our interviews, 
the prioritisation of some elements of the Environment Bill over others, 
was at an early stage.35
One element of the Bill that came up most frequently in our 
interviews was targets. Targets ended up being successfully framed as a 
governance issue, as below; but targets also involved at times a discussion 
about which specific targets on which environmental issues the coalition 
should argue for legislative action on. ‘It’s quite difficult to keep the whole 
coalition on the same page on targets generally’ (Interviewee 3):
I think it’s fair to say, not all organisations are entirely happy 
with, not only the topic areas but also the way that the targets need 
to be, well drafted, for want of a better word. There’s still a lot of 
debate and I think [XXX] is pulling [their] hair out. […] So each 
organisation, you know, somebody wants a bee specific one, 
someone wants a soya specific one, someone wants, you know. So 
I think that has been a huge, huge challenge (Interviewee 12).
Focusing on the legal architecture for targets, as opposed to the setting of 
specific targets in particular areas was significant: the ‘wording we need 
to see on the face of the Bill that would give confidence that it would 
deliver across, you know, all of these areas’ (Interviewee 2). There was, 
according to this same interviewee, ‘a bit of work to do, and that’s 
ongoing, about explaining and trying to give confidence that a target-
setting framework, which is by its very nature not specific will deliver 
what, you know, colleagues working in specific policy areas want’ 
(Interviewee 2).
Collaboration and consensus-building around trade has been 
difficult, for different reasons. As discussed earlier, its technical complexity 
is likely a resource and capacity challenge for environmental groups. 
Furthermore:
some of the Greener UK coalition have got a clear interest or 
position, a history of working in this area, and see trade as 
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something impinging on their objectives. And others […] not 
traditionally involved in trade, wouldn’t necessarily see it as a 
priority (Interviewee 3).
On the one hand, ‘there’s still a sense I think amongst those organisations 
that do wish to work on trade – they want to do it together’ (Interviewee 3) 
and common ground has been established. But it has been acknowledged 
that there are some aspects of trade policy in which consensus was either 
unachievable or even undesirable, and different organisations will take 
different positions, within a common framework.
profile, competition and identity
Collaboration may imply not just the pooling of resources, but also the 
‘pooling’ of outcomes (credit, policy impact, profile, relationships); 
working in coalition may threaten interest groups’ drive to remain 
competitive, specialised and autonomous. Groups may ‘avoid alliances 
with other groups in order to enhance their own reputations as advocates 
and to distinguish themselves from other organizations representing 
similar interests’.36 A key factor in ensuring the survival (and organi- 
sational maintenance) of an NGO is that it has a strong and appealing 
organisational identity, in the eyes of both supporters and those it 
seeks to influence.37 Group identity, which ‘flows both from how an 
organization understands itself and how it is understood by others’38 
is especially important in a crowded environment in which NGOs 
are competing for income, resources and influence. Although the 
emphasis placed on identity will vary from one group to another, it is an 
important factor in the decision to work in collaboration or work alone. 
Organisational identity may relate to a group’s policy position or special 
expertise on a particular issue,39 or its favoured political strategy (for 
example litigation, lobbying or protest), or may be linked more broadly 
to whether or not the group defends radical positions or prefers more 
moderate positions that are suited to political compromise. Describing 
the environment sector as ‘like an ecosystem’ in which ‘we all have slightly 
different perspectives … slightly different views’, Interviewee 9 went on 
to say that:
you have those that are what you might describe as at the extreme 
end, who want to really push forward, who want to do big public 
campaigns, lots of sort of disruptive stuff. And then you have 
[others] at the other end of the spectrum, who are very much on 
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board with the kind of principle, but actually you know […] in a 
different place. (Interviewee 9).
Whilst they may share end goals, environmental NGOs must weigh the 
advantages of collaboration against the fact that they will also likely be 
competing (with their collaborators) for income and indeed, influence; 
without resources, an audience, members and supporters, groups are 
unable to pursue their strategic objectives. In the words of one of our 
interviewees:
whilst environmental NGOs obviously all work together, there is 
also an underlying element of competition, I think. And because 
obviously they all work in the same sector, they’re all trying to 
get the same members and they’re all trying to become the lead 
organisations, if you like, in the environmental sector domestically. 
So there is always going to be a little bit of an element of competition, 
and that does sometimes manifest itself in organisations trying 
to take ownership of particular areas and lead in those areas 
(Interviewee 15).
Albeit in the context of litigation, one of our interviewees alluded to this 
‘strategic positioning’ when there is the potential to work collectively on 
a particular high-profile case:
… there’s lots of dialogue about who’s going to argue what and how 
is it going to work and don’t shaft us, and that kind of thing. […] 
some of that becomes about organisational positioning; it’s not 
elegant, it’s not pretty. It is proper, you know, People’s Popular Front 
of Judea kind of stuff. Because they’re jostling for position and 
jostling for recognition. They’re jostling for money, they’re jostling 
for members. So it isn’t beautiful sometimes (Interviewee 5).
Some interviewees explicitly acknowledged the clear ‘profile sacrifice’ 
(Interviewee 2) that has to be made when NGOs are working in coalition: 
‘coalition work didn’t allow enough room for the oak leaf to shine or the 
panda to stand out’ (Interviewee 13). To take another example:
So I spend quite a lot of my time drafting stuff or kind of working in 
coalition, attending meetings on behalf of or with the coalition. 
That’s, you know, it does come often at the expense of profile for 
XXX. So there is a tension. (Interviewee 2)
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This may be especially challenging at high-profile moments when 
coalition members look for their contribution to be explicitly ack- 
nowledged and recognised. One of our participants made this point 
when talking about the ‘internal pressures’ s/he faced during the second 
reading of the Environment Bill in February 2020:
it’s questioned why there were only [X] references to XXX whereas 
there were twenty to Greener UK. And does everyone know that 
XXX is basically tied into Greener UK? And I’m sure that other 
organisations are having equally tricky conversations, you know, 
they want that name recognition (unattributed).
We see ‘competition between coalitions’ (Interviewee 15) in the 
relationship between Link and Greener UK. Getting two large coalitions 
to work together (and indeed reach a level of consensus which, as 
discussed above, it seems they did) is no small task:
we’ve managed to inspire quite a high level of trust and collabora-
tion amongst thirteen organisations, you add fifty-two more into 
that mix, you think, ‘How on earth can you do that?’ So it’s been 
a case of needing to ensure that all of the organisations are 
brought on board, whilst not creating something totally unwieldy 
(unattributed).
A number of our interviewees spoke of tensions between the two 
coalitions, certainly during the earlier stages of advocacy around Brexit-
environment, although some also noted improvement: ‘I think they 
seemed to have found their roles now […] that relationship seems to be 
improving ’cause they’re working out how they can complement each 
other’ (Interviewee 15). For another interviewee there was a sense 
that early in the process, although relations were ‘perfectly friendly’, 
‘Link kept feeling they were being excluded from things and they should 
have a bigger role’ (Interviewee 3). We are conscious that our interviews 
may not have picked up on any broader resentment of Greener UK in 
the sector.
And the competitiveness between NGOs sometimes manifests in 
a very personal way. Not speaking specifically about Brexit, Interviewee 
12 told us:
We are all human and I do find myself getting a bit competitive 
when maybe other organisations seem to be doing things in their 
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own name, when we have agreed to work together and be in 
collaboration. […] other organisations might want to make sure 
that people know that they are working on something and therefore 
they want to do their own reports, they want to do their own 
lobbying or their own meetings with different organisations […] so 
yes, I do get quite annoyed.
We may assume that the greater the competition, the less likely it is that 
groups will form coalitions. However, the literature suggests the opposite: 
competition stimulates coalition forming, perhaps because groups in 
competition often share important policy objectives.40 ‘Organisational 
salience’ is an important explanatory factor for coalescing.41 The shared 
objectives and high salience of Brexit, discussed in the next chapter, 
bear considerable explanatory weight in respect of collaboration over 
Brexit: political alignment around the post-Brexit governance 
mechanisms seemingly outweighed any costs to organisations’ own 
interests. Furthermore, the need for strong accountability mechanisms 
post-Brexit was important for environmental NGOs, in terms of 
maintaining their own political and legal opportunities in the future.
But the challenge is not just about the immediate question of 
profile. In the longer term, collaboration may inhibit the extent to which 
NGOs are able to build their own relationships with power-holders, 
which are so important in the world of lobbying. So, ‘whilst it’s useful to 
be talking with one voice, in another sense … over the longer term, that’s 
not useful because we’re not generating our own relationships with 
government. Which of course, is the stuff that we live on’ (Interviewee 14). 
And yet:
You can’t set up a coalition and say ‘we want you to represent us’ 
and when we do that say ‘ah but, you know, we want be there too’. 
So there are many benefits of a coalition, but there are also 
inevitably tensions along the way as well, and I think that’s one of 
them. How you achieve meaningful representation and advocacy 
without cutting off rightful ties that organisations need to have on 
their own basis (Interviewee 6).
Both the literature on collaboration and our interview data points to 
membership organisations as facing particular competitive risks around 
collaboration and identity.42 The type of membership model might be 
significant. Much of the work identifying membership pressures as a 
deterrent to collaboration is about collaborations whose members are 
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themselves organisations rather than mass membership organisations 
like ours.43 But the impact on membership was explicitly acknowledged 
by some of our interviewees, for example:
by having to put a lot of effort into the coalition, more dynamic 
NGOs may have lost investment and members on their own profile. 
They probably have, you know, if I was really being clinical about it. 
You know, they would have been able to perform. […] ‘Cause 
they’re all, you know, they’re free-market organisations, NGOs. 
They do need to keep their profile up, keep their members up. And 
if they’re always saying things in coalition, it’s kind of boring and 
it’s not good for membership (Interviewee 3).
We might expect membership groups to work in coalition less frequently 
than, say, groups with incomes from other sources,44 although we should 
note wider competition for finance, for example philanthropic funding. 
However, members may query an NGO’s commitment to a particular goal 
if it fails to work in coalition with other like-minded groups: ‘they’ve also 
been able to demonstrate to their memberships and to the interested 
parts of the public, “Look, we collectively ...” ’ (Interviewee 11). A very 
large majority of Greener UK members are membership organisations, 
again perhaps signalling that collaboration around Brexit is ‘special’. 
An important and related point, raised by a range of interviewees working 
within and outside membership organisations, is that membership 
organisations ‘need to tread really quite carefully’ around Brexit, due to 
its sensitivity for their membership. Collaboration may have given them 
‘a space to kind of debate those issues and they’re not necessarily leading 
that debate. Sometimes it maybe might help them to push the boundaries 
of what their own kind of positioning might be’ (Interviewee 6).
Conclusions
Collaboration is important and the environmental NGO sector is calling 
for more of it.45 Our case study has provided a useful lens through 
which to observe the ‘benefits of a coalition’, but also the ‘tensions along 
the way’ (Interviewee 6). Greener UK is a key feature of the Brexit-
environment collaborative landscape. We can however point to a range 
of other collaborations, both formal and informal, which have enriched 
the debate and are likely to have contributed to shaping the post-Brexit 
environmental landscape.
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One of the interesting features of the Greener UK collaboration 
from the perspective of our work is its impact on legal expertise. It has 
made pockets of specialised expertise available to the community. But it 
has also deepened that expertise through deliberation, creating more 
than the sum of its parts. And it may have contributed to foregrounding 
legal expertise within member organisations. We surmise that collabora-
tion may play a similar role with respect to other thinly spread areas of 
expertise, such as expertise in parliamentary procedure and tactics.
Whilst the focus of our work has been on principles and governance, 
we can see that collaboration is continuing with the broader Environment 
Bill. The scope of the Bill (not to mention the Covid-19 pandemic and 
shifts in the political landscape) has made collaboration more complex 
and has demanded greater resource from both Greener UK itself and its 
member organisations. Greener UK’s important alliance with Link has 
facilitated a grand pooling of expertise but has raised new and additional 
challenges.
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7
Greener UK: influence  
and collaboration
Introduction
As we discuss in chapter 6, collaboration brings with it both challenges 
and rewards. Whilst it has enabled the environmental NGO community 
to pool and develop resource and expertise (including legal expertise), it 
requires groups to reach consensus on end goals and may come at a cost, 
both financial and in terms of organisational profile. In this chapter, 
we focus in more detail on the Greener UK coalition, which has played a 
central role in Brexit-environment advocacy. Greener UK has been the 
key forum in which many of the large UK environmental NGOs have 
developed their thinking on Brexit, and has led the debate for NGOs in 
the corridors of power. Collaboration through Greener UK was a recurring 
theme of our interviews, with almost everyone volunteering positive 
assessments of its work. That is of course in part a result of our sample; 
almost anyone working on Brexit-environment, especially on governance 
and principles, will be aware of, and probably directly working with, 
Greener UK, and no doubt some of Greener UK’s choices or objectives 
might be contested. But we do think we would have heard any complaints 
and disappointments from our own participants.1 Collaboration has been 
a ‘bright side’ (Interviewee 13) of the Brexit-environment journey, and 
Greener UK has been ‘exceptionally well-organised, very disciplined’ 
(Interviewee 3).
We assess the Greener UK coalition’s success along two lines. First, 
and this is the subject of the next section, it influenced the public debate 
and some outcomes on Brexit-environment. As discussed in chapter 1 
(pages 10–14), and as is recognised by our interviewees, determining the 
influence of NGO advocacy on specific outcomes is extraordinarily 
difficult: ‘it’s always very hard to know how powerful [environmental 
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NGOs] are, and what influence you have and what you can do’ 
(Interviewee 8). Attributions of causation are complex and often 
contested. We have already explored some significant political factors at 
play in the Brexit process, and many other actors, including academics 
and other public and private interest groups have contributed to the 
debate alongside environmental NGOs, as have individuals in parliament 
and government. Having said that, and taking these limitations as read, 
we explore the influence of Greener UK on the Brexit-environment 
debate and the development of the Environment Bill. We see Greener 
UK’s influence from the early stages of the post-referendum debate, right 
through to the version of the Environment Bill introduced to Parliament 
in 2020. As discussed in chapter 5, we do not try to establish the precise 
impact or influence of legal argument. However, the heavy reliance on 
legal expertise by the environmental NGO community, coupled with 
what we have to say about the relative success of Greener UK, provides 
some indirect evidence for the influence of that expertise.
A second measure of success, which is probably related to Greener 
UK’s influence and effectiveness, is that this is a collaboration that has 
‘worked’ as a collaboration. It has held together, it has been active, people 
have contributed and found that contribution rewarding. It has been 
properly ‘collaborative’ in any sense of the word. Indirect benefits of the 
coalition, beyond immediate or even delayed outcomes on the objectives 
of Greener UK, may include improved relationships, and the development 
of expertise at an individual and collective level. Drawing heavily on 
our interviewees’ perceptions and experience of working together 
through Greener UK, we explore some of the key features that may have 
contributed to this collaborative ethos. In particular, and developing our 
discussion in the previous chapter, we identify three crucial features of 
the Greener UK coalition: the nature of Brexit and its salience for the 
sector; people and trust; and resourcing. And finally, we consider the 
‘footprint’ (Interviewee 3) of Greener UK and the possible future of 
collaboration between environmental groups.
Influence and impact
Adapting Michelle Betsill and Elisabeth Corell’s definition, influence can 
be attributed when environmental groups ‘intentionally transmit 
information’ to those making decisions, and that information alters the 
process and the outcome.2 We are a little more modest in our aspirations 
than Betsill and Corell. We have observed an enormously complex, 
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diverse and dynamic set of influences on Brexit-environment, and we do 
not attribute sole responsibility for process or outcome to Greener UK (or 
even environmental NGOs generally), or engage in any philosophical or 
practical debates about causation.3 So when we refer to influence, we 
mean that we can see a link between Greener UK and debates or outcomes, 
but accept that other influences may also be significant. And of course, 
it would be impossible to separate Greener UK’s influence from the 
influence of other NGOs and coalitions, as well as individuals (including 
academics) advancing similar arguments.
We use Greener UK as a reference for a number of reasons. First, as 
we discuss in chapter 3 (page 63), our interviews have revealed the 
‘unprecedented’ nature of ‘access’ (Interviewee 6) to government and 
parliament during our period of study. According to DEFRA transparency 
data, Greener UK met with ministers on nine occasions between January 
2018 and December 2019, and there would have been many more 
meetings with officials than with ministers.4 Maria can attest to very 
frequent meetings between Greener UK and officials in DEFRA and other 
government departments. Second, Greener UK is made up of, and gets its 
resources (of expertise as well as finance5) from a number of major 
environmental groups, representing a significant part of the community 
on the issues at the heart of our case study. Third, and more prosaically, 
for the purposes of our research, Greener UK provides a convenient 
marker of NGO demands.6
As we say in chapter 1 (page 13), we do not intend to suggest that 
Greener UK is responsible for all of the positive outcomes of the sector’s 
work in this area. In addition to the challenges of attributing causation 
noted above, the active and energetic collaboration by a large number of 
NGOs is what made Greener UK what it is.
We did not set out in our interviews to assess influence. However, 
although our interview data provides an impressionistic and subjective 
account of influence, our participants did have interesting and insightful 
things to say on the subject. Along with our interview data, our analysis 
in this section of the progress of Greener UK demands provides a good 
sense of influence. ‘Process tracing’ is subject to a significant literature,7 
and is broadly an effort ‘to assess causality by recording each element of 
the causal chain’.8 Although we are making limited claims on causation, 
we borrow from this methodology to explore influence. We start from 
Greener UK’s Manifesto, and explore the progress of their objectives on 
governance through key moments, into government policy, and into the 
Environment Bill as it stands in June 2020. As the sector’s demands 
become more detailed and refined, rather than trying to follow through 
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the whole of the Greener UK Manifesto, we focus on a single objective, 
the need for a new body to replace as far as possible the role of the 
European Commission.
We use Select Committee reports as milestones against which 
to assess the evolution of Greener UK’s objectives, and responses to 
them. This is of course a major simplification, not least because of the 
mutual influence between the Select Committees and environmental 
groups, with Select Committees amplifying, and being amplified by, the 
NGO community on Brexit. Nor was there a single leap in Greener UK’s 
demands between these milestones. Rather, the demands were subject 
to constant refinement and iteration, and Select Committee submissions 
are very far from Greener UK’s only interventions on the subject. Despite 
these caveats, Select Committees provide a useful way of organising 
the material and are a good place to observe political activity around 
Brexit: they are a ‘key site of influence for external pressure groups’.9 
We have not systematically analysed ‘behind closed doors’, face-to-face 
or written interactions with government and parliamentarians, simply 
placing public-facing work alongside what our interviewees told us. 
We shall explore in this chapter the Environmental Audit Committee 
Inquiry into the EPG Consultation,10 the pre-legislative scrutiny of the 
draft Environment (Principles and Governance) Bill11 and interventions 
on the Environment Bill published in January 2020.12
Notwithstanding the inevitable methodological limitations, we are 
confident, from our interview data, our personal observations and our 
analysis of the progress of its demands (to which we return below) 
that Greener UK was in a broad sense very influential in the Brexit-
environment debate. Simply keeping environmental governance on the 
agenda, at a time when the excitement of the Brexit drama was almost 
overwhelming of media, public and political attention, was an extraordi-
nary achievement. Many of our interviewees referred to this, with 
varying levels of surprise: ‘So recognition of the governance gap and 
things […] it was much more successful than I expected it to be in terms 
of the discussions we started at the end of 2016’ (Interviewee 16). In 
2018 (before Greta Thunberg or Extinction Rebellion hit the headlines), 
anyone would have expected the parliamentary agenda to be exhausted 
by the high constitutional and political drama of Brexit, and yet ‘you’ve 
got cross-party debate on the environment in the context of the EU 
Withdrawal Bill’ and that significant debate itself ‘was a big sort of win’ 
(Interviewee 16).
Many elements of the Environment Bill (arguably even any prospect 
of primary legislation) can be linked to the work of Greener UK and its 
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allies. This came through in our interviews: ‘Greener UK has had a really 
profound influence on DEFRA’s thinking, in terms of its approach to 
Brexit’ (Interviewee 11); Greener UK has been at ‘the sharp end of things, 
sharp end of delivery … that’s allowed the somewhat more jelly-like 
enviro sector to gain a hard edge at the front’ (Interviewee 13).
Greener UK also became a trusted interlocutor with parliament. As 
well as public briefings and evidence to Select Committees, Greener UK 
had many private communications with parliamentarians and their staff. 
Our interview data points to Greener UK’s influence in parliament, with 
one participant noting that: ‘You can see that people are on a journey, 
we’re all on a journey together. And so I think the support [in parliament] 
was there but it had to grow and it had to be broader than it was, 
and [Greener UK] helped make that happen’ (Interviewee 6). With 
appropriate reservations about our sample, we heard only one overtly 
negative comment about Greener UK in our interviews, and that might 
be attributed to a difference of opinion on a particular decision, and 
may even speak to Greener UK’s effectiveness in driving the debate.13 
That there seems to be some commitment to continuing with a formal 
collaborative arrangement in the sector post-Brexit is also perhaps 
indicative of the seeming success and influence of Greener UK.
the Manifesto objectives
The top headline of the Greener UK Manifesto, published in February 
2017, is to ‘Secure the benefits of existing environmental laws as the UK 
leaves the European Union, and pass an ambitious new Environment 
Act’.14 The issues set out under that headline are, in full (references 
added), as follows:
1. Fully transpose and maintain existing EU environmental laws 
and principles through the Repeal Bill,15 and ensure we have 
the necessary governance arrangements in place for robust 
implementation and enforcement in future.
2. Lead the world by setting measurable milestones for environ-
mental restoration and high standards for pollution and resource 
efficiency, as part of a strong 25 year plan,16 reinforced in law in 
an ambitious new Environment Act.
We pursue four basic Greener UK objectives from this statement: 
maintenance of environmental laws; maintenance of environmental 
principles; governance arrangements for implementation and 
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enforcement; and targets (‘milestones’) in ‘an ambitious new Environment 
Act’. This necessarily simplifies the sector’s environmental asks, which 
were not pre-packaged, waiting to be inserted into a decision-making 
process. Rather, they were developed collaboratively, and partly precisely 
in response to the fora available to make the case, and the receptiveness 
of those fora: the political and hybrid political–legal opportunities 
discussed in chapter 3.
When the Greener UK Manifesto was published in February 2017, 
as discussed in chapter 3 (page 61), the Government of the day was 
implacably opposed to making any interventions to address changes to 
the structures and governance of environmental law that would result 
from Brexit. They had undertaken to ‘retain’ existing law after leaving the 
European Union, and argued that this, together with existing domestic 
mechanisms of political and legal accountability, would be adequate. The 
General Election in June 2017, and the appointment of Michael Gove as 
Secretary of State for DEFRA, changed that. In a November 2017 article 
in The Daily Telegraph, the Secretary of State promised a consultation on 
establishing ‘a new, world-leading body to give the environment a voice 
and hold the powerful to account. It will be independent of government, 
able to speak its mind freely. And it will be placed on a statutory footing, 
ensuring it has clear authority.’17 He also undertook to ensure that 
‘environmental enforcement and policy-making is underpinned by a 
clear set of principles’. And by contrast with his predecessors, Gove 
acknowledged that judicial review and parliamentary scrutiny are not 
sufficient to respond to concerns about the loss of EU Member State 
accountability mechanisms.18 We know from personal experience and 
our interviews that Greener UK (including its members) was in close 
contact with DEFRA in the period between the General Election and this 
major and public shift of policy. Public documents, including a Greener 
UK briefing published in August 2017 for Parliamentarians and policy-
makers on the ‘governance gap’ enlarged on the Manifesto.19
The Secretary of State’s article addresses, in broad outline, two 
elements of the Greener UK Manifesto. It promises the retention of 
environmental principles after Brexit, and proposes a new body to 
scrutinise the implementation of environmental law. And whilst he is 
silent here on future environmental targets, a 25 Year Plan on the 
Environment had been expected since 2014, and this article promised 
legislation (albeit only for the new body, not for the plan).
As we discuss in chapter 3 (page 66), the maintenance of 
environmental laws after Brexit was achieved in a minimalist way by the 
EU (Withdrawal) Act 2018. If by ‘maintenance’ of environmental law, 
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Greener UK had intended a longer-term maintenance of standards, that 
is non-regression after leaving the EU, Greener UK continues in 2020 to 
argue that a non-regression provision should be introduced into the 
Environment Bill.20 Even the retention of EU law had begun to fall apart 
a little by the time that the UK left the EU, given the amendment of 
provisions on EU case law in the EU (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020, 
discussed in chapter 3 (page 73). Equally questionable are the problems 
with the 2018 Act’s provision, also discussed in chapter 3, for secondary 
legislation to deal with ‘any failure of retained EU law to operate 
effectively’, or ‘any other deficiency in retained EU law’.21 For example, 
EU environmental laws routinely contain review and revision clauses, 
to ensure that the legislation remains up to date and effective. Andy 
Jordan and Brendan Moore highlighted in May 2020 that these had not 
been ‘retained’ effectively. The role of the Commission in reviewing 
legislation needed to be addressed, but rather than giving that role to 
another body, these provisions were removed entirely.22 The review and 
revision clauses of the Environment Bill, such as they are, fall short of 
what is required.23
Moving into detail
The 25 Year Plan was published in January 2018.24 It is 151 pages long, 
covering a wide range of policy areas. Its overall ambition was broadly 
welcomed by the environmental community. Criticism focused on the 
absence of a statutory underpinning for the commitments and targets 
(also one of Greener UK’s manifesto objectives), weak or even backsliding 
commitments, and a general vagueness. The Environmental Audit 
Committee launched an inquiry focused on the ‘ambition and architecture’ 
of the 25 Year Plan, foreshadowing what became the provisions on 
environmental targets and Environmental Improvement Plans in Chapter 
1 of the Environment Bill. We return to Greener UK’s response to this 
inquiry below. The 25 Year Plan further committed DEFRA to holding a 
consultation on ‘plans to set up a world-leading environmental watchdog, 
an independent, statutory body, to hold Government to account for 
upholding environmental standards’.25 This provided some demanding 
language against which environmental groups judged Government 
intentions.
The DEFRA consultation on Environmental Principles and 
Governance (the EPG Consultation) was finally published in May 2018,26 
including questions on creating a new body to monitor government 
performance on the environment, and options for bringing the 
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environmental principles into the post-Brexit domestic legal system. We 
should not understate the influence (subject to all the provisos above) of 
the environmental NGO community in achieving this. The Consultation 
Paper was, however, deeply disappointing in its detail.
Staying with the big picture for a moment, the introduction of 
section 16 to the EU (Withdrawal Act) 2018 was a major achievement for 
Greener UK and its allies: ‘I said, “Who’s been briefing you?” He said, 
“Greener UK”’ (Interviewee 10). As Interviewee 3 put it:
not wanting to kind of blow all our own trumpets around the work 
that we did on the Withdrawal Act, I don’t think we can understate 
what we managed to achieve there. Which was to get an amendment 
into a piece of legislation that Government really, really didn’t want 
to amend and to get that amendment on policy into a procedural 
Bill and to get commitment for legislation to come out the back of it.
Ruth Chambers of Greener UK said at our closing event that this 
achievement ‘should never ever be forgotten and never ever be diminished’ 
because ‘the law is stacked against being changed by civil society from start 
to finish’.27
Passed before the EPG Consultation had been completed, section 
16, as discussed in chapter 3 (pages 67–68), required Government to 
produce draft legislation (what became the draft Environment (Principles 
and Governance) Bill) within six months.28 The Secretary of State had 
been much more equivocal in front of the Environmental Audit 
Committee: ‘he would “hope, but of course it is subject to the agreement 
of my Cabinet colleagues, that we would bring forward an Environment 
Act […] by 2020”’.29
As discussed above, and to avoid making this section too lengthy, 
rather than trying to follow through the whole of the Greener UK 
Manifesto, we focus here on the proposed new body, which (see chapter 3) 
was to replace, as far as possible, the role of the European Commission in 
scrutinising and enforcing the implementation of environmental law by 
the state (regulating the regulators). The sector’s objectives for the new 
body continued to be developed in much more detail, in outputs such as 
blogs and briefings, as well as responses to the Consultation Paper. We 
take Greener UK’s submission to the Environmental Audit Committee,30 
which expands significantly on the bare starting point of the Manifesto, 
as the framework for our discussion.
Greener UK argued that ‘it is essential that recourse to legally biting 
mechanisms is available’. The new body ‘must be able to initiate legal 
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proceedings, and to intervene in proceedings brought by others 
where appropriate’.31 Binding notices must be available, and ‘would 
be of most value if they arose from a consideration of the merits of 
government decision-making’. Greener UK criticises the absence of any 
details on how Government will ensure that the new body will be 
independent, and in oral evidence, said that this suggests that 
independence has been ‘kicked into the long grass’. Greener UK argued 
that the new body must have ‘legal powers over all public bodies, not just 
central government’, as had been proposed by DEFRA. It also rejected the 
exclusion of climate change32 from the remit of the body.
Many of these points are picked up in whole or in part by the 
Environmental Audit Committee’s Report and Recommendations.33 
Spelling out mechanisms for independence from government, the new 
body should report to parliament, and be overseen by a parliamentary 
committee who would also set its budget and ‘endorse’ its Chair. Further:
The Government should ensure that the draft Environmental 
Principles and Governance Bill includes effective and proactive 
enforcement powers, with the power to fine government 
departments and agencies that fail to comply. […] The enforcement 
function should investigate compliance with environmental law, 
including complaints brought by the public, which the courts can 
then adjudicate.34
Government published the draft Environment (Principles and 
Governance) Bill on 19 December 2018, at which point, the ‘new body’ 
becomes the Office for Environmental Protection (OEP). Some of Greener 
UK’s detail was accepted by Government, and included in the draft Bill: 
Government purports to have put in place mechanisms to ensure the 
independence of the OEP; the OEP’s remit is extended to all public 
authorities; it is able to issue ‘decision notices’, and bring what amount 
to judicial review proceedings. The reliance on judicial review means 
that there is no merits review at the hard enforcement end of the 
OEP’s activities. There is no express provision on intervening in others’ 
litigation, although a catch-all provision in the schedule would allow the 
OEP ‘to do anything … it thinks appropriate for the purposes of, or in 
connection with, its functions’.
In its submissions to the joint Environmental Audit Committee/
EFRA Select Committee pre-legislative inquiry into the draft Bill, Greener 
UK again held the proposals up against Government promises. It states 
that the provisions do not amount to ‘equivalence with the current EU 
????
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oversight, scrutiny and enforcement arrangements’, and do not meet ‘the 
government’s ambition for a “world-leading body to give the environment 
a voice and hold the powerful to account” and “a pioneering new system 
of green governance”.’35 On independence, Greener UK focuses on 
funding, appointments and status. As quoted by the Environmental Audit 
Committee, three of Greener UK’s ‘critical’ measures on funding are: a 
strong and visible commitment to multi-annual budgets; the OEP to 
determine what funding is sufficient by preparing and publishing its own 
supply estimate; and the OEP having the right and the independence to 
say how much money it thinks it needs at the start of the process.36
On appointments, the draft Bill provides for the OEP Chair and 
Board members to be appointed by the Secretary of State. An undertaking 
to consider a pre-appointment Parliamentary hearing for the Chair was, 
however, not sufficiently reassuring for Greener UK, which argued that 
‘Parliament must play a greater role in the appointment of the OEP Chair. 
There is no reason why the Chair could not be appointed either directly 
by Parliament or the appointment approved by the relevant Select 
Committee.’ Greener UK also argued that the Chair’s appointment 
should be made directly by the Monarch, rather than by the Secretary of 
State, ‘following a proposal to Parliament for a preferred candidate by 
the Secretary of State, supported by the Chair of the relevant Select 
Committee.’ The other non-executive members should be appointed 
by the Chair, and not by the Secretary of State. And on status, the draft 
Bill provides for a non-departmental public body (NDPB);37 for the sake 
of independence from Government, Greener UK argued that the OEP 
should be a Parliamentary body.
These arguments around funding, appointments and status are 
all to some degree supported by one or both of the Select Committees. 
On funding, the Environmental Audit Committee ‘recommend that 
the Government makes a political commitment to providing the Office 
for Environmental Protection with a five year budget in line with 
spending reviews’, subject to its own estimate.38 The EFRA Committee 
also recommends a ‘multi-annual budgetary framework’.39 The EFRA 
Committee recommended that: ‘The Chair and all non-executive 
members of the board should be appointed by the Secretary of State 
only with the consent of the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs 
Select Committee. The Chair should be subject to a pre-appointment 
hearing prior to the Committee consenting to her appointment.’40 The 
Environmental Audit Committee concludes that a committee of 
Parliament ‘should set [the OEP’s] budget, scrutinise its performance and 
oversee its governance’, with a new Parliamentary Committee having a 
veto over certain appointments. The EFRA Committee recommends that: 
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‘The Government should revisit the legal status of the Office for 
Environmental Protection to provide greater independence than a 
standard Non-Departmental Public Body allows.’41
Turning to enforcement, Greener UK supported the draft provisions 
on information and decision notices, but expressed concern that the 
‘proposed enforcement provision’ would not provide ‘an adequate and 
effective means for enforcing environmental law’. More specifically, the 
OEP should have express powers to initiate its own investigations, rather 
than having to wait to receive a complaint. They propose ‘dedicated 
and bespoke enforcement processes’, including the possibility for 
binding decision notices against all public authorities, which can require 
particular steps ‘such as the publication of action plans, the implementa-
tion of certain policies or compensation payments’. Enforcement action 
must be available if decision notices are not complied with: ‘The 
most appropriate forum for this could be the specialist Environmental 
Tribunal rather than the High Court’, ‘operating an improved system of 
Judicial Review with tailored rules on standing, costs, intensity of review 
and remedies and in which specialist judges (possibly with technical 
advisers) could sit’. Remedies should include ‘fines, relocation of powers 
or introducing “special measures” ’. Greener UK seeks transparency of 
the OEP’s decisions. It seeks ‘greater clarity’ on the meaning of ‘a 
serious failure’ to comply with environmental law, a phrase that sets 
the boundary on the OEP’s remit; and a review of the definition of 
‘environmental law’, so that it includes climate law and law ‘relating to’ 
rather than ‘mainly concerned with’ environmental matters. The OEP 
should also develop and publish its own enforcement policy.
Again, much of this finds its way into the reports. The EFRA 
Committee recommends that:
the Bill should be redrafted to ensure the OEP has the power to 
proactively carry out investigations into a serious failure to comply 
with environmental law on its own initiative, rather than just in 
response to a complaint. […] The word ‘serious’ in relation to a breach 
of environmental law should be clarified on the face of the Bill.42
The Environmental Audit Committee proposes that the definition of 
‘environmental law’ ‘should be changed from “is mainly concerned with” 
to “relating to”’.43 Both Committees recommend more attention to 
‘international law’.44
The Environmental Audit Committee describes the draft Bill’s 
enforcement procedures as ‘too slow and inflexible’, says that judicial 
review is ‘not appropriate for environmental problems’, and calls for a 
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‘bespoke enforcement procedure’ and ‘an expansion of the role and remit 
of the General Regulatory Chamber in the First-tier Tribunal’. It suggests 
that the OEP should be able to issue notices ‘at first advisory, then 
latterly binding’, including ‘a range of compliance recommendations’. 
A decision not to comply with the notice could be challenged by the OEP 
in ‘substantive review of the authority’s decision not to comply with the 
notice’ by the tribunal (so looking very like a merits review).45
The response of Government to pre-legislative scrutiny was limited. 
The Environment Bill put before Parliament in January 2020 (which 
for current purposes is almost identical to the October 2019 version) 
continued to include in broad outline the relevant initial Manifesto 
objectives of Greener UK as discussed above; and picked up many of the 
more detailed objectives, although by no means all. Greener UK, jointly 
with Link, produced a number of briefings on the Bill.46 The changes that 
are called for are indicative of arguments not yet accepted. On the OEP, 
Greener UK seeks a number of changes, including: the consent of the 
EFRA and Environmental Audit Committees to the appointment of the 
Chair, who would then appoint the other members; a legislative 
commitment to five-yearly budgets, the OEP’s ability to make its own 
estimate, and direct funding from Parliament; a number of improved 
institutional protections of independence, including ‘the maintenance of 
a log of substantive contact with government’; a specific power to carry 
out broad reviews into substantive issues; clarity that the tribunal can 
‘consider technical facts and issues, with experts who are able to 
thoroughly review the substantive matter at hand’; improved transparency 
around the OEP’s processes; a definition of environmental law as law 
‘related to’ rather than ‘mainly concerned with’ environmental matters.47
The Covid-19 pandemic has had a significant impact on the progress 
of the Environment Bill through the Public Bill Committee. As discussed 
in chapter 3 (pages 73–74), all Public Bill Committees were suspended in 
March 2020, in response to the lockdown. There is enormous pressure on 
parliamentary time and physical space for progressing Bills.48 At the time 
of completing this manuscript, the Bill has not returned to Committee, 
and the Secretary of State has said that it is unlikely to return before 
September 2020.49
success, failure and influence
It is a little premature to call victory or failure. Not only has the Covid-19 
crisis derailed progress on the Environment Bill, but legislation is not the 
end of the journey. Even a fabulous Environment Act would not be self-
executing and would require ongoing scrutiny and engagement by 
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environmental groups. The environmental NGO community should take 
any opportunity presented by the provisions of a future Environment Act 
to contribute to shaping the rules of the environmental governance 
game.50 Some of the things not successfully achieved during passage of 
the Bill may be advocated as part of the day-to-day practice of the OEP, 
and that may be helped if the debate during the Bill leads to ministerial 
assurances from the dispatch box.
And it is difficult at the best of times to agree what success would 
look like. An NGO’s objectives may be unclear, in part because they evolve 
during a process, but also because they may take public positions that go 
beyond what they would privately be content with. Interviewee 3 says 
that in some meetings with government, ‘you might be there to represent 
a position, even if it’s a more extreme position than you think you’re 
going to get’. And as should be clear from the above, NGO positions 
evolve during a process. An Environmental Funders Network survey of 
environmental groups brings out the ambiguity of success:
Some of the work that features in the sector’s collective list of 
successes also appears in the list of the top ten failures, reflecting 
the fact that while [civil society organisations] may have helped put 
issues on the agenda there is much that remains to be done. For 
example, some respondents saw campaigns against fracking as a 
failure because the government has not shut the door on shale gas 
development. To others, this work is a success – not only because 
fracking has not yet moved forward at anything like the scale its 
supporters would like – but also because a strong, vibrant grassroots 
movement has been built around this issue.51
There are similarly distinctive ways of thinking about success in the 
Brexit-environment debate. We are confident that Greener UK, and the 
sector, have been influential in the Brexit-environment debate, keeping 
that debate alive and shaping its progress over a lengthy and challenging 
period; the resilience and persistence of the individuals and institutions 
involved should not be under-estimated. The very existence of the first 
major Environment Bill for a generation is at least a partial victory, and 
its contents in many respects reflect the objectives of Greener UK. If the 
Covid-19 pandemic means that the Bill is killed or weakened does this 
still count as a success? On its own terms, it must, and shaping the debate 
over this period lays some groundwork for the future.52 The expectation 
is that the Bill will survive and become an Environment Act; Greener UK 
may yet exercise further influence. For now, an Environment Act that is 
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passed as the Bill stands could, as far as the OEP is concerned, be 
categorised a success for the influence of Greener UK and the sector. 
Imperfect, and incomplete, but a good thing, a body whose job it is to 
make sure that Government (in all its parts) ensures compliance with 
environmental law.
It is not really a criticism to say that Greener UK (or its allies, 
including academics) did not address all of the significant governance 
questions. In fact, it may indicate just how much Greener UK has driven 
the debate to observe that issues like the ‘review and revision’ clauses 
discussed above, which received little or no attention from Greener UK, 
also received little or no timely attention in public debate. Whilst it is 
impossible for us to robustly evidence this negative, we believe that this 
particular gap reflects the constraints on legal expertise in the sector. Not 
only was the issue not recognised (or at least not at the right level at the 
right time), but the capacity to carry out a comprehensive assessment of 
the statutory instruments as they went through Parliament, and then to 
raise the flag and fight the battle, was simply not there.
The targets/milestones objective from the initial Greener UK 
Manifesto are a mixed story. The Environment Bill is lengthy, and 
addresses many of the sector’s key issues, and to that extent is a success. 
The architecture of the targets in the ‘governance and principles’ part 
of the Bill is also a significant achievement, albeit with some major 
and concerning gaps from Greener UK’s perspective, as is apparent from 
its briefings. The provisions on principles are much more difficult to 
categorise as an achievement. The principles are present in legislation, 
and they certainly formed a part of what was a hugely important debate, 
which evidences influence of a sort. But they have lost their legal status, 
are subject to worrying exceptions, and are more or less entirely within 
the control of the Secretary of State. Battles won along the way are not 
therefore terribly significant in terms of the legislation’s overall approach 
to principles.
The qualities of collaboration
‘Success’ may translate literally, as we discuss above, into achieving 
specific legal or public policy goals such as governance arrangements 
post-Brexit, either in the short term or by laying the ground for the longer 
term. But there have also, as suggested in the Introduction, potentially 
been more indirect benefits to collaborating through Greener UK. We 
discussed in the previous chapter the way that relationships between 
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NGOs, particularly ClientEarth, evolved and deepened through this 
process. Our sense is also that Greener UK has contributed to a deepening 
and foregrounding of legal expertise. Greener UK may also have played 
an important role in building capacity in the sector. Junior colleagues 
have had the opportunity to learn from more experienced individuals 
across the sector, and perhaps to be stretched with more robust support 
than might otherwise be available, or in strategic spaces that are less 
familiar to them. This learning could be significant for individuals and for 
the sector, especially given the relative inexperience we noted in chapter 
4 (pages 93–94).
In this section, we explore the features of Greener UK that may have 
contributed to its success as a collaborative exercise, as something 
that held together and was resilient to the extraordinary challenges that 
the four years of our case study threw at it. We explore our participants’ 
perceptions of collaborating in Greener UK, or their reflections on this 
collaboration from outside. It is important to remember, as we discuss in 
chapter 6, that collaboration is not easy and that it brings with it both 
opportunities and challenges. It will not always be successful, in any of 
the ways explored in this chapter. We identify three key factors that 
contributed to the success of Greener UK: the nature of Brexit and its 
salience for the sector; people and trust; and resourcing.
The nature and scope of Greener UK’s work has not remained static 
and has, as we note in chapter 3, required the coalition to be agile in its 
response. The broadening of the Brexit-environment debate, the fast-
paced shifts in the political landscape during our period of study and the 
pandemic lockdown have all played a part in shaping Greener UK and 
its work:
It’s been like tales of the unexpected and the unpredictable, hasn’t 
it? So we’ve had to be quite adaptable, and adapt as we’ve gone 
along. Not only react to all of the things that nobody knew were 
coming, but also to try and be as proactive and strategic as we could 
amongst that (unattributed).
Generally, ‘Brexit has turned into a major project in terms of legislation 
and policy beyond legislation – trade policy, politics, negotiations with 
the EU. It’s become a very big topic’ (Interviewee 3). The Environment 
Bill itself, our focus in this monograph, is huge and addresses a wealth of 
issues. Despite these new challenges, the sector’s commitment to 
Greener UK and its work has continued. Here, we can see two things 
going on. First, ‘a recognition that no one organisation can deal [with all 
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elements of the Bill]’ (Interviewee 3). This extended even to the Greener 
UK collaboration itself, and led to the important alliance with Wildlife 
and Countryside Link, as outlined in chapter 6. And second, the 
perceived success of Greener UK, ‘the sense that Greener UK’s track 
record has been quite good, they have actually managed to achieve 
some things’ (Interviewee 3) also led to continued commitment to 
the coalition.
the nature of brexit: salience for the sector
In the previous chapter, we discussed the importance and the challenge 
of consensus, and Greener UK’s success in building consensus around 
both the governance and the substantive elements of the Environment 
Bill. We do not want to repeat the discussion in chapter 6, but it is 
important to highlight the contribution of the extraordinary salience 
(and associated broad consensus) around Brexit to the success of the 
collaboration. Several of our interviewees seemed at least a little 
surprised by the sector’s commitment to collaboration around Brexit: 
‘the NGOs did organise better than I thought they would. You know, the 
coalition came together, and it was quite disciplined and quite effective’ 
(Interviewee 3).
Our interview data suggests that Greener UK is different from 
previous collaborative efforts. Whilst one interviewee acknowledged 
that the sector has ‘always collaborated’ (Interviewee 6), s/he went on 
to state that historically ‘it’s done so at a much more technical policy 
level … to do, you know, joint letters to ministers and that kind of thing’ 
(Interviewee 6). For that same interviewee, collaboration on this ‘political 
journey … it’s been on a different scale and the appetite for it has been 
different and, you know, that’s because of Brexit I think’ (Interviewee 6). 
The scale of the challenge posed by Brexit, its technical novelty (not 
‘bread and butter’ issues, below) and the pace of the debate, have 
intensified the interest in collaboration. That the nature of Brexit has 
forced a different kind of ‘political’ collaboration was acknowledged by 
other interviewees:
So it took this political crisis moment to force that kind of 
collaboration, rather than an environmental [crisis] […] ’cause the 
organisations were already set up to do environment, that was 
their bread and butter, and they were doing that. But they weren’t 
doing that collectively, in the way that they have worked on Brexit 
(Interviewee 8).
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We can conclude, albeit tentatively, that the Brexit project has led to 
a different kind of collaboration: ‘there’s gotta be a big enough threat, 
or maybe a big enough opportunity, but at the time it felt like the threat, 
I think, was the thing that pushed everyone together’ (Interviewee 8), 
what Ruth Chambers of Greener UK described as ‘an ethos of organisational 
selflessness’.53
The changing nature of the debate, once there was a broader 
Environment Bill to discuss, added a layer of complexity for Greener UK 
and its member organisations. As discussed in chapter 6, the search for 
consensus around the broader sectoral elements of the Bill required 
intense coordination and effort.
people and trust
Ultimately, collaboration is about people. Almost all of our interviewees 
(unprompted) identified the same individual as being central to the success 
of collaboration through Greener UK; we return to the importance of 
resourcing some key roles below. Many also pointed to the importance 
of higher-level individual and organisational leadership in the instigation 
of the collaboration, albeit without coalescing in the same way on where 
that leadership lay. But generally, good relationships and good communi-
cations are crucial:
[Greener UK] try to be a lot more consensual […] if we have to say, 
‘No, we can’t sign up to that.’ We try not to do that unless we really 
have to. And you know, we’ve kind of got good enough relationships 
that actually people still understand why we’re doing it. […] So it’s 
all about relationships, it’s all about being clear and communicating 
as well as we can, compromising in both directions where we need 
to (Interviewee 9).
There is also ‘something about the spirit and the culture in which 
it’s done’ (Interviewee 6) in Greener UK. There seems to have been a 
strong commitment by Greener UK members to work together, at an 
organisational and an individual level. Trust within a coalition (or any 
team) is generally considered important. Greener UK seems to fit with 
the idea that ‘closely connected, recurrent relations embedded in intricate 
social structures’54 enhance trust. Greener UK had a number of active 
groups, which met regularly and worked on specific tasks over a lengthy 
period. Maria has witnessed impressive chairing of formal meetings, 
meticulous inclusion, careful and considerate management of meetings 
greener uk :  infLuenCe AnD CoLLAborAtion 165
with external actors such as government officials. Open discussion 
and debate have been the norm. Similarly, one of our interviewees 
acknowledged that ‘there’s a lot of, a huge amount of trust between the 
individuals around that table to be able to debate in a very respectful and 
thoughtful way’ (Interviewee 8).
We also see the importance of people and personalities in the 
tension discussed in chapter 6 around early relationships between Link 
and Greener UK. These personalities worked positively in that members 
of both groups worked hard to forge a stronger relationship between 
the two coalitions, but also less positively: the early tensions were 
‘partly aggravated by personalities’, although ‘all this seems to have been 
ironed out now’, again largely by dint of the involvement of particular 
personalities (Interviewee 3). Another participant expanded on that:
largely it’s a personality thing, so each individual comes in at the 
beginning with what they think should be in [the Bill]. But with 
anything, when you’ve been working on it for over a year, two years, 
and you see little movement in areas or you see acceptance of 
something, you become more comfortable with what’s been in 
front of you for a length of time. So it might not necessarily be an 
institutional thing with the member organisations but a personality 
thing where people are sort of giving up ground to reach that 
consensus (Interviewee 15).
Despite all of the challenges, collaborating through Greener UK has been 
personally rewarding for our participants:
yes personally I’ve rather enjoyed the level of collaboration. It 
makes it more worthwhile. So I think for the people involved in 
doing it, it is quite rewarding, and it makes their jobs richer. I think 
quite a lot of us will miss it if it goes, and probably be a little bit 
biased towards maintaining it because of its personal qualities. And 
I think we’ve been lucky in the personalities. Just that is fortuitous 
to some degree. Although you do get more collaborative people 
coming into these collaborative roles, it doesn’t always work that 
way (unattributed).
But the ‘people’ question cannot be left to chance, even if this participant 
suggests that it was ‘fortuitous to some degree’ in this case. It requires 
commitment by member organisations, and strategic thinking about 
which people to devote to the collaboration (and we discuss possible 
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limitations in that respect in chapters 4 and 5), and it requires commitment 
to individuals to hold the coalition together. This feeds directly into our 
discussion of resources, below.
In addition to diverting some of Greener UK’s attention away from 
Brexit-environment to work on the impact of Covid-19 on the environment 
and on the sector, the pandemic has impacted the sector’s way of working. 
For one interviewee, the move online is a positive development and will 
facilitate more collaboration: ‘I’m hoping that actually people will see 
that it is literally just a click of a button and we can all work together 
and chat easily, which I hope will make it easier to work together’ 
(Interviewee 15). For another, this was more problematic:
Obviously we’re gonna do more video conferencing and that 
allows us to speak to people more quickly, more easily. But video 
conferencing is not the same as being there in person. You can’t 
build the same kind of personal relationships as you can in person, 
it’s less chit-chat, certainly when it’s a big meeting, when you have 
twenty-five people on the meeting to begin with, you can’t have 
little side conversations (Interviewee 7).
In light of the crucial role that people play in making coalitions work, 
and the importance of communication and building trust in collabora-
tion more broadly and within Greener UK in particular, this could be 
detrimental to the sector in the longer term.
resources
In chapter 6, we discuss how collaboration enables the pooling of 
resources, including legal expertise. We conclude that the investment of 
resource (both financial and human) in Greener UK as a coalition has 
contributed to its success. As we know, lobbying in coalition is a resource-
intensive strategy:
All the coordination takes a lot of time and effort. And you can’t just 
say, ‘Oh we all want to collaborate.’ It means that everybody has to 
invest time which has then a resource attachment. And if you’re the 
organisation that’s doing the convening and collaborating, you 
need to be resourced. And I know that Green Alliance would 
sometimes find that people would say ‘collaboration’ but then they 
weren’t necessarily willing to put in the resource that would be 
required to really support that to flourish (Interviewee 16).
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Notwithstanding the efficiency gains of collaboration, discussed in 
chapter 6, if shared goals are to be accomplished, then at least a subset of 
members must contribute resources to the work of the group: ‘it takes a 
lot of resource, you know. […] yeah, you’ve gotta pay for people’s time 
and you’ve gotta put your own staff time into going to working groups 
and thinking through building consensus and all that stuff’ (Interviewee 
8); collaboration takes ‘energy’ and, ‘if you have a focus on collaboration, 
you inevitably don’t have a focus on what you otherwise would be doing’ 
(Interviewee 6). The extent of an organisation’s contribution to coalitions 
is generally thought to vary depending on the level of their commitment 
to the issues, the availability of staff and resource, and the prospects of 
success. There must also be a genuine intention to make it work. As noted 
by one interviewee:
Collaboration, it really is the only way to win anything but it comes 
at a cost and it takes time and it takes resources and you’ve gotta 
invest in that collaboration if you’re really serious about it. So 
you can’t just pretend you’re collaborating; you really have to 
collaborate and it’s got to be meaningful, and you know, it takes 
time (Interviewee 6).
Another interviewee points to the growth of Greener UK as a particular 
challenge: ‘And you know, that’s a huge resource and capacity issue for 
all of us’ (Interviewee 14). Greener UK took the strategic decision to work 
on the Bill in its entirety, ‘which some might say is a fool’s errand when 
you consider just how many clauses are in the Bill’ (Interviewee 6), albeit 
in a collaboration with Link that allows it to focus on particular issues. 
The complexity and scope of collaboration has almost certainly also 
become more challenging for individual organisations and indeed 
individuals working intensely in the Greener UK coalition. Interviewee 9 
emphasised the challenge in ‘keeping track of everything’, especially 
when internal resources are limited. This, and the ‘new kind of politics’ 
(Interviewee 16) that emerged after the 2019 election, has brought with 
it some quite significant challenges for the coalition.
From observation and our interviews, it is clear that individuals 
from across the coalition have worked extremely hard on Brexit, 
specifically within the structures of the coalition. Brexit has ‘sucked up a 
lot of resource, a lot of people’s time and effort’ (Interviewee 14) and for 
some, ‘the day job’s carried on’ (unattributed). A number of organisations 
contributed significant (human and expert) resources. Maria has 
observed some ebb and flow in both respects; the Brexit process has been 
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going on for a very long time, punctuated only by a global pandemic. 
But this serious commitment from member organisations, and the 
individuals within those organisations, has been crucial to making the 
coalition work.
The resource demand of a coalition is not just in the in-kind contri-
butions of personnel from the partner organisations. Importantly, by 
contrast with ad hoc collaboration, certain people are actually responsible 
for making the collaboration work, without other organisational demands. 
The resourcing of the Greener UK unit has clearly contributed to the 
success (in all senses) of Greener UK. At a very practical level, ‘that going 
back and constantly involving people and checking that they’re on 
message. And not everyone is onboard, so then you have to get all of that 
constant iteration […] it’s driven by the unit’ (Interviewee 6). This direct 
resourcing of Greener UK itself is closely connected to the people point 
above, and as suggested above, our participants clearly consider the 
community to have been fortunate in the individuals involved. The ‘kind 
of actual coordination and collaboration role’ is a ‘job that does have 
to be valued in order for it to exist’ (Interviewee 16). This is not an 
administrative role. There is a huge amount of effort and of skill in holding 
the coalition together, and inspiring people to work for the coalition, 
including paying attention to the external competence and reputation 
of the coalition.
We think that it has been extremely important for Greener UK’s 
success that these roles were both valued and resourced. By contrast with 
Greener UK, one of our interviewees described Link as ‘a sort of true 
coalition in that it’s the members who are doing the work themselves’ 
(Interviewee 15). This emphasises the sense that the spirit and culture of 
collaboration through Link was different, that there was more scope and 
space for individuals within Link to shape the coalition’s focus. Our 
participants spoke very positively of Link, but we got a strong sense that 
this flexibility meant that things had not always happened when they 
needed to. The culture of Greener UK was more ‘can do’ (Interviewee 16) 
and ‘disciplined’ (Interviewee 3), which may well be attributable to 
Greener UK’s specific resource (both financial and expertise) for the 
support of coalition working.
The future of collaboration and Greener UK
The collaboration around Brexit has clearly left behind a ‘footprint’ 
(Interviewee 3). Important organisational links have been strengthened 
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and individual relationships have developed. Greener UK has 
demonstrated what can be achieved when groups work together. So 
despite all the challenges and tensions, our interviewees see a future for 
collaboration in the sector, beyond Brexit: ‘the positive experiences 
around coalition show what we can achieve if we work together and if we 
put our minds to it’ (Interviewee 2).
There was less certainty as to the vehicle through which collabora-
tion would take place. Greener UK was of course formed in response to 
the Brexit crisis. As to its future role:
As Brexit becomes a fact, and as the primary legislation moves 
through Parliament and presumably is adopted eventually, I think 
there’ll be another question about whether Greener UK at that 
point ceases altogether. Which would be logical. Or whether there’s 
some kind of ongoing collaborative structure. And I think that’s a 
question on a lot of people’s minds and there’s not a completely 
clear answer as yet (Interviewee 3).
The future of collaboration will ultimately be decided by the collaborating 
organisations themselves, and the future of Greener UK is ‘really up to 
the groups’ (Interviewee 16). As we know, building a successful coalition 
requires funding. It requires commitment in terms of time and resource, 
and effective leadership. The profile sacrifice inherent in collaborative 
working is part of the assessment of the future of collaboration:
They’ve seen, they’ve created, they’ve co-created something 
together, that’s been really powerful and effective. But there is an 
opportunity cost for them, in that a lot of the time with government 
or, you know, the parliamentary airtime on whatever you might 
want to say has been created for the many, sometimes at the expense 
of the individual organisations. Is that something that they are 
happy with, continue to do, or is it in prescribed circumstances, and 
if so, what are they? And I guess that’s a question more for [the 
organisations] than for the [individual] collaborators as it were 
(unattributed).
One interviewee emphasised the importance of larger NGO commitment 
to collaboration:
But the real value of it has been all the big groups are members 
and I think if you were to lose even really one of, some of, the big 
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names […] I dunno, it’s hard to see it working in the same way 
(Interviewee 7).
Coalitions ‘rarely end with a bang’, they fade away, with a gradual 
withdrawal of energy and support.55 That Brexit created a clear and 
significant focus (salience as above) was an important contributor to the 
perceived success of Greener UK. Perhaps, in the absence of such ‘big 
events or big moments’, collaboration will continue but will be smaller, 
‘certainly in terms of taking on less resource and capacity from members’, 
without the necessity of ‘a shared view on everything’, but just ‘a space 
where we can come together to share ideas, to share intelligence, in a 
trusted way’ (Interviewee 7). Whilst such a space may have value, and 
may even be all that is available in the absence of a highly salient joint 
project, it is clear that it would not have the drive of Greener UK. On 
similar lines, we wonder whether the delay in the Environment Bill, 
certainly if it goes on for too long, will lead to some dissipation of energy 
and focus from the coalition.
And so that leads us to the question of whether there will be another 
issue with the salience and common ground of Brexit. Sadly, collaboration 
may be most attractive and most productive in a crisis:56
If the government comes out of Covid with a kind of deregulatory 
phase […] If it can encompass an economy first, you know, reduce 
the role of the state, I think the NGOs will stay together. You 
know, the pressure to collaborate will be greater. If it’s a sort of new 
world of endless opportunities and ambitious new carbon targets 
and so forth, maybe less pressure to work together and more 
opportunity to kind of get one’s own idea to the front of the pack 
(Interviewee 3).
Conclusions
Whilst we are not seeking to establish unique causal connections, Greener 
UK’s contribution seems to be clear to our participants, and we have been 
able to trace some influence through the public debate. We suspect that 
there may be further significant indirect benefits of collaboration over 
Brexit, in particular around learning and support, including on legal 
expertise. This needs to be recognised and valued by organisations and 
funders.
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Our interviewees indicated a strong interest in continuing to 
collaborate after Brexit, albeit recognising that that would be both 
difficult and different; there was less consensus about what the vehicle 
for collaboration would be. It is clear from our case study that working in 
coalition requires commitment. The threat to the environment from 
the UK’s departure from the EU provided a big enough incentive for 
coalition members to set aside any differences and commit fully to the 
Greener UK agenda. Collaboration is about people working together to 
achieve common goals, and key people have worked hard to build trust 
and a sense of purpose. The relationships that have been forged during 
collaboration around Brexit will be central to the success (or failure) of 
any coalition moving forward. And finally, collaboration must be properly 
resourced by the organisations involved and will be enhanced where the 
coordinating unit is itself appropriately funded and led.
Collaboration is not new to environmental NGOs, but our inter-
viewees have perceived collaboration through Greener UK as being 
different, more intense, special, with plenty of lessons for the future. 
Memories are short, and individuals move on. Interviewee 6 emphasised 
that it is important ‘to take some space and time to actually write [the 
lessons] down and check that we’ve got them right and socialise them 
amongst the movement’ (Interviewee 6). The benefits we have witnessed 
are most likely to accrue if the sector (or more specifically their funders) 
consciously capitalise on the Brexit experience.
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We write in strange and uncertain times. We had hoped that by the time 
we finished writing we would know the fate of the Environment Bill. No 
one who has been following Brexit for four years would suggest that we 
postpone completion pending certainty – even if the end seems within 
grasp. Although there will be much to say on the Environment Act (or 
indeed the failure of the Bill), and we hope to be part of that conversation, 
this book has a different objective. What we have learned about law and 
legal expertise in environmental groups and about the path to Brexit 
stands, regardless of what happens to the Bill.
Three tightly related themes have emerged most strongly from 
our work. First, the political and legal opportunities around Brexit have 
been fascinating, complex and unique, and our own work confirms 
the emphasis in the literature on the role of external factors in shaping 
interest group activity and achievement. Paying unusually close attention 
to legal mobilisation outside judicial and quasi-judicial fora has allowed 
us to add to ideas of political and legal opportunity, identifying hybrid 
political–legal opportunities that create space for legal expertise in 
political fora. Second, we draw two ostensibly contradictory conclusions 
about the role of legal expertise in the community. Legal expertise is 
thinly spread in environmental NGOs, and the understanding of the role 
and complexity of legal expertise is sometimes complacent. This may be 
linked in complicated ways to the sector’s internal context, especially 
‘resources, identity, ideas and values’.1 And yet at the same time, we 
saw intense and sophisticated rallying of expertise around Brexit and 
the Environment Bill. 
Third, a very powerful collaboration between environmental NGOs 
on Brexit has been successful in a number of different respects, although 
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the sector has not got everything it has asked for. The existing literature 
on collaboration and coalitions between NGOs is limited, and the value 
of collaboration is largely assumed both in the scholarship and by 
practitioners such as the Environmental Funders Network.2 Our work 
does bear out those assumptions, and we have also been able to explore a 
little more the different ways in which that value can manifest, and to 
identify some of the elements of a successful collaboration.
In this chapter we address each of these three themes in turn 
(although in reality they cannot be so easily separated). We then turn 
again to our case study. The heterogeneity and complexity of the area we 
are examining (the nature of the sector, the nature of the problem), and 
the unique circumstances thrown up by Brexit, means that the caution 
necessary for drawing conclusions from any case study is especially 
pertinent here. All of our conclusions are therefore subject to the proviso 
that they have emerged in the rather distinctive context that Brexit 
provided for NGO advocacy. That distinctive context has, however, made 
legal expertise especially visible; and whilst ‘proof is hard to come by […] 
learning is certainly possible’.3
Political and legal opportunity
We set our case study, the debate about the environmental impact of 
Brexit, and the resulting Environment Bill, in the context of the literature 
on political and legal opportunity. The political context in which Brexit 
played out has been extraordinary. At times, parliament has had a good 
deal of power, making it possible for environmental groups to leverage 
(hard-won) relations with individual and groups of parliamentarians. 
The hefty Conservative majority in the December 2019 election changed 
the parliamentary context in which environmental groups operate. In 
addition, government (or at least DEFRA) has engaged unusually actively 
with the environmental community around some shared objectives. 
In this, the dynamics of the General Election 2017, which galvanised 
the governing Conservative Party to improve its ‘green’ credentials, 
were crucial.
In addition to conventional political and legal opportunities, we 
have also identified what we call hybrid political–legal opportunities, 
where the nature of the political space augments the role of legal 
expertise in argument. So the framing of Brexit as a question of (legal) 
equivalence and the acceptance of the ‘governance gap’ by parliament 
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and government, both emphasised legal expertise, as did the heavy 
legislative agenda associated with Brexit.
For much of the period of our case study, especially the two and a 
half years between the 2017 and 2019 General Elections, political 
dynamics opened space for environmental groups pursuing careful and 
quiet advocacy with the powerful. This book would be telling a very 
different story if a different set of political opportunities and hybrid 
political–legal opportunities had emerged during this period. But political 
opportunity is complex, shifting subtly and quickly, simultaneously 
hampering and enabling environmental groups. Environmental groups 
need to be extremely agile to make the most of any external environment.
Law and legal expertise in the environmental 
community
We set out in this project to understand better the uses of law and legal 
expertise in environmental NGO advocacy. Our analysis shows that law 
and legal expertise have been heavily utilised in the Brexit-environment 
debate, and in the development of the Environment Bill. Some of this 
has been extremely sophisticated. Although it is probably impossible to 
draw absolute conclusions on the impact of particular arguments, legal 
expertise can be a powerful tool of advocacy and we share the perception 
of many of our participants that the environmental community’s legal 
expertise had some impact in the Brexit process.
The conclusions we reach on the limitations of environmental 
group appreciation of legal expertise in this section need to be read 
alongside the nuance of earlier chapters. Further, ClientEarth is an 
obvious outlier, to which we return below. Having said that, although the 
NGO community enjoys the benefits of skilful and effective legal experts, 
our sense is that this area of expertise is generally under-utilised and 
under-resourced. There is just not that much legal expertise in the sector, 
and what there is, is thinly spread, and relatively early career. We also 
identified a limited understanding of the complexity and diversity of 
legal expertise, and a complacency around specialisation. The expertise 
necessary for a ‘generalist’ environmental lawyer to engage in debate on, 
for example, trade or constitutional law is not a trivial form of expertise, 
and the challenge of attaining it may be underestimated. Our interviewees 
had given limited thought to the role of law outside the courtroom, and 
when pressed, turned primarily to the role of legal experts in drafting 
legislation. More specifically, legal expertise seems not to have a 
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strong role in leadership and strategy in the sector. On the contrary, law 
is generally perceived as instrumental, supporting a pre-articulated 
campaign need. This is surprising and revealing: this is a sophisticated 
and well-resourced sector, dominated in practice by complex regulation, 
and our sample of interviewees (connected with Brexit) is probably more 
than averagely sensitive to law. We would have expected more reflection 
about legal expertise.
Legal expertise can make a number of contributions to advocacy. 
In addition to work on cases and legislation, our interviewees pointed 
to contributions in education, translation and fact checking. Analysing 
submissions to Select Committees, we see the use of legal expertise as 
a path to credibility and authority, the identification of ‘legal hooks’ 
to provide evidence for arguments, the assessment of the impact 
of government promises or commitments within broader legal architec-
ture and frameworks, and the comparison of government promises or 
commitments against the best from elsewhere. More generally, under-
standing both the detailed implications of law, and the overarching 
frameworks and institutions that govern outcomes, can provide a 
different way of seeing the world, and a different way of changing the 
world. Law and legal experts play a significant role in shaping the rules of 
the social and economic game, in setting out the way things are done. 
Economic interests and governments involve themselves in the rules of 
the game. Many of our participants emphasised the perceived authority 
and power of legal argument, and saw legal expertise in environmental 
groups as an important equaliser.
Our conclusion that NGOs are underpowered in terms of personnel 
and expertise is not straightforward, for a number of reasons: because 
there is strong legal work going on, because the situation varies across 
organisations and because it is possible that the situation might be 
evolving in ways that were not visible in our interviews – but also because 
the reasons are complex and self-reinforcing. Our conclusions fit neatly 
in the literature that argues that the approaches taken by environmental 
NGOs will be shaped by external factors (by political opportunities 
as above), but also by internal factors such as resource and organisational 
culture. The link between resource, capacity and culture has been 
an important observation from our work. Resources are not just a 
practical limit on what expertise is available, but also spill into the very 
understanding of what constitutes expertise, and the contribution it can 
make. Theoretically, this supports in a very concrete sense the idea that 
legal expertise is partially constructed in the process of developing and 
communicating that expertise. Practically, limited legal resource means 
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limited appreciation of legal expertise, means limited ongoing investment 
in legal resource. An organisation’s understanding of itself, and of law, 
is likely to be reflected in investment (or not) in legal expertise; and in 
turn, expertise in law reverberates in the understanding of law, in a self-
perpetuating cycle. Intervening to reduce the overstretching of legal 
capacity in the sector could have effects throughout these chains. The 
point would be not just to allow for more of the same, but to create space 
for more creative thinking about law and its contribution to the objectives 
of the environmental community.
As we suggested above, ClientEarth is an outlier for many of 
our conclusions about legal expertise in the environmental NGO 
community. To really get to the bottom of what ClientEarth does, and 
how that affects the sector, would require a completely different (and 
very worthwhile) research project. But whilst we did not set out to 
study ClientEarth specifically, its place in the environmental NGO 
community is obviously significant. It should go without saying that 
ClientEarth takes a sophisticated and strategic approach to law (although 
of course there is space for disagreement about its approach). Its 
integration into the community has been slow, and sometimes tense, 
but enhanced by Brexit. If one accepts that legal expertise is not just a 
technical service for campaigners, but has a more substantive role to play 
in understanding and shaping the world, then one might conclude that 
it is not healthy for a single organisation to dominate the pool of legal 
expertise in the sector.
Forming a successful collaboration
Greener UK has been an important actor in the Brexit-environment 
debate, and an important theme in our research. Although there have 
been tensions and unachieved objectives, and its approach might be 
contested, Greener UK has been broadly successful across two dimensions. 
First, for all of the challenges of attributing influence to particular actors, 
and recognising that others were making similar points at similar times, 
we have demonstrated that Greener UK was influential in areas that 
mattered, from the existence and shape of the Environment Bill to many 
of its detailed provisions. Greener UK amplified political opportunity by 
speaking with a united voice and became a trusted expert insider with 
government and parliament.
Second, the success of Greener UK as a collaborative enterprise has 
been striking. This was a strong and recurring theme from our interview 
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data. We identify three particular features of the Greener UK collaboration 
that have contributed to its success. First, consensus around the broad 
issues associated with Brexit, and the enormous salience of Brexit for the 
sector, meant that individual organisational pressures were temporarily 
set aside. Second, people are at the heart of collaboration. Without the 
right people, in terms of expertise and ability to build trust, collaboration 
is not going to work well. But this should not be left to chance, it must 
be managed. The careful attention to working relationships and trust 
between individuals was crucial – and, crucially, somewhat resourced. 
So third, Greener UK had some resource. The partner organisations 
contributed expertise and people to the exercise, and these individuals 
worked hard. Direct funding of Greener UK itself has also, we think, 
been crucial, valuing and resourcing the extraordinarily skilled roles 
that make a coalition work. That means partly the internal relationship 
building and ability to get work done. But it also means that those leading 
the coalition identified the expertise and people needed for the coalition’s 
external work, and the importance of that significant work being done 
by the coalition rather than by an organisational representative. This 
links to our more tentative observation that early successes cemented 
commitment to the collaboration; and a concern that the delay to the 
Environment Bill risks diminishing the momentum.
Importantly for our purposes, we found that collaboration made a 
major contribution to the space in the community for legal expertise, 
in three main ways. First, thinly spread expertise was pooled, and 
available to the community. Second, collaboration deepened expertise, 
which became more than the sum of its parts as legal experts discussed 
issues with each other. The importance of these communities of expertise 
are presumably equally important in other areas where expertise is 
fragmented or dispersed. And third, the high profile of law within the 
coalition’s activities may have its own impact. Whether it will encourage 
the sector to develop its understanding of legal expertise and to reflect 
upon a non-instrumental role for legal expertise, remains to be seen.
Brexit is special, but lessons can be learned
This book is specifically about environmental groups who are active in 
English-level advocacy and have an interest in Brexit; and it is specifically 
about Brexit, and the Brexit-oriented Part 1 of the Environment Bill. We 
set out to improve understanding of how and why NGOs use law and 
legal expertise in advocacy, by assessing their efforts to influence Brexit’s 
ENVIRONMENTAL GROUPS AND LEGAL EXPERTISE180
impact on the environment. If we altered any of these features of our 
research, our conclusions would also alter. Our research has focused 
specifically on law and legal expertise, and it is of course possible that the 
strengths and weaknesses that we observe are not just about the sector’s 
approach to law and legal expertise, but about the sector more generally.
But more importantly than the scope of our research, Brexit has 
been special. A number of issues stand out. First, over the four years 
between the referendum and June 2020, the political opportunities, that 
is the external context affecting access to and receptiveness of decision-
makers, have been unusual. Notwithstanding the brutality and drama 
of the politics, the technical difficulty of leaving the EU, alongside the 
large and significant legislative programme, seems, during most of these 
four years, to have prioritised insider advocacy, expertise and law. 
Second, collaboration was surprisingly disciplined in part because Brexit 
was special, with members of the Greener UK coalition (at least) setting 
aside fundamental differences in light of the threat posed by the UK’s 
withdrawal from the EU. Third, the relatively high status of law in the 
Brexit debate, beyond but including the environment, may have been a 
factor in elevating legal argument in NGO advocacy. Legal advocacy on 
Brexit may have been more appealing to ambitious and energetic lawyers 
than usual. It involved working with a community of peers over a long 
period, on an issue of huge significance and considerable profile, with 
the glamorous interludes of appearing before Select Committees and 
attending important meetings. Fourth, it might also be that because 
stability was precisely one of the aspirations of advocacy in this case, the 
criticism of law, with which we have some sympathy, that it will often 
favour incremental, status quo solutions over radical change, actually 
made legal expertise especially apposite.
All of these special features of Brexit, and of our research, mean 
that there is a limit to what we can claim about legal expertise in the 
sector generally. However, the nature of our case study means that 
the barriers to using law, and limitations in the understanding of 
legal expertise here, are very likely to be replicated in cases where the 
significance of law is less obvious or less strongly argued. Further, the 
special circumstances of Brexit have allowed us to shine a brighter light 
than usual on law and legal expertise. Even if the strength of law may not 
be perfectly replicated in other cases, it should be considered for what it 
can do. Law is not limited to enforcement, is not merely a service, is not 
only relevant when there is a case or a Bill to be getting on with. Legal 
institutions and structures are not deterministic, but they contribute to 
shaping the world we live in, in very profound ways; being able to see and 
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critique and offer alternatives to those institutions is a crucial role for 
environmental civil society.
Conclusions: the future
The detailed provisions of the Environment Bill are not finalised at the 
time of writing. There is currently no indication that Government intends 
to abandon or weaken the Environment Bill, although the environment 
may be vulnerable to efforts to stimulate the economy through deregula-
tion, post-lockdown. In any event, careful and considered scrutiny of the 
Bill as it continues through Parliament is vital. But it is more difficult 
than ever, due to the Covid-19 delay to the Bill process and the difficult 
working conditions in Parliament and Government. Furthermore, the 
impact of the virus on environmental NGOs means that their continued 
robustness cannot be taken for granted. It was always unlikely that 
Parliament would be able to force amendments to the Bill, given 
Government’s large majority. But shaping the debate and setting a 
direction of travel for the future will require enormous amounts of 
environmental group energy and expertise.
This once-in-a-lifetime legislation, although imperfect, contains 
important measures to protect the environment. But even an Environment 
Act is not the end of the story. Environmental groups have the opportunity 
to be the ‘repeat players’ of any future Environment Act, playing the long 
game rather than looking for immediate outcomes, and in that way 
shaping the rules, including the rules of the game.4 This means influencing 
the OEP’s enforcement activity by careful and strategic selection of 
complaints, but also by using the broader ‘legal stock’ of the Act: for 
example scrutinising and exposing the target setting and monitoring 
framework, or influencing the OEP’s non-legally binding powers around 
the implementation of environmental law. The whole point of the 
‘governance gap’ exercise was to provide a framework to assist civil society 
in holding the powerful to account. That will require yet more sustained, 
disciplined, careful, collaborative and at least partly legal work.
Notes
1 Hilson 2002, 239 and 240. 
2 E.g. Miller, Cracknell and Williams 2017. 
3 Flyvbjerg 2006, 224. 
4 Galanter 1974. 
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the new Environment Bill in the first half of 2020.
There is generally a weak understanding of both the complexity and the potential of legal 
expertise in the environmental NGO community. Legal expertise can be more than a 
tool for campaigners, and more than litigation: it provides distinctive ways of both seeing 
the world and changing the world. The available legal resource in the sector is not just a 
practical limit on what can be done, but spills into the very understanding of what should 
be done, and what resource is needed. Mutually reinforcing links between capacity, 
understanding, culture and investment affect legal expertise across the board.
There are, however, pockets of sophisticated legal expertise in the community, and legal 
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